University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and
Administration

Martin School of Public Policy and Administration

2012

E PLURIBUS URBES: INTEREST GROUP
ORGANIZATION’S EFFECT ON THE
FRAGMENTATION AND GOVERNANCE OF
AMERICAN URBAN AREAS
Matthew L. Howell
University of Kentucky, MatthewLHowell@gmail.com

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Howell, Matthew L., "E PLURIBUS URBES: INTEREST GROUP ORGANIZATION’S EFFECT ON THE FRAGMENTATION
AND GOVERNANCE OF AMERICAN URBAN AREAS" (2012). Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and Administration. 1.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/msppa_etds/1

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy and Administration at UKnowledge. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and Administration by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been
given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright
permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written permission statements(s) from the
owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic
distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine).
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make
accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the
document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless a
preapproved embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future
works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to register the
copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of
the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we
verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s dissertation including all changes required
by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above.
Matthew L. Howell, Student
Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Major Professor
Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Director of Graduate Studies

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Matthew L Howell

Martin School of Public Policy & Administration
University of Kentucky
2012

E PLURIBUS URBES: INTEREST GROUP ORGANIZATION’S EFFECT ON THE
FRAGMENTATION AND GOVERNANCE OF AMERICAN URBAN AREAS

___________________________
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
___________________________
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Martin School of Public Policy & Administration
at the University of Kentucky
By
Matthew L Howell
Lexington, KY
Director: Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Professor of Public Administration and Political
Science
Lexington, KY
2012
Copyright © Matthew L Howell

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

E PLURIBUS URBES: INTEREST GROUP ORGANIZATION’S EFFECT THE
FRAGMENTATION AND GOVERNANCE OF AMERICAN URBAN AREAS

American cities have proliferated in the post-War era. More than 2,000 new cities
were founded between 1950 and 2000. While the history of the local government boom
has been documented, research into urban fragmentation has explored why there is no
consolidation of metropolitan areas rather than exploring why Americans chose
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This dissertation proposes that individuals create new jurisdictions because
individuals prefer to have governments which give them the services individuals desire,
even if they could have similar (but not perfect) services cheaper in a larger jurisdiction.
Individuals, however, must balance the benefit they get from better fitting cities with the
price they must pay to live within the small cities.
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and fragmentation with the literature on interest groups. This synthesis builds the
argument for conceiving cities as interest groups and contributes a theory of urban

behavior as the behavior of organized interest groups. I argue that urban fragmentation
should exist anywhere there are urban areas –not only metropolises –and that
fragmentation is produced by diversity in the population and constrained by the resources
available for the formation of cities.
In the second part of the dissertation, I analyze the fragmentation of both
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas to determine what drives fragmentation. I use
Poisson regression on 2-period panel data from 1992 and 2002 collected from various
public sources. I find that there are differences in the forms of fragmentation in the
metropolis and the non-metropolis. In both types of urban settlement, fragmentation is
driven by political and population diversity and available resources for forming cities.
Legal authority and intergovernmental revenue are particularly important.
Finally, I turn my attention to cities’ interactions with each other. I use a survey
of Kentucky mayors, fielded with the Kentucky League of Cities, to determine why
mayors of different cities to communicate with each other. Using specialized network
methods I find that mayor-to-mayor contact is not based on goal and interest similarities
as expected, but rather depends on sharing an organization which encourages
communication –an Area Development District.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
It is traditional to begin discussions of urban organization with the observation
that there are more American cities today than ever before, and that the American people
are moving into suburbs where once they would have lived in cities. This is treated as a
great mystery –why the proliferation of local general governments? Alas, the great
mystery is rarely addressed. As the population has grown in the post-War era, the
number of local governments has increased by 2,000. Special districts have exploded.
The population is divided across tens of thousands of local governments and continues to
create more every year. And in this environment, the typical research question has been
“why do these cities not consolidate?”
Consolidation has so many benefits. It enlarges the civil society of a metropolis
and allows residents to get cheaper, more efficient services. It rationalizes public
administration and creates larger, greater, more productive cities. If only citizens and
their short-sighted officials would agree to consolidation, voters would approve
annexation and merger, or states encouraged consolidation, life would be better in our
urban areas.
Even among the supporters of the non-centralizing citizens, arguments are largely
written as being against consolidation. Consolidation is inefficient because it reduces
competition for voters. Consolidation is unequal because it forces residents with
different preferences to share services which –unable to serve both perfectly –must serve
all badly.
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But the history of urban expansion is not one of failing consolidation. Residents
are not resisting consolidation and holding onto their current jurisdictional arrangements.
Americans are creating new jurisdictions. These jurisdictions do not appear because
consolidation is bad, and they do not appear from the ether. Someone, somewhere, thinks
that a new city is a good idea, and that increasing jurisdictional fragmentation is a net
benefit. While scholars argue over why the organization of urban areas does not become
more consolidated, and what the ideal number of jurisdictions should be, urban residents
have gone on organizing their governments. Why do they do it?
How do urban residents organize new cities? Why is there urban fragmentation?
Not, why does it persist, but why has the growing population not simply increased the
sizes of existing jurisdictions? Why have there been more jurisdictions? These are the
questions theories of metropolitan organization should ask because it is the phenomenon
actually happening in the United States. The answer to these questions should influence
how urban policy is made and how scholars think of the metropolis.

1.2 Research Question
This dissertation proposes that individuals create new jurisdictions because
individuals prefer to have governments which give them exactly the services individuals
desire, even if they could have similar (but not perfect) services cheaper in a larger
jurisdiction. Individuals, however, must balance the benefit they get from better fitting
cities with the price they must pay to live within the small cities.
In this way, residents of cities behave in the same way that individuals joining an
interest group do. Both seek better fitting organizations which will reward cooperation
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from the individual worker with exactly the services they want. In fact, there are more
similarities between the two types of organizations. Both must motivate members to join,
even when there is a cost. Both must provide benefits to members to maintain
membership. Both have proliferated across American history.
Where city and interest groups theories differ is that interest group organization
has an explanation in the form of the exchange theory of interest groups. A combination
of entrepreneurial interest group formation, need to control resources, and competition
between interest groups constrain them such that interest groups remain small and
narrowly focused, leading in turn to fragmentation. But these factors are themselves
driven by the need to convince members to join, pay dues (or taxes for cities), and for the
organization to provide benefits in return. If the exchange theory of interest groups
explains interest group proliferation because of these factors, then the same factors
should explain local general government fragmentation. Furthermore, interest group
theory predicts more than just fragmentation. It also explains aspects of interest group
behavior when groups interact. If the constraints are the same, then local governments
should behave the same way.
While this dissertation is in large part about fragmentation, its purpose is not a
theory of metropolitan fragmentation. This has been studied in great depth by others.
This dissertation is about how interest groups can explain the organization of urban areas
–whether in the metropolis or out of the metropolis –and also how cities organize their
super-organizations and cooperate (or not) amongst themselves.
In the first part of the dissertation, I synthesize the literatures on urban governance
and fragmentation with the literature on interest groups. This synthesis builds the
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argument for conceiving cities as interest groups and contributes a theory of urban
behavior as the behavior of organized interest groups. As a first test of the theory, I argue
that urban fragmentation should exist anywhere there are urban areas –not just in the
metropolis –and that fragmentation is produced by diversity in the population and
constrained by the resources available for the formation of new cities.
In the second part of the dissertation, I analyze the fragmentation of both
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas to determine what drives fragmentation. I use
Poisson regression on a 2-period panel of data from 1992 and 2002 collected from
various public sources. I find that there are differences in the forms of fragmentation in
the metropolis and the non-metropolis. However, in both types of urban settlement,
fragmentation is driven by political and population diversity and the resources available
for forming new cities. Legal authority and intergovernmental revenue are particularly
important resources.
Finally, as a second test of this theory, I turn my attention to how cities interact
with each other. I use a survey of Kentucky mayors, fielded with the help of the
Kentucky League of Cities, to determine what leads mayors of different cities to
communicate with each other. Using specialized network methods, I find that mayor-tomayor contact is not based on goal and interest similarities as expected, but rather
depends on sharing an organization which encourages communication –an Area
Development District.

4

1.3 Organization of the Study
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into 6 parts. In chapter 2, I introduce
the previous research on local government growth and fragmentation and synthesize it
with the interest group literature to provide insight into how local government is
organized. I argue that cities behave like interest groups, and that they do so for the same
reasons as interest groups. In important ways, cities are interest groups, and this explains
why cities do not consolidate, why new cities form, what prevents new cities from
forming, and why cities grow the way they do.
Chapter 3 builds on this synthesis with a theory of local government as interest
group. As an interest group, cities are concerned with maintaining their autonomy and
controlling resources, which drive cities to avoid conflict by forming small,
homogeneous, niche organizations. This behavior is affected by the amenity value of
living in a metropolitan area. The many nice things about living in certain places –like
New York City –compensate residents for their choice of jurisdiction regardless of what
the jurisdiction does. This leads to hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 explores jurisdictional fragmentation in Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs). I describe how the theory is applied to the MSA, the selection of variables and
creation of the dataset, and how the evidence should look if the hypotheses are correct. I
then analyze the data by Poisson regression and supplement the analysis with analysis of
other measures of fragmentation. I conclude with a discussion of the findings.
Chapter 5 explores jurisdictional fragmentation outside the MSA. It follows the
rubric of chapter 4, describing the application of the theory, statement of hypotheses,
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supplemental analysis on other forms of fragmentation, and concludes with a discussion
of the findings.
Chapter 6 turns to the behavior of cities with each other. It summarizes the
literature on how networks form and how interest groups form networks and applies it to
the network of city mayors. The survey method and the social network analysis methods
are described, and then the results discussed.
The final chapter summarizes the theory and findings before discussing what the
findings mean and their implications for future research and for policy makers.

Copyright © Matthew L Howell 2011
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Chapter 2
Political Interest Groups and the City
2.1 Introduction
Political interest groups are a common component of American government.
James Madison wrote in “Federalist 10” that faction was endemic to a free republic and
that factious people would organize to gain the advantage each faction desired. In the
new Constitution, he argued, the many local, state, and federal governments served to
prevent faction running tyrannically across the entire republic while also allowing
factions the liberty to live as they liked within their own jurisdictions. Interest group
influence on public policy has been an intentional part of our government ever since.
This has, naturally, attracted the attention of political scientists.
Scholars have investigated how factions organized, whether individual factions
could dominate a single policy or polity, how did available resources constrain faction,
and how –when factions, due to scarce resources, could not single-handedly control
politics –factions worked together. This literature greatly expanded the understanding of
how politics worked and how policy was made. As Madison suggested, the lessons
applied to all types and levels of American government. In both the federal government
and the state governments factions (henceforth interest groups) competed amongst each
other for control of political power. The same happened in local governments, but with a
twist. Compared to states and the federal government it is relatively easy to form a new
local government. Where, in the state and federal government, interest groups must
compete in a near zero-sum game for influence, at the local level it is quite possible for
7

an interest group to form the very government it intends to lobby. Much of the research
on interest groups argued that organization was the most important component in the
success of an interest group. If interest groups are experts at organization, then they
could also organize local governments.
Interest group organization of local governments –particularly regarding resources
necessary to control policy –is consistent with history of urban growth in the United
States. At the founding, local governments were few and far between. As the country
became richer and government became cheaper there was an explosion of local general
and special governments. Simultaneously there was an explosion in the number of
organized interest groups.
There are other similarities. Cities form when a developer or a prominent resident
organizes residents for an incorporation vote and then to provide community services –
both political goals. Interest groups form when an entrepreneur organizes members to
accomplish some other political goal. Cities maintain their economic growth and
development to maintain their residents and fund their programs. Interest groups
maintain the members and money to lobby for the programs they desire.
There are already good histories of American urban growth, though. The
importance of interest group formation of local governments is that it explains the
specific behaviors of local government cooperation, merger, annexation, and
incorporation. If local governments are more akin to interest groups than to other
government types then it is not surprising that these governments are as uncooperative,
independent, factious, and resource conscious as other politically active interest groups.
These local government behaviors in turn influence how local governments interact with
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each other, with states and federal governments, and with the other organizations in a
metropolitan or other urban area.
The rest of the chapter is in four sections. In part 2, I briefly trace the history of
urban growth in the post-World War II era and discuss some of the theories explaining
the development of this growth and how they relate to interest group theories. In part 3, I
explain interest group theory in more detail and specifically the entrepreneurial theory of
interest groups. Part 4 returns to the local government literature on local and
metropolitan governance, and part 5 concludes with the ways in which interest group
theory improves the study of local government and urban governance.

2.2 The Growth of Cities
From the founding until the end of the 19th century, Americans spread across the
continent founding cities as they went. A large rural population, long stretches of
railway, and practical limits on how densely populated cities could be in the days before
sanitation and steel guaranteed a lot of local governments. As the country became
wealthier and more industrial, workers moved from rural areas into the industrial cities.
Cities grew in size at the expense of towns and smaller communities and a period of
consolidation began. Those who could afford it continued to live outside central cities
(Teaford, 1997, 9), but even the wealthy –if they worked –lived inside the cities because
they had to walk to work (Fischel, 2004).
The development of transportation technology and the growing wealth of workers
changed that. First electric trains and then automobiles allowed the wealthy workers to
commute from suburbs into the central city. While urban consolidation continued –it was
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a political goal of Progressives at the time –it was joined by the growth of new suburbs.
By 1952 (the first year of the Census of Government’s historic tables) there were 34
thousand sub-county general governments (municipal or township governments). In
2002, that number had grown to just under 36 thousand. More than 2,000 cities were
offset by the loss of around 500 townships. 1 Urban consolidation has been swamped by
this growth. At the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century, there were more
cities (Pelissero, 2003, 10), those cities were smaller (Oliver, 2003, 312), and those cities
were becoming more specialized both in their industry and their residents (316).
The growth of cities coincided with improvements in transportation. First roads,
then heavy steam railroads, then light rail trolley cars, and finally modern highways and
interstates allowed more of the population to spread far away from the sources of income
and the markets for goods (Fischel, 2004). Easy and cheap transportation meant it was
possible to go to work without living near work. The limit was the individual’s tolerance
for traveling. Telecommunications was once thought to make even the commute
obsolete. The residents of the United States did not, however, spread evenly across the
continent. While smaller cities grew in size and number, most of the population
continued to live in one of 366 metropolitan areas –slightly more than 75% in the 2010
Census. 2 The population moved not into uniform spread across the nation, but to the
suburbs and the Sunbelt. Each will be addressed in turn.

1

The real growth in governments is special districts, which increase from 12 thousand to 35 thousand
over the period. However, there is massive consolidation in school districts which drop from 67 thousand
to 13 thousand.
2
According to the 2010 Census, 233,069,827 of 308,745,538 people lived in one of the Census Bureau
designated Metropolitan statistical areas.
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2.2.2 The Suburb and the Sunbelt
The suburb is a somewhat nebulous concept, defined mainly by its presence in a
metropolitan area but not being the central city (Oliver, 2003, 312). They are not
required to be small and some in fact may rival central cities in population (Lewis, 2004,
115). They may be diverse in population or homogenous. They may be densely settled
or sprawling. There is not even agreement that suburbs have a defining political
characteristic. But while the suburb is hard to define, it not being the central city may be
an interesting starting point.
Residents flee central cities for many reasons –job opportunities, desire to live
with people of the same race or politics or religion (Oliver, 2004, 316), cheap land, and
space for development (Garreau, 1991) –but perhaps most important is to get away from
the central city’s rules. Getting beyond the borders of the central city is the first step, but
the important follow up is incorporation (Teaford, 1997, 44). Without forming a city, the
urban exiles risk being annexed back into the jurisdiction they escaped (Bolton and
Roland, 1997). A Nassau County, New York lawyer –arguing for incorporation of a new
suburb in the 1940s –made no secret of his reasoning. Having just left New York City,
he had no desire to be returned (Teaford, 1997, 17).
The suburban founders wanted to have their own governments which would be
responsive to their own particular preferences. They wanted to control their own zoning
(Fischel, 2001, 2004), their own budgets (Bolton and Roland, 1997), and create a new
political culture and climate. They wanted the politics and lifestyle of the village, rather
than the urban canyons. They wanted their governments to be less centralized –partly as
a hedge against the corruption of the central city’s city hall and partly because they were
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trying to get away from meddling government (Teaford, 1997). And it seems to have
worked. Suburban residents are more active and engaged in local politics and retain their
willingness to pay for their small governments and their privileges (Oliver, 2001; though
the empirical results are mixed – Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001, 41, showed no result;
Kelleher and Lowery, 2008 showed the opposite results, and Oliver and Shang, 2007
indicate the democratization may be the result of an active elite). They will even put up
with corruption so long as the corruption is small and broadly works for the residents of
the cities (Adrian, 1961).
During the initial growth of the suburbs, the central city was still important.
Suburbs lacked the economic activity and population of the central cities, so their
residents still had to go downtown to work and shop. Eventually, however, entrepreneurs
recognized the opportunity of all those residents out in the suburbs (Garreau, 1991).
Those entrepreneurs brought commerce and industry to the suburbs. Residents of the
suburbs could then travel from suburb to suburb for whatever they need. A resident may
work in one suburb, shop in another, and sleep in a third (Oliver, 2004). They no longer
need to travel to the central city and may even begin to think of themselves as
competitors with their old anchor (Lewis, 2004).
The flight to the Sunbelt is a similar story. The Sunbelt –sometimes restricted just
to the South –is notable for its growth, and also for its climate. The summers are hot and
the winters are warm. The latter is the important factor because heating was expensive
but available –but while air conditioning lacked wide-spread application until after World
War II. With post-war economic growth and air conditioning –followed by Civil Rights
and political reforms, the South in particular and the Sunbelt (the South plus the South
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West) generally became viable places to develop (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008). At the same
time, transportation became much cheaper such that goods could be moved to the Sunbelt
despite its lack of rivers and rails. The value of these new amenities is displayed in
stories of South West residents who have no tan because they stay in the air conditioning,
the introduction of international brands and industry to the backwards (and backwoods)
South, and the influx of residents from all parts of the country.
The simple story of expanding opportunity is not complete, though. The Sunbelt
was also home to a more developer friendly entrepreneurial local government system
(Elkin, 1987). The growth in the Sunbelt came about because the Sunbelt made it easier
to develop land and had a less onerous permitting process (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008).
Like the flight to the suburbs, the rise of the Sunbelt is partly a story of getting away from
unwanted government controls facilitated by easy transportation.
While this story explains the decline of large cities and the rise of the small-tomidsize city, it does not explain why the population continued to move from farm to city.
If cities are exercises in meddling, why would anyone move there? The answer is
amenity, agglomeration, and economies of scale.

2.2.3 Amenity, Agglomeration, and Economies of Scale
Amenities are simply desirable features of a location. Access to a coast might be
an amenity in California or Maine while climate is the main attraction for North Carolina
and Texas. Amenity need not be a natural feature, though. Housing availability is an
amenity (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008) and so are various public services (Glaeser and
Gottlieb, 2006) –such as public health. Prior to modern sanitation, public health in cities
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was so poor that it was an active disincentive for industry and residents. Similarly,
pollution from industry can make cities less attractive (Fischel, 2001, 162). On the other
hand, police protection and safety are attractive, and so are the market goods available in
a central marketplace. To the extent that cities are located in desirable places, cities will
attract more of the population. In fact, being a city itself can be an amenity:
agglomeration.
People like to interact with each other, they like to shop where their consumption
can be satisfied, and they like to live in a community (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006, also
Aristotle 4th Century BC, Politics Book I, 1253; 2005, 3). This requires a minimum
number of people to support the cultural, political, and economic life (Dahl, 1967) that
attracts new residents. Like the amenities of the suburbs or the Sunbelt, agglomeration
attracts entrepreneurs (Glaeser, Rosenthal, and Strange, 2009) who produce wealth and in
turn attract more residents. In short, the presence of many people close together can
improve the economy and social life. If they choose to submit to a single jurisdiction,
they can also save money by using economies of scale.
For public goods the addition of new users does not increase the cost of
production, but it does reduce the price of service. Police protection costs the same
whether it protects 100 residents or 1,000 residents, 3 but in the latter case each resident
pays only a tenth what the former does. In a single city; residents not only get the
amenities of city life and the agglomeration of industry and culture, but also get the bulk
discount (Zimmerman, 1972). Here, however, is where the wonders of single cities
begins to falter. Not everything scales.
3

Hypothetically, at least. In the real world more residents may require more officers, making the analysis
more like a club good –but the basic logic is the same.

14

2.2.4 Self Determination, Diversity, and Diseconomies of Scale
The benefits of city life do, in many ways, counteract the costs –but city life is not
costless. None of the suburbanites in Nassau County complained about the amenities of
New York City, or the benefits of agglomeration, or even the economies of scale. As
suburbanites they could commute and get most of those benefits anyway. They objected
to being governed without their input.
In the largest cities it was difficult for individuals to influence their governments.
Even through civic organizations it was difficult (Dahl, 1958) to self-govern. Dahl
thought that the sheer number of interests which had to be accommodated would make
self-government impossible once the population exceeded 200,000 residents (1967).
Eventually, someone had to be disappointed. Unable to get what they wanted from their
current jurisdictions, those disappointed residents went to form their own governments.
While it might have been true that these new jurisdictions were more factious,
homogenous, and self-centered (Wood, 1958); and that the many small governments
were expensive and inefficient (Zimmerman, 1972); and that only a single jurisdiction
could address externalities (Harrigan, 1993, Sparrow and Brown, 1986); the new
suburbanites did not care. They “cynically, expect[ed] government to be relatively
inefficient…come professional or reformer…and…want[ed] a voice in local
government” (Adrian, 1961). Having gained self determination, they were loath to
surrender it –through annexation, consolidation, or immigration –back to the central city.
The new cities also had little in common with each other. They were highly
specialized by race, class (Oliver, 2004, 316), religion, language (Auffhammer and

15

Carson, 2009) 4, industry (Duranton and Puga, 2000), or several reasons at once (Epple
and Platt, 1989). They even specialized in economic activity with bedroom communities
bordering commercial cities bordering industrial cities and so on (Garreau, 1993). With
all the different resident populations there were many different preferences for
government type and government services. No one government could provide –at the
same price –the match of services each smaller city could give to its own residents.
Whatever the progressive civic reformers promised, the economies of scale never
materialized (Lewis, 2004, 100; Toma, 1978).
Diverse populations were the key obstacle to cheap government. Economies of
scale could be found so long as every resident had the same preferences. Police
protection for 100 was the same as protection for 1000 so long as everyone wanted the
same type of police protection. With a diverse population this was no longer true. If the
protection was the same, some residents would be unsatisfied with it. Perhaps one set of
residents wanted more drug suppression while another wanted more investigation.
Whatever the reason, when forced to share a government neither group could get
everything it wanted. Either the service had to be inferior or it had to become more
expensive to provide both services. The economies of scale gave way to congestion and
diseconomies of scale (Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby, 2004, Alesina and Spalaore, 1997).

2.2.5 Organization
Recognizing the competing desires of residents –for amenities and agglomeration,
but also for self-determination –the reformers and progressives looked for ways to make
4

This is a European study, but it does not seem unreasonable to think religion and
language might matter in the United States as well.
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central cities a better deal for urban residents. Amenity and agglomeration already
moved people from the farms to the cities; all that was needed was to get people to agree
to consolidation with other diverse people. The task was made more difficult by easy
transportation, which let urbanites enjoy the benefits of all neighboring jurisdictions
without having to live in all of them.
The main difficulty, however, was the organization of cities. Once incorporated
elected officials and residents alike resisted (Lyons, 1977) interference in their new
organization. Mayors and leading officials could mobilize their residents to oppose
mergers; they could raise money to campaign against changes in the law which would
disadvantage the smaller cities. The cities could make use of voting rules to stay
independent (Toma, 1978). Furthermore, so long as there were adequate resources to pay
for the more expensive smaller cities, residents were willing to pay the price.
What does this say about the growth and persistence of cities, then? First, cities
exist to offer benefits to their residents through amenity and agglomeration. Second, that
organizing and maintaining a city requires resources. Third, organization matters –
without incorporation the new cities would be swallowed up again. Fourth, leadership
and entrepreneurship matters –cities require voting campaigns and developers to form.
This is enough to make the non-controversial statement that cities are a type of
organization. However, the desire for self-determination means that cities also exist to
provide effective political activism for their residents –and this moves them into the
category of interest group organization. This is the subject of the next section.
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2.3 Interest Group Organizations and the City
As Madison wrote, faction –which is here associated with interest group
organization –is the common and unavoidable result of allowing individuals to influence
their own government. One person can write a letter or make a meeting with a
government official –or even run for office –to move his or her government to different
policies. Many people can work together to accomplish the same goal more effectively.
Organization can make any task easier –many hands make short work, after all. The
distinguishing factor of political interest groups is that they try to produce a public good
or persuade a government to provide a public good which benefits all group members.
Ideally, they do so without expending so many resources the group members come out
worse than when they started (Becker, 1983). This provides three important components
to understanding interest group behavior: a body of members, a public good, and efficient
organization.

2.3.2 Group Identification
In the formation of the city many different personal characteristics were identified
under which new cities organized. The Protestants want one their own city and the
Catholics want their own city. But it is not all Protestants everywhere demanding a
Protestant city. In another place the entire population could be Protestant but the working
class people want their own city and the white collar families want their own city. The
common definition of “group” as a collection of individuals with a common characteristic
(Huddy, 2003; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999) is not quite adequate to describe the growth
of cities in anything except the trivial meaning that all groups are collections of elements.
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For cities, the common characteristic varies such that, while every group shares a
common feature, not every collection of individuals with a common feature is a group.
Among those individuals with common features who form a group, there is a
sense of identity not held by those with the same features –but not part of the group
(Gibson and Gauws, 2000). The New Yorker who says “you mess with one of us; you
mess with all of us,” 5 has a very different conception of the characteristic “lives in New
York City” than the student from Ohio who merely “lives in New York City” for four
years of college before leaving. For the group member, the characteristic is an important
facet of his or her being and maintaining that facet motivates behavior (Vedlitz, Alston,
and Pinkele 1980). So important is it to be a good New Yorker, the members will alter
their behavior to conform to the norms and expectations of the other New Yorkers. 6
Those who lack the identity –who do not desire to be like the group, nor gain the
approval of the group members –do not join and do not conform.
However, while social identification does provide a better theory, it still
summarizes to “groups are collections of individuals who share a common feature, and
who consider that feature and the connection to it important.” Nothing explains what
makes the given feature important. For that, individuals need a sense of awareness
(Conover, 1988). Members must be made aware that they have something in common
with others and that they should think of that feature as important. The importance might
come from an outside actor –another group has already formed and plans to do something
which will harm all people with a specific feature (Giles and Buckner, 1993, Becker,
1983). Importance might also be more proactive –that all who desire a specific good
5
6

From the movie Spiderman when the Green Goblin threatens fellow New Yorker Peter Parker.
Including pelting super-villains with rocks from the Brooklyn Bridge.
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should work together to gain it. In either case, what makes the common feature
important is that it is a signifier for a common interest (Olson, 1965).

2.3.3 Free-rides and the Logic of Collective Action
If the common interest is in a private good, then organization is like the process of
building a firm. Individuals work and in return they get a private good. If the common
interest is a public good, however, there is a different problem. The nature of a public
good means it cannot be limited only to those who work for it (Olson, 1965, 7).
Work is hard and has a cost. Coldly rational people recognize that if they avoid
work they also avoid the cost, but they still reap the reward, and therefore they shirk. The
collective action problem arises when everyone behaves rationally and everyone shirks.
No one pays any cost, but no one gains any benefit either. The purpose of organization in
this framework is to make contributing time or money rational. Legal obligations are one
approach (Samuelson, 1954). Those who do not contribute (through taxes or mandatory
service) are threatened with punishment. This option is not generally available to nongovernmental organizations, but it does indicate a solution: make contributing pay more
than not contributing even if the public good is still provided, and this is what
organization provides.
The type of organization needed varies, though. For small groups (“privileged
groups”), working for the good already pays more than shirking (Olson, 49). Each
individual member’s contribution is indispensible in producing the common good. One
person’s failure to contribute dooms all. The organization requires coordination, but it
can act like a market. Each person acting in his or her self-interest cooperates. In an

20

extreme case, one member may benefit so much from the public good that he or she is
willing to provide it alone.
As the number of people involved grows or the size of the project expands the
cost of cooperating rises against the benefits. Members of the intermediate group can
shirk without paying a steep price. The benefit may not be as great if one member shirks,
but there is still a benefit which the shirker gains without paying (Olson, 1965, 50).
Organization at this level is about monitoring cooperation and creating systems where
each member’s contribution is important and obvious (Ostrom, 1990, 189; Hojnacki,
2008).
Most group organizations are too large even for the intermediate group. In the
privileged and intermediate groups individuals cooperate because it is in their immediate
interest to do so –because they benefit directly from their work or because they do not
wish to fail their colleagues. As the size grows beyond the point where monitoring is
possible, potential group members can shirk, never join or work with the group ever, and
not be found out (Olson, 50). Getting members of this latent group to cooperate requires
providing a selective benefit –a benefit in addition to the public good which is provided
only to those who contribute and can be identified as having contributed. The benefit
might be pecuniary –wages for working in an office or a coffee mug for sending a
contribution –but they can also be social or psychic (Vedlitz et al, 1980; Olson, 1965).
Getting to work on an important project with similar and like-minded people may be
reward enough to mobilize members of the latent group. Raising awareness (Conover,
1988) educates individuals about their possible interests and then recruits the newly
recognized latent group members into active behavior.
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Organization, though, is not sui generis. Someone has to do the organizing in
such a way that the costs in effort, monitoring, and selective benefits do not outweigh the
public benefit the organization exists to produce. That organizer is the entrepreneur
(Salisbury, 1969).

2.3.4 The Entrepreneur and the Organization
Without an organizer, the latent group never contemplates a selective benefit and
never shifts to active cooperation. Providing a selective benefit has costs, though.
Eventually the payout from activism may cover those costs, but the activism has to come
first and so the selective benefit has to come first. The organizer has to first accumulate
the capital necessary to provide a selective benefit and then risk it to organize a workforce to action in the hopes that activism will eventually have a return greater than the
initial cost. Organizers are entrepreneurs.
Being an organizational entrepreneur is not just about risking the money. Public
entrepreneurs need to have the skills to attract members and guide the activism that
eventually pays off just as a private sector entrepreneur must have skills in hiring and
production. To be successful the entrepreneur has to assemble the necessary capital and
then apply it to produce a profit. And, like the private sector entrepreneur, if the
organizer cannot produce a profit, they will go do something else.
Capital is the key. Without capital there is no selective benefit. Without capital
there is no activism. Without capital there is no public good. Without capital there is no
organized group. Whether the group is latent or privileged, whether it is activism heavy
or just a social gathering, capital is required to organize the group. Understandably,
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given the dependence, entrepreneurs are preoccupied with their resources –money and
members. The entrepreneur needs a stream of resources to replenish the spent capital,
fund the continuing operations of the group, and pay the entrepreneur.
Each entrepreneur has to sell the organization as providing the best bargain. Each
member has to provide a certain amount of work and gets a benefit in return. Other
entrepreneurs are watching this take place, and if there are great profits to be made, those
entrepreneurs will want to organize too. To do so they have to organize new members by
offering a lower price or a different benefit. How they offer the better bargain is similar
to the private sector: offer a product more like what the consumer wants and reduce the
transaction costs to produce it (Moe, 1984; Coase, 1937).
Better organization reduces the cost of advocacy (Becker, 1983) and provides a
better bargain. Entrepreneurs organize those threatened by the existing groups (Giles and
Evans, 1986, Giles and Buckner, 1993 and 1996, Voss 1996a and b, Lowery et al, 2005)
or just opposed to changes from the status quo (Miller and Krosnic, 2004) thus
organizing the previously unorganized. The only limit is the available capital (Lowery,
Gray, and Monogan, 2008, Gray and Lowery, 1996).
Entrepreneurs can also lure away the already organized with the offer of a better
benefit. Within an organization, members will have slightly different views. In a
resource poor field, individuals will work together even though they have differing views
because it is the only way to make activism work. Small groups are too expensive to
break up into smaller groups. When the members have resources or diverse views,
though, entrepreneurs can offer a new group which better meets the desires of some
members, and pull them out of the existing groups.
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Every entrepreneur can see this dynamic at work. Diverse populations have
preferences for public goods. For the right bargain, individuals will join an organization
to provide those goods. So long as there are resources (and therefore profits) to be made,
entrepreneurs will compete to organize those individuals. If there is competition, there is
the risk that one entrepreneur can lose customers to another. Heading off that risk is high
in the entrepreneur’s mind. To that end, group organizers focus on controlling resources
(sometimes to the exclusion of everything else, O’Toole and Meier, 2004, Selznik, 1943,
Selznick, 1948) and protecting themselves from take-over (Gray and Lowery, 1996;
Walker, 1983). These facets explain the behavior of groups.

2.3.5 Group Behavior and Cooperation
The easiest way to avoid being driven out of business is to avoid competition, and
interest groups are good at that (Holyoke, 2009). This usually means staying small or
homogenous (Browne, 1990, Gray and Lowery, 1996). The other method is to control a
very valuable resource (Moe, 1984, Lynn, et al, 2000, O’Toole and Meier, 2004). In the
first case, small and homogenous groups do not offer the ability for a division. Smaller
groups would not provide a better service and would be more expensive when duplicating
what the existing group does. Niche groups also have an easier time monopolizing
resources as there are fewer resources to hold. Monopolizing a valuable resource can
support a large group because it denies the resource to all other groups. For example, the
City of Denver’s monopoly on the water supply allowed it to force other city
governments to join the Denver government because without water, the other city
organizations could not survive (Ellison, 1998). It was not possible for Denver to be
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divided because one city would still control all the water and immediately force everyone
back into the single jurisdiction (Holden, 1964).
Much like the city and the many types of common interest, niche groups have
many characteristics. A niche group can specialize on a specific type of material benefit
or resource (Hildreth, 1994, Lowery and Gray, 2004, Salisbury, 1969), or it may
specialize in a closer ideological match for members (Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair and
Woods, 1991; Browne, 1990; Gray and Lowery, 1996). Other groups specialize in
providing activism skills to their members (Leighley, 1996). The unifying factor is that
all these specializations avoid competition. Groups will even give up growth
opportunities because traveling beyond the niche invites division and competition which
might destroy the group (Holyoke, 2009).
Groups do not scoop up every resource available –that risks competition. Instead,
they look for the resources necessary to support the organization’s existence. The
entrepreneur’s first interest is a return on the investment, not affecting policy. Where
resources are plentiful or organization cheap there are many organizations because early
organizers are hesitant to expand outside their original niches. When one entrepreneur’s
organization fails, the resources are freed for another entrepreneur. And, while generally
trying to avoid competition, entrepreneurs will compete with and eliminate their
competitors if doing so will have a higher return on their investments in the organization.
Part of what makes an organization cheap or expensive is the product, too
(Salisbury, 1969). Expressive groups are easy to form because their capital requirements
are small. Not much is required to allow a collection of individuals to express
themselves. Expressive organizations are easy to build, and as a result easy to dissolve.
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All that holds members to an expressive group is their desire to express themselves. If
that desire wanes, members leave. If the different members have different expressive
desires, it is not costly for another entrepreneur to steal members. On the other side,
purely material organizations are expensive. Producing a good that all members enjoy
requires work, influence, connections, and more. Passing a new program into law is
difficult. Material organizations are, consequently, much harder to form. They require
more resources. If successful, however, they are equally hard to dissolve. The members
are the recipients of a stream of tangible benefits. Competing with that benefit requires
capital –capital not already being used to provide the benefit –and stealing over members
is a large risk for all involved. It could hobble both organizations, leaving everyone
worse off than before.
Eventually, the entrepreneur has to make good on the promise to produce the
public good the group formed around. If that good was group expression, then members
have to be able to express themselves. If it was a government program, that program
needs to develop. If the entrepreneur cannot do this, another entrepreneur can steal
members away with the promise of providing everything members already have and
success (Gray and Lowery, 1996, Hojnacki, 1997). Some organizations are able to do
this alone. Expressive organizations do not require support to express themselves and
large organizations have the necessary valuable resources. For the rest of the
organizations, though, affecting policy requires cooperation.
Cooperation is risky. The entrepreneur could lose the organization to the alliance.
Group members could have their preferences sacrificed to maintain an alliance which no
longer advances the group’s goals. Group members value their independence –it is why
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they created the smaller groups in the first place (Salisbury, 1969; Holyoke, 2009).
Ultimately, affecting policy means wrangling the necessary resources, and if those
resources are spread across multiple groups then cooperation is necessary. Entrepreneurs
analyze the situation and seek advice from other alliance members (Lowery and Gray,
2004; Hojnacki, 2007) and then make a decision.
Group members and entrepreneurs want some minimum amount of goal overlap –
ideological or practical. Group members would prefer nothing happen than join an
alliance which ultimately makes them worse off (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 7 Once the
common interest is established, though, it is just a matter of organization (Ostrom, 1990).
Different groups have different resources: formal legal authority, public opinion,
information, mobilized membership, money, or skillful leadership (203). A new
organization of the constituent organizations is formed. Appropriate selective benefits
are offered and contributions are made as visible as possible (Hojnacki, 1998). Because
the alliance requires all the resources to function, the alliance can act like an intermediate
or privileged group.
The larger group combines the necessary resources to influence policy and, if
successful, gains the public benefits the constituent groups organized for. This is not a
foregone conclusion. Nothing requires that the resource combination which influences
policy all lie with groups who share goals. Nothing requires that groups who share goals
get along with each other. And while an alliance may have the necessary resources to
affect one policy, nothing requires that the constituent groups agree on future policies.
7

This section is reliant on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) for much of its content. The ACF relies
on a psychological framework about individual beliefs which is somewhat beyond the scope of this
discussion. For the discussion of cooperation and alliances it is enough that group members and
organizers recognize the benefit of cooperation in advancing all their goals –whether they agree on deep
core beliefs or not.
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The alliance can fragment later just as large groups are pulled apart by entrepreneurs.
Even if the resources line up with a single alliance and the alliance stays together, nothing
prevents a shock to the policy field shifting resources to other groups and alliances.
Shocks can break up alliances and even dissolve the groups which make them up.
The members, however, remain. They still have their preferences and they have their
knowledge from previous organization. Organizations come and go, but the members
remain; ready to be organized by the next entrepreneur (Zafonte, and Sabatier, 2004).
Alliances come and go, but there is always the possibility of new cooperative ventures.

2.3.6 The City and the Group
While the literature on city formation and growth is distinct from the literature on
interest group organization, the two literatures share common features. The city is, after
all, an organization which provides public goods to residents in return for cooperation –
taxes. Anyone living within the jurisdiction benefits from the services regardless of the
taxes they pay. It is unsurprising that many of the characteristics of the interest group
would also appear in the city.
The population moved to cities because the city offered benefits only available to
residents that made the higher taxes worth paying (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008). When the
benefits declined or the taxes rose, new entrepreneurs offered organizations with a better
deal (Teaford, 1997). Developers expect a profit from their organization –they are
businessmen and women (Duaney, Plater-Zybeck, and Speck, 2000). Resources and cost
affect the size of jurisdictions (Alesina and Spaloare, 1997) and diverse preferences are
associated with multiple jurisdictions (Alesina, et al, 2004). Cities even form around
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common identities (Oliver, 2004, 316, Auffhammer and Carson, 2009, and Duranton and
Puga, 2000).
There are differences, too. Cities do not have to elicit cooperation because they
can tax. Cities can also self-produce the public goods their residents desire. The mere
act of being a city can attract resources –from legal authority to grant access (Stein,
1981). Cities are also much harder to dissolve. 8 These differences can be incorporated
into existing group theories, though. There is no analytic difference between an interest
group which self-produces and one which lobbies another government to produce goods.
The practical difference is not much either. Cities lobby through direct contact with state
officials and municipal leagues, and non-government interest groups often produce
benefits –like the selective ones –for their members. The legal powers of cities are just
another type of resource to contemplate, including the legal staying power to avoid being
dissolved when the other resources fail.
It is not surprising, then, that other scholars of local government and metropolitan
organization have thought about how interest groups influence government. The next
section addresses how interest groups have been applied to urban government. The final
section will elaborate on how urban government and interest group literature can
complement each other.

8

Hard, but not impossible. Part of the inspiration of this dissertation was the disincorporation of Lone
Oak, KY. It was a small city in McCracken County and when the economy turned bad, there was not
enough tax money to operate the city –so it dissolved. The residents of Lone Oak still maintain their
identity, though, and resist being roped in with either “McCracken County” or the City of Paducah. Their
lack of organization is because of the cost, not the lack of interest.
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2.4 Interest Groups and Theories of Urban and Metropolitan Government
Interest groups are usually thought of as influencing their governments. The
argument of the preceding two sections is that local governments, rather than being
influenced by interest groups, frequently are interest groups. This view is not common
when combining interest group and urban governance. Rather, local governments are
often thought of as similar to other governments and which interest groups try to
influence. This is still the case even when discussing metropolitan governance. This is
effective for analysis, but is not the complete story.

2.4.2 Governing the City
Interest group research has some of its roots in the study of local government.
Early pluralist theory came out of studies of New Haven, Connecticut by Robert Dahl.
Previously, the organization of cities was modeled as a collection of residents governed
by a ruling elite 9, but the identities of the ruling elite were ephemeral (Dahl, 1958). For
each policy issue, there were some people who were interested and others who were not.
The interested parties dominated discussions of their particular policy, but they could not
rule the entire city.
Instead, there were many coalitions of interests which pushed against each other
to govern the city. No one group could expand across the others because, in the process
of doing so, it would lose the cohesion necessary to run any policy (Dahl, 1978).
Governing the city required multiple interest groups to work together to coordinate all
their policy interests. As the city increased in size, the heterogeneity of preferences also
increased, and there was more conflict among groups. Dahl estimated that above 200,000
9

Dahl names Floyd Hunter as his foil on this point.
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residents there were simply too many groups and preferences to define a coherent
platform, and city government would become sclerotic and ineffective. Below 50,000 it
would be too expensive (1967). These observations sparked interest group theories,
group alliances, and the advocacy coalition discussed above.
What Dahl wanted was a democratic city where every voice mattered. Too large
and too diverse cities where each voice mattered could not find compromise solutions
which satisfied everyone, so such cities would necessarily have to break up. But there
was also an alternative: privilege some voices. Like interest groups, cities need capital to
function and this capital comes from banks. Bankers like economic development because
it makes their financial transactions more valuable. For cities to get capital, they have to
support economic development (Elkin, 1978). Any group which does not support
economic development will find it difficult to influence city hall simply because city hall
knows that without economic development, the banks and other businessmen will not
support city hall and the city would go under.
City governments also rely on voters to stay in power, and the most involved
voters are landowners (Fischel, 2004; Molotch, 1975). Landowners have sunk much of
their money into illiquid assets and wish to see their assets increase in value, and so again
cities pursue economic development. Anti-growth interests have a hard time influencing
policy because the pro-growth interests have a louder voice and a stronger financial
interest in setting policy. Along with growth, the landowners want to prevent waste and
depreciation –leading to support for strict zoning (Peterson, 1981).
Both of these theories rely on the institutions of the city forcing a specific
outcome. The need for resources (money or votes) forces cities to support one interest or
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another. When the population reaches a point where the city can no longer find
consensus policies, it must obey specific interest groups to survive. What the minority
parties do is not discussed, but given city realities, it is unlikely that founding a new city
would solve their problems. The new city would still rely on bankers and landowners to
function. Does every city really act like this, though? These studies are not
comprehensive, and there is anecdotal evidence of cities forgoing economic development
and ignoring land owners. 10
A more generalized theory is that, like advocacy coalitions, there are coalitions of
interests which control the necessary resources to govern a city (Stone, 1989). If a city
needs money and votes to operate, then any coalition of groups that provides both can run
the city and lock out other potential governing coalitions. In the case of Atlanta,
downtown businessmen provided the capital and African Americans provided the votes.
It is notable, though, that the mayor was secondary to the policy setting. When an
African American was elected mayor and tried to go against the businessmen, those
businessmen stopped cooperating and the city government ground to a halt. At the same
time, the threat of African Americans voting against bond issues and downtown business
proposals was enough to get businessmen to pay attention to the leaders of the African
American communities. If policy veers too far to one constituent group, it risks
provoking a secession (Hogan-Esch, 2001)

10

One such story was told to me by a retired Vice Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri –Bill Skaggs in July of
2011. In the old days, the Northland suburbs, Liberty and North Kansas City, had the opportunity to
annex the territory where growth was happening. Neither did. Eventually, Kansas City enveloped both
cities. The suburbs’ lack of action was mystifying to Mr. Skaggs. A while later he mentioned that some
landowners wanted to annex even further north to the City of Kearney –about 11 miles. Kansas City was
reluctant to do so because of the cost of the expansion and the risk that the investment would not pay
off.
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The generalized Advocacy Coalition Framework has been applied to cities, too.
Small groups can form alliances to control policy in a city, or control a city entirely.
Control of a city can then be a resource in affecting national policy (Davies, 2005,
Greenway and Grantham, 2000). Control of important resources can lead to control over
a metropolitan area (Ellison, 1998). National groups may decide to dominate local
government because it is easier to monopolize resources at the local level than nationally
(Greenway, 1998).
The coalitional theories are more interest-group-like. Individuals with similar
preferences form interest groups to influence city policy. The groups have to control a
valuable resource to have a chance at influencing the city, even if the resource is only
votes. Unable to influence policy alone, the groups have to seek out allies. Once these
alliances form, they are durable in governing the city until the resource allocation is
shifted. The other parts of organization are present as well. Stone in particular mentions
the importance of selective benefits in keeping the regime together and how much of
local government is run on psychic and social benefits. The governing regime likes to
work together.
Whether coalitional, institutional, or pluralist, all these interest group theories of
the city conceive of the city government as something affected by interest groups. This
helps explain local government behavior, but the story is incomplete. Unlike state and
national policy, new local governments are easy to create. The losers in a city can always
create a new city which better serves their interests. Why do the not? In the pluralist
model, every organized interest wins some and loses some and so it makes sense that the
losers on a certain policy would stay in the city. However, for this to work cities must
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remain fairly small or become dysfunctional. In the institutional models, cities must
follow their growth imperatives, so any new city would act just like the original cities. In
this case, however, there should not be the growth in the number of cities because new
cities cannot act differently than old ones. 11 Coalitional theories simply do not consider
what happens if the losers decide to leave. Returning to the interest group literature can
connect the story of local government behavior to local government growth. However,
connecting the two first requires discussing how cities interact with each other.

2.4.3 Metropolitan Governance
Interest group theories may have roots in and continue to influence the study of
local government, but it is almost entirely absent from the discourse on how multiple
cities interact with each other. Perhaps this is because few if any think of local
governments as representing groups.
The first question regarding multiple cities is whether there should be multiple
cities. The economics were against it (Toma, 1978). Public goods can be provided more
cheaply when there are more residents. However, the single monopolistic government
has little reason to perform (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961). The economic benefit
of consolidation is lost in the waste. When there are multiple cities, they must compete
for residents (Tiebout, 1956) and therefore cities have an incentive to better match
services and tax levels to the preferences of potential residents. If problems cross
jurisdictional boundaries, there is plenty of incentive for local governments to cooperate

11

This objection is not quite appropriate for the homevoter hypothesis of William Fischel. Many small
cities make sense in his framework because each one can specialize in a different type mechanism of
improving home values. Partly for this reason, I think the homevoter hypothesis is closer to correct.
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in solving them without invoking consolidation. This is the closest the discourse usually
gets to discussing organization.
Instead, scholars investigated whether the economic evidence supported the
competition hypothesis. Residents were ignorant about tax prices and service bundles
(Lowery and Lyons, 1989, and similarly as Lyons and Lowery, 1989), but that may not
matter so long as movers are informed (Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best, 1993).
Even if movers are ignorant, businesses are informed, and mobile capital will seek out the
best allocation across a metropolitan area. That alone could signal, either through wages
or through property values, which cities offered the best deal for services and taxes
(Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009; Fischel 2001; and this would be consistent with Glaeser and
Gottlieb, 2006).
If competing cities could match individuals to better mixes of services and taxes,
there were still other potential problems. The metropolitan area was a community, and
governmental fragmentation broke that community apart (Wood, 1958). While the
smaller local governments might be better fits on material measures, they were civically
impoverished (Lowery, DeHoog, and Lyons, 1992). The communities were insular,
isolated, and divided –often on racial, social, economic, or multiple lines (Nechyba and
Walsh, 2004; Epple and Platt, 1998). Such cities were unlikely to work for the common
good across jurisdictional boundaries.
Insularity is possible, and even happens in some cities, but not all (Agranoff and
McGuire, 2003, 43). The relationships of different cities vary widely. Some cities are
insular and self-sufficient. Other cities are protective and independent, but willing to
cooperate if the reason was compelling enough. Still others are so resource constrained
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that their very survival depends on cooperating with other governments. Cities make
their decisions to cooperate based on factors about the city, the other government
(federal, state, or local) and the nature of the agreement.
Intergovernmental cooperation in general is common. Cities rely on
intergovernmental funds and grants from other governments (Stein, 1981), and even
organize themselves specifically to attract grants (Lowry and Potosky, 2004).
Cooperation across local governments can be used to lobby for grants (Bickers and Stein,
2004) or to consolidate voters behind certain elected officials (Bickers and Stein, 1994).
When not attracting money, local officials keep in touch through personal and staff
contacts (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002), coordinate their common policies (Post, 2004),
and keep an eye on potential cross-border problems (Sharpe, 2004). Given time, repeated
interactions, trust, and social capital local officials may even formalize their relationships
into intergovernmental organizations (Feiock, Tao, and Johnson, 2004; Feiock, 2004, 2009) or
contemplate consolidations.

Actual consolidation, however, is rare for general governments (Toma, 1978).
Partly this is because the usual voting rules make consolidation difficult. Two
jurisdictions both have to pass referenda agreeing to the consolidation. Even annexations
can be difficult if the state gives unincorporated areas rights, or makes incorporation easy
(Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001, 93). In either situation, voters have reasons to vote
against consolidation. First, any consolidation means that the voters are losing some of
their influence over their jurisdictions (Lyons, 1977) by adding new voters with different
preferences. Second, the smaller jurisdiction is risking being perpetually outvoted by the
larger jurisdiction (Dur and Staal, 2008). Far better to maintain independent governments
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and retain the right to say no (Fischel, 2001). Third, current local officials –political
entrepreneurs –risk losing their positions in the new jurisdiction (Lyons, 1977). 12
When cities make decisions about how to interact with each other –to stand apart,
cooperate, or consolidate –cities appear to consider the costs and benefits, but this is still
not the entire story. Fragmentation may provide greater benefits but it is not clear that
residents are actually calculating net benefits when choosing a new jurisdiction.
Coordination between cities is largely an elite function, not a popular one, and when
voters are asked to permanently join two jurisdictions they oppose it. Even the elite,
while willing to cooperate, are hesitant about consolidation. Certain costs are too high
for the expected benefits.
There is also a gap between how cities are governed internally and their
relationships with other cities. How do the interest groups that influence city behavior
affect inter-city cooperation? They disappear when discussing inter-city contact and the
new unit of analysis is just the city. These gaps can be filled –and tie the individual to the
group, the group to the city, and the city to the metropolitan area –by reintroducing
interest group theory to local government.

2.5 Synthesizing Local Government and Interest Groups
Metropolitan governments are supposed to benefit all their residents, yet residents
are reluctant to join metro-wide agreements. They are more likely to cooperate, but many
cities, in fact, avoid each other. Cities do not always attempt to grow in size, and yet
12

There are ways around these problems. Lyons –covering a successful merger –addresses several.
Single member districts, special governments, and grandfathering of existing arrangements allowed the
constituent communities to accept merger. It helped that the state threatened them with annexation
otherwise. More generally, changing the voting rules to a higher standard assures minorities of any type
that they will not be exploited as described by Buchanan and Tullock (1964).
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general governments have grown in number. What can explain this? It is entrepreneurial
interest group behavior. The following subsections combine the literatures on interest
groups and urban governance to better explain both behaviors.

2.5.2 Merger and Cooperation
When interest group organizers contemplate mergers, they assess the costs and
benefits on their members, but also for the entrepreneur. Organizing the group costs
entrepreneurs resources and they want to make sure they earn a profit. Joining another
group means losing control over resources, and could ultimately cause the entrepreneur to
lose. Members too desire assurances that the new group is not going to take their
resources and use them on different projects. The interests of entrepreneur and members
align to generally resist mergers. However, interest groups are willing to cooperate.
Does this not also risk resources?
Cities are likewise unwilling to merge. Officials are reluctant to give up their
offices and residents are unlikely to give up their autonomy. They prefer to maintain
their independence and instead cooperate at arm’s length –but the nature of their
cooperation is erratic. Some cities are insular, others require cooperation to exist.
The unifying factor is that both groups and cities are concerned about losing
control of their resources. Local official’s reluctance to give up power might be a
different concern, but as the economic benefits of consolidation rarely materialize, it
seems unlikely staff would be fired. Elected officials may be holding onto office, but
they are political organizers by nature. Elected officials would have plenty of
opportunities to keep, and even enlarge, their offices in a merged government. Doing so
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requires them to take a risk –and if they lose then their investment in running for their
current office is lost. It is the same concern of the entrepreneur that any merged group
would cut the entrepreneur out of the ultimate payoff. Residents and members are both
worried that the merged group would no longer serve them as well.
Cooperation does not have this problem. Explicitly in the local government
literature, the great benefit of cooperation is that cities can refuse to cooperate. Everyone
has to agree on the resources devoted to cooperation. No one risks losing control of
resources. Either city can also cut its losses if the agreement turns sour. This should be
imported into the interest group literature explicitly, rather than implicitly.
But why is local government cooperation so varied? For the same reason it is
varied among interest groups. Interest groups are goal oriented in their cooperation.
Groups seek out partners with similar interests and different resources so that they can,
together, accomplish a common goal. Cities, however, have many of the same resources,
particularly as regards their formal powers. Cities are also intended to be self-sufficient.
There is less reason for cities to cooperate than there are for interest groups. The problem
has to affect multiple cities, the cities have to be unable to address it themselves, and the
cities must have some resources to trade.

2.5.3 Conflict Avoidance and Fragmentation
Interest groups avoid conflict because it is expensive and risky. Entrepreneurs
who wish to make a profit do not want to waste money establishing dominance.
Expanding the group beyond a niche invites conflict, and even if successful risks future
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conflict as the new members conflict over their different preferences. It is far safer for
entrepreneurs and current group members to stay in their specialty.
Cities are compelled to grow, and yet instead of larger cities there has been an
increase in the number of cities. Cities limit their annexation and suburbs specialize.
The reason is unknown. Growth machines, financial requirements, and property values
explain some of it, but not all.
Again, resources are the key. Interest groups that burn through their resources fall
apart. Cities too have to cultivate their resources. Engaging another city in an
annexation fight is as expensive as competing with another interest group for residents.
Even if the city wins, it can suffer the victor’s curse –where the city or group pays more
for winning than the victory returns in benefits. As groups expand, they risk schisms
within their members. Cities are the same. As the city expands, residents become more
diverse, and the city risks schisms that make providing satisfactory services more
difficult and increases the risk of expensive secessions. It is cheaper and safer for
residents –and the entrepreneurs who wish to make a profit –to be conservative in
managing the growth of the city. Do not annex too far out; do not encourage too many
different types of residents; and do not give up resources easily. Growth compulsions are
moderated by fears that growing too far to fast would wreck the balance sheet of the city.
This, of course, leaves plenty of land and unclaimed resources for other
entrepreneurs who will likewise be conflict averse. The newly developed cities will be
smaller, grow more slowly, and be wary of attracting diverse populations. The growth of
urban areas would depend on how quickly the population grows –and would manifest not
in each jurisdiction getting larger, but in the creation of jurisdictions. With all that extra
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land, secession becomes unnecessary. When enough people with different preferences
are available, a developer need only offer a new jurisdiction in an unclaimed part of the
county. They do not even have to incorporate.
There are, however, circumstances where competition is expected. First, when
some organizations lack the resources to support themselves and cooperation is not
possible for whatever reason; then conflict and competition are expected. When one
interest group organization or one city collapses, others will consider the use of the newly
freed resources. Existing entrepreneurs may decide that the expansion is still too
dangerous, and the resources lay idle. Entrepreneurs who need resources, though, will
scramble to get what benefit they can. Where resources are few, conflict is more likely.

2.5.4 Amenities, Agglomeration, and Size
Most groups are small, niche organizations, but there are larger ones. Likewise,
most cities are small, but there are large ones. For cities, the largest cities –the ones so
large that Dahl thought they could not be governed –can be explained by amenities and
agglomeration. Large cities have some benefit so great that residents are willing to put
up with less-than-ideal services to get it. That benefit may be the agglomeration of
millions of individuals.
This same explanation would apply to large interest groups as well. There is a
benefit to being part of a large group like the NRA or the Sierra Club rather than their
local activist equivalents. While the smaller groups may be more like what an individual
wants, their ability to influence policy is restricted. Large groups can use their size to be
influential. Their size alone acts as a valuable resource, along with their name and
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reputation. Part of why the NRA, Sierra Club, and New York City can be so large is
because associating with those names is itself valuable to individuals.
Agglomeration is another area where conflict is to be expected. The benefits of
being the largest and most prominent group do not spread across multiple large groups.
Those trying to be the biggest group or the central city must compete with the other big
groups and other contenders for central city (this would explain why “supersuburbs” are
more growth-oriented than their smaller cousins, Lewis, 2004). Those who do not aspire
to agglomeration as their amenity have less cause to compete.

2.5.5 Considering Cities as Interest Groups
Conceiving of cities as interest groups allows for the preceding synthesis to make
more sense of the observed behavior of cities. It explains why some cities compete,
others cooperate, and others isolate by identifying population diversity and city resources
as the important components of city organization. It explains how developers and elected
officials try to organize new and existing cites. It explains why the number of cities has
grown and why the cities have gotten smaller. There are, however, some potential
objections to address.

1.) Why did cities start getting smaller recently? If local governments are interest
groups, then the problems with diverse populations should have been present
earlier and led to small governments from the start.
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What changed was drop in the price of transportation. This made agglomeration
less valuable because the same benefits could be had without having to live in a small
area. In the 1800s, the wealthy could afford to live in small villages and towns outside
the major cities, but no one else could. With easy transportation, the relative benefits of
large organizations and small organizations changed. This made the organization of
smaller towns possible, and so entrepreneurs organized them.

2.) Cities are still governments, though. They are not interest groups.

Small cities act like interest groups in all but name. The residents know each
other, they choose leaders and hire workers to provide public goods, and they even lobby
state and federal governments. The only difference between a small city and a large
interest group is that small city can provide its own public goods –and even this
difference can be overstated. Interest groups can provide public goods and services too.
Homeowners associations already provide some services to their members. A church
provides its own public goods (association, collective worship and ritual). Both of these
types of interest groups can ultimately become cities. They would remain interest groups
when they did so.

3.) What about large cities?

It is true that large cities are unlikely to have a single well-defined interest group
at their core –such as a church or homeowners association turned city. Stone’s study of
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Atlanta argued for many interests within a single city working together, and Dahl argued
for hundreds of interests which had to at least stay out of each other’s way. In both of
these arguments, the feuding interest groups had to organize a government. This required
entrepreneurship on the part of someone –a mayor, a businessman, or a clique of
prominent citizens –to make work and this coalition of interest groups is itself an interest
group. Ostrom argued that this was a way to take large latent groups and make them
work together. Large cities organize this way, and when they fail to, they become
dysfunctional as Dahl predicted.

2.5.6 Conclusion
The city as an interest group synthesizes two literatures in a way which improves
both. Interest group organization explains the unusual (for a government) behavior of
cities and agglomeration and city-to-city cooperation can explain the behavior of interest
groups. The theoretical implications of this are discussed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
An Interest Group Theory of Urban Fragmentation
3.1 Introduction
Whether fragmentation is beneficial to local government has been a perennial
concern of urban scholars. Is it better to have few large cities which can use economies
of scale to serve their residents cheaply (Wood, 1958), or is it better to have many small
cities which better serve their specific residents at a higher cost (Ostrom, Warren, and
Tiebout, 1961)? In the post-war period, local general governments proliferated and the
smaller cities grew in number and size (Pellisero, 2003, 10; Oliver, 2003, 312) which
would indicate a wide-spread preference for the many, small, expensive governments
which better served their specific residents. But why would the population prefer small
and expensive –and why, despite this preference are there still large jurisdictions such as
New York City’s eight million people?
The key to understanding the preference for small and fragmented lies in
understanding city formation as a type of political organization by the residents. As
discussed in the previous chapter, other types of political organization are constrained by
the need to 1.) pay the entrepreneur who organizes, 2.) provide benefits to members, 3.)
out-compete competitors for members, 4.) and secure the resources necessary to do 1
through 3. In the case of most types of political group, this is very difficult to do for
large numbers of members. This is also true of cities, but cities have important
differences from other types of political organization. First, cities can produce the public
good the organization desires rather than having to lobby another government. Second,
cities have legal rights and authorities such as taxation and police power which are

45

impressive resources. Third, because cities control the land within their borders, cities
can turn agglomeration effects to their advantage to grow in size.
The chapter continues in four parts. In part 2, I develop the basic theory of the
city as entrepreneurial interest group. In part 3, I consider the effect of amenity,
agglomeration and mobility on city proliferation. In part 4, I use the theory to produce
hypotheses about the proliferation of cities. Finally I summarize and conclude in part 5.

3.2 The Entrepreneurial Interest Group City
When Elkin (1987) spoke of the entrepreneurial city, what he had in mind was a
city which sponsored growth as a means to attract and sustain entrepreneurs. The city
political economy relied on a coalition of businessmen who funded the city, directed the
growth, and made sure that other interests did not block the thriving business community.
The method, however, also deserves the label of entrepreneurial. Local business leaders
and bankers created a system where local officials were compelled by economic and
political necessity to do things which benefited business. Businessmen and bankers
controlled capital and financial talent necessary to the operation of the city. They also
had the organizational ability to support candidates for office in at-large elections. In
effect, the business leaders used their acumen in organizing companies which would do
what they wanted to organize the city. Bluntly, business, concerned that other types of
interest group government would be bad, formed its own city.
Businesses are a type of organization –and a very effective one. Business
entrepreneurs excel at getting other people to willingly work for them; for pay, mutual
gain, a return on investment, or something else. These same skills could be turned to
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organizing interest groups. Businessmen are not the only people who possess such skills,
though. Every organization requires an entrepreneur to provide incentives, coordinate
activity, and secure the desired end.
In a private endeavor, the businessman must secure capital to produce the end
product. The private entrepreneur needs money to pay wages and buy equipment. The
private entrepreneur then uses that capital to produce a good that is sold, providing the
return for the entrepreneur. When successful, the workers are paid, the entrepreneur is
paid, and the consumers of the good are happier.
The public entrepreneur is much the same, but the nature of the end product is
slightly different. The public entrepreneur is producing a public good, or convincing a
government agency to produce the public good. Those who work on the product are also
beneficiaries of the product (analogous to workers who buy their company’s product).
Because of this, the workers might need to be paid less or to be paid less overtly. The
reduction in wage costs does not, however, wipe out all capital requirements. The public
entrepreneur still has to buy the equipment, contacts, and keep the phones working.
When successful, the workers gain their private benefits, the entrepreneur is paid a
private return, and everyone benefits from the public good. The difference in the end
product does change the organization’s structure.
Where a private entrepreneur can offer a wage individualized to each worker, the
public entrepreneur is offering a low or non-existent wage and public benefit. The public
benefit cannot be individualized. Where the private firm can have workers who care only
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for the paycheck and nothing for the end product, the public organization needs workers
who care about the end product. 13
Whether public or private, all organizations must control their capital. Without
money, there are no wages or equipment and there is no production. Without capital,
workers seek out other firms that can pay better. Without capital, the organizer has no
return on investment and must find another source of income. Without capital, the
organizer cannot pay workers or provide other selective benefits. What capital must be
controlled depends on the type of production and the type of organization. Whichever
factors produce the end good are the factors the entrepreneur must dominate. (Those
factors can differ between different types of organizations, too.) If those factors –
resources –are not controlled, then the entrepreneur cannot produce the end good, cannot
sell it to consumers or workers, gains no return, and eventually will burn through existing
capital. Capital-less, the organization dissolves. Access to the necessary resources is
critical to the entrepreneur’s success.
In addition to controlling capital, entrepreneurs also want to reduce their costs.
The less they must spend to produce the good –private or public –the higher their return.
Low costs also allow entrepreneurs to sell their product at a lower price; attracting
consumers, which in the case of the public good are also potential workers. Capital
burned on something other than production is wasted –drives up prices, drives away
consumers, and cuts into the entrepreneur’s return. For this reason, entrepreneurs avoid
competition for resources. The capital used to secure the resource and fend off another
organization is capital which does not make the end product, but still must be paid off.
13

It is possible for an interest group to be staffed by people who care only for the paycheck, but they
must be paid more –since the success of the group is of no benefit to them. This increases the costs of
the group, and makes it susceptible to another entrepreneur offering a cheaper benefit.
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This raises the price of the product without improving its quality. Fewer consumers buy
(or volunteer to work) and the entrepreneur loses money.
How many resources are required depends on the type of organization.
Expressive organizations do not need much to provide the benefit –group expression –to
members. Expressive organizations can be small and resource poor. Organizations
intended to produce some good or service need more resources and more workers.
Expressive organizations are cheap to create and hard to sustain –it is easy to create a
competitor. Material organizations –the ones that produce goods or services –are harder
to undercut because they already control the necessary resources and benefit their
members well (Salisbury, 1969).
For the public entrepreneur, the need to secure resources and avoid conflict drives
organization towards niches. Niche interest groups are small, have limited resource
needs, and are unlikely to come into conflict for their resources. The entrepreneur does
not need to provide the same level of private benefit as a business because the members
have similar preferences and the public good provides the bulk of the incentive to work.
This same preference homogeneity also makes the organization value its autonomy.
Anything that alters the public good –including cooperation and compromise with
another group –reduces the benefit to the members. Giving up autonomy only happens
when the result is a more valuable public or private benefit. As the niche interest grows
in size, preferences necessarily become more diverse (no two people think exactly alike).
These more diverse members need a better personal incentive to work –this raises
the price of the organization. The organization must secure more resources to provide
that incentive. This might raise the level of needed contribution –reducing everyone’s net
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benefit –or risk confrontation with another group –which also raises the price of the
public good. The larger and larger the group gets, the more the price goes up.
Eventually, another entrepreneur will notice the high cost and poor benefit for some
members of the existing groups and offer to form a new group which would be a better
fit, lack the excessive incentives needed to get the larger group to function, and require
fewer resources and risk. The large group splits, and the new organization is again a
niche. How quickly this happens depends on the nature of the group, for example
whether it is expressive or material.
While the necessity of resource consolidation drives interest groups towards
niches, there are large groups. These groups may exist because of economies of scale. If
there are general preferences which many people share, then membership in a large group
is a cheap way to meet the widely shared preference. There is a balancing act in the size
of interest groups. Too small and they lack the resources necessary to survive. Too large
and they risk being undercut. Too large and too small, however, depend on the resource
environment. If resources are few, then economies of scale matter a lot.
More commonly, interest groups stay small and form alliances to combine
resources rather than outright merging. Coalitions do not require paying more incentives
to the new workers, preserve autonomy for all group members, and increase the quantity
of the public good. Coalition members agree to the compromises because they believe
that they will, on net, get more from cooperation than they will working alone. 14 Groups
will also engage in competition if necessary to continue operating –such as if there is
14

As an example, two groups may lack, individually, the ability to gain the public goods they desire.
Working alone they have homogenous preferences and low costs, but ultimately no benefit. If they
merge, they lose some autonomy and the cost goes up (either because the benefit is no longer as perfect,
or because more incentives are needed, or both). If they stay separate, but cooperate, the cost may still
go up, but they gain the benefit and maintain autonomy on all other matters.
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only one source of money and two groups both need it to survive. In both cooperation
and competition, there is a balance between the threat to autonomy (the threat to less
perfect service) and the benefit from cooperation (which may be greater than otherwise,
but still not ideal).

3.2.2 The City as a Group
All of this is also true of city organization. Cities exist to produce goods and
services or provide public goods acquired from state or national governments. Cities
have entrepreneurs who organize the new city. In order to produce public goods, cities
need resources to produce the goods and services and to motivate residents to live within
their borders and pay taxes. That resource can be an expression of community or a set of
goods and services. The resources have to be controlled by the city or the city risks
dissolution. As these constraints push interest groups to niches, they also push cities to
smaller, more homogeneous organizations.
The smaller, more homogeneous city occupies a niche. Niche does not mean,
though, that the city cannot still be a full service organization. As a niche interest group
serves a narrow and specific policy goal for members, a city provides a specific balance
of public goods and policies. Cities in metropolitan areas have become even more
specialized to the point where they do not have to provide everything a resident requires
(such as culture or employment). Their residents can get them from other cities. Even
where cities are full service, the combination of goods and services the city provides is a
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tailored to the population, lest the residents organize a new city or move to another
jurisdiction.
The public goods cities produce are legion. The most obvious are actual city
services like police and fire protection. Cities also produce an environment through laws.
Zoning, nuisance, public health, and economic development are all policies that cities can
use to benefit their members. They can also provide private services and goods. The
policy is uniform across the jurisdiction, though. The benefit to the residents depends on
how much each resident values each policy or service. If preferences fit a narrow band,
then the public goods alone are enough to encourage individuals to live within the city
jurisdiction and pay equivalent taxes. 15
When preferences diverge, the average value of living in the specific city drops.
Taxes have not changed, but the value of the goods is higher for some and lower for
others depending on their preferences. At this point, an entrepreneur could consider
trying to organize a new city. The entrepreneur might be a land developer. The
developer produces a new community and offers to sell it to new residents. The
homeowner’s association charter, or the new incorporation charter would spell out the
benefits of moving and allow potential movers to decide if a new jurisdiction would be a
better fit. An entrepreneur may be a local politician who runs for office promising to
provide more efficiency, or shift current policies and services to a better fit for more
residents. The entrepreneur may also be a potential future mayor or prominent citizen
who organizes the secession of the new town he or she intends to lead. Whoever the
organizer, the deal offered must be better overall, not simply a better fit.

15

For simplicity I am going to assume, unless stated otherwise, that cities try to be efficient.
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As interest groups can benefit from economies of scale, so can jurisdictions.
Smaller jurisdictions need resources to provide a better fit without costing so much that
the net benefit is better in the larger jurisdiction. As with interest groups, this is easier to
do when resources are plentiful or costs are low.
The new jurisdiction must provide incentives for people to move there. The
incentive may be better fitting public goods at a better price, or it may be some private or
club-like good. Whatever the incentive, the jurisdiction needs resources to produce it.
Local government powers are one resource. If potential residents want a better fitting
zoning code, the new jurisdiction must be granted zoning power, for example. Tax
revenue is another resource, along with intergovernmental revenue sources. Another way
to provide cheaper services is to contract them out to other governments, thus gaining the
benefit of scale without giving up autonomy on other matter of more importance to
residents. Residents of two cities may be happier to share garbage collectors than police
or zoning codes.
Cooperation is not a costless choice. Even for something as simple as garbage
collection, residents may have to give up some of their autonomy. Perhaps the
cooperative agreement can only work if pick-up is done curbside even if one jurisdiction
prefers back-door service. Cities would only cooperate when the loss in autonomy is
offset by better results than would be gotten without cooperating. This might be through
economies of scale, as in the garbage collection example, or because cooperation is
necessary to achieve the goal. Two jurisdictions may each have resources necessary to
lobby the state government, and so must cooperate to lobby, for example. To the extent
that cities are either expressions of community borders or self-sufficient, cities will not

53

cooperate with other jurisdictions –just as expressive and self-sufficient interest groups
do not cooperate with other groups. Rather, cooperation must come from shared goals,
similar situations, but different resources. 16 Wealthy cities are unlikely to cooperate at all
if their resources allow them to stay completely autonomous. Even if two cities want to
cooperate, are willing to give up autonomy and share resources, the costs of coordination
and transportation can still wipe out the benefit of cooperation.
Finally, the city must control the necessary resources. If a city is dependent on
another jurisdiction for revenue (such as through a contract) or a service and the other
jurisdiction ceases to provide it, then the city will be unable to provide benefits to its
residents. In the best case, the city cuts back on services enough to stay solvent, but the
reduced benefit to residents causes residents to move to other jurisdictions. In the worst
case, the city goes bankrupt. In the story of Denver water politics, told by Ellison (1998),
the City of Denver was able to squelch the growing fragmented suburbs by refusing to
sell water to other cities (Holden,1964 also applies).
The constraints on cities are the same as on interest groups. Entrepreneurs are
competitive people, but they want a return on their investment more than crushing their
opposition. They want to avoid costly competition with other cities. They want
preference homogeneity from their residents so that public goods can satisfy members.
Their residents want to maintain their autonomy so that the public goods remain a good
fit. And entrepreneurs want to avoid growing too big and too diverse because the new
population will make the city more expensive and risk the current organizers being
16

Economies of scale can be thought of two ways. In the first way, a bordering jurisdiction automatically
controls a different resource –another population of residents to share the costs –or in the second, it can
be thought of as an exception to the general rule. Differences in resources are required for most forms of
cross-boundary cooperation, but if the cooperation is about jointly-running an operation to save money,
then only similar goals and similar situations are required.
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undercut by another developer, politician, or future mayor. Organization size is a balance
of resources and fit. If the incentives are the same from interest group to city, then the
behavior should be the same as well.

3.2.3 Three Objections and their Responses
There are three objections to conceiving cities as interest groups. First, cities can
tax. Second, cities are functionally immortal and interest groups turn over frequently.
Third, there are very large cities which do not seem to be very niche-like.
The objection to city tax power is that an interest group cannot compel
cooperation, but a government can. Interest group organizers have to focus on providing
a good fit because if the organization is not advancing the member’s goals, they will stop
contributing and the organization fold. People in cities can be compelled to support the
organization through taxation. This is true, but overlooks that residents can avoid city
taxes by leaving. Cooperation in the city is not signified by paying taxes, but by living in
the city. As paying dues is the cooperative action in an interest group, buying a house
and paying its property tax is the cooperative action in a city. Cities can no more compel
residence than an interest group can compel membership. Where the city has an
advantage is that its public goods can be –to some extent –limited to tax payers because
the services do not extend beyond the jurisdiction borders. 17
The second objection is that once founded, cities rarely go away. One of the
distinguishing characteristics of niche interest groups is that they crop up quickly and
disappear quickly, as the farmer’s organizations Salisbury used did (1969). This is also
17

This is not entirely true –but is fair for a generalization. Police protection, for example, may only go up
to the border of the jurisdiction, but presumably the suppression effect extends somewhat further.
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true. What it misses is that the longevity of an interest group depends on its resources.
Interest groups which last a long time have steady streams of resources independent of its
members and do not depend on the shifting preferences of their members. So long as
those streams of resources continue, the organization endures (though Selznik, 1948
points out that this is not guaranteed to be beneficial to members). Members stay with
the group, even if it goes its own way, because there are not adequate resources to create
a competitor and the benefits of the existing organization are better than nothing. 18 The
interest groups which are short-lived depend on members’ desire to be with similar
people. It is the expressive groups, in other words, which have the short life cycle. The
groups dedicated to providing material benefits are longer lasting. While cities can be
expressive, most cities have to provide some material benefit (the state and county will
not pave city roads without being paid, for example). Further, city resources are much
stronger and their political authority more powerful than other interest groups. The city
has undisputed control over its tax base. So long as the city can convince residents to
join it and pay those taxes, it has no risk of losing control of a resource. Cities which lose
their tax base, lose residents, or depend on intergovernmental revenue to survive are as
much at risk as any other interest group.
The final objection is that there are large cities which have diverse populations.
Stone’s study of Atlanta (1989) highlighted the biracial, business-leaders and blackleaders coalition which governed Atlanta. New York City has eight million residents.
These are not niche cities. There are also large interest groups, though. One reason for
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Jenkins-Smith et al, 1991 argues that expressive groups are even more constrained. Material groups
can maintain members who want the material benefit so long as at least some benefit flows –and will
except some variation from their preferences. Purposive or expressive groups were much more
restricted.

56

large cities might be their ability to provide economies of scale. The other reason
suggested by the metropolitan fragmentation literature is that a large city can control a
valuable resource: amenity or agglomeration.

3.3 Amenity, Agglomeration, and Mobility
3.3.1 Amenity
Business leaders and African American leaders in Atlanta did not cooperate in
governing a single jurisdiction because they liked each other. They each valued the
existence of a single, large, powerful city (though for different reasons) and so were
willing to share a jurisdiction in order to get that benefit. The amenity of a large and
influential city cannot be subdivided. Nor can many other types of amenities. Coasts do
not split infinitely many ways; neither do financial districts, historic downtowns, rivers,
of nice climates. As long as cities have undisputed control of the land within their
boundaries, individuals wishing to enjoy a city’s amenities are going to have to live
within those borders and pay taxes.
An amenity is a type of selective benefit. As a selective benefit encourages
members of an interest group to contribute more to the group, a city amenity encourages
residents to pay more to live in the city. Payment can be in the form of higher property
prices, lower wages, or less-than-perfect government, and frequently a combination of all
three. This makes city amenities a resource which entrepreneurs can use to attract new
residents and to compensate for differences between members.
The reason interest groups aim for niches is that entrepreneurs do not want to lose
members to other groups. However, if an entrepreneur has a valuable selective benefit,
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the risk of losing members to other groups is reduced. Without access to the great
resource, other entrepreneurs will find it difficult or impossible to offer a better net
bargain to potential members.
In the past, the great “amenity” of cities was jobs. People flocked to the urban
centers looking for work. The other amenities –culture, ports, et cetera –were secondary.
That is no longer true because transportation is cheaper. Individuals can commute and so
there is no need to live in a single large jurisdiction simply because the jobs are there.
Cities have had to shift to other types of amenities to attract residents –ones which cannot
be gotten via commute. Gentle climate, residential parks, good schools, safe streets, and
friendly communities are all ways to attract members open to many or most cities.
Economies of scale can make some of these benefits easier to acquire –the need to pay
for safe streets is one reason there are cities in the first place –but small cities can still
have good schools and nice parks. For that matter, nice parks can be enjoyed by
neighboring cities. The benefit of living in a city with nice parks rather than the cheaper
city next to it is entirely in the hassle and cost of travel. In order to get a large city, the
amenity has to be unusually and equally large.
One such amenity is the ability to redistribute. 19 Jurisdictions which have an
immobile source of capital can tax the capital (or tax the high returns through progressive
taxation) and use the proceeds to subsidize other residents, either through direct payments
or lower taxes. New York City has the port and the financial district that the city can tax
to pay for services that would otherwise be paid by individual property taxes. This is not
unique to New York. The same basic logic applies to a city which allows a locally
undesirable land use –such as a landfill or a factory –into its borders. In the first case, the
19

This section is inspired by, but not drawn from, Peterson’s City Limits (1981).

58

cost of gaining access to the financial system’s wealth is sharing a jurisdiction with 8
million people. In second, the cost is putting up with pollution from a factory. In both
cases, the subsidy makes living in the city cheaper –allowing more members with
disparate tastes to decide it is a “good deal.”
This would explain why previous theories focused on economic development as
the driver of city growth. Economic development means wealth creation, which means
sources of non-personal tax revenue. If a city is going to grow in population, it will have
a more diverse population. That more diverse population will need a lower price to put
up with the less-than-perfect ideal services, and economic development makes that
possible.
Redistribution also explains why, despite having different preferences, the poor
chase the rich. Both poor and rich would be better served by governments catering to
their specific needs, but the poor cannot afford good government. They either need to
live with other wealth creators, or with wealthy people in order to pay for the government
they need. The poor will accept less-perfect government in order to have it be
affordable. 20 The wealthy can try to price out the poor, but this requires expending
resources. More expensive houses, restrictive zoning codes, or limited governments such
that residents have to provide many of their own services can all make jurisdictions
unwelcome to the poor. They are also costs which residents balance against the cost of
redistribution and sharing a jurisdiction with the poor.
Beyond redistribution, most amenities are only partially restricted to residents.
Culture, museums, beaches, coasts, and parks are all available to commuters. However,
20

Either wealth creators or wealthy people will work. A factory owner probably has different interests
than the poor, but the poor will put up with the factory owner’s needs if the result is that the factory
owner’s production funds their government.
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the cost of the commute does matter. Living a long distance inland means the net
amenity benefit of the coast is much less, even if it is possible to visit the coast every day.

3.3.2 Agglomeration
As the last section argued, one benefit of a large population is that it can
specialize. Adam Smith’s pin factory story applies to general government services too.
However, while agglomeration is an amenity which can attract many residents and make
government cheap, it does not ensure single jurisdictions.
The benefit of agglomeration is that many people working together are more
productive. Nothing stops people from working together if they live in separate
jurisdictions, or just long distances from each other, though. The benefit to the single
large jurisdiction is that many people can work together cheaply. The transportation
costs are low, meeting and networking is easy, and everyone travels in the same
environment. It is an amenity, like a financial sector, but just like the financial sector,
people will be willing to spend more to commute for it if in turn they get to live in a
jurisdiction that fits them better. By analogy, just because a coal mine is more productive
if everyone lives on sight does not mean that coal miners would not be willing to pay to
go home at the end of the day.
This could be why the polycentric metropolis still has a central city. There is a
place which has a valuable amenity. That amenity attracts people and so the central city
now has two great draws: the amenity and the agglomeration. The central city can be
large and less-perfect for the individual because of those two valuable resources.
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However, there are still individuals who would prefer a smaller, more perfect
organization and then commute to the central city.

3.3.3 Mobility
As the previous two sections have argued, mobility matters. The lower cost of
transportation means that the amenities of nearby cities can be enjoyed without living in
them. People can also choose to locate where there are certain amenities. Finally,
mobility can change the make-up of an urban area.
The combination of amenity and agglomeration accounts for a single, large,
central city. Those who want easy access to an amenity crowd into the jurisdiction which
controls it. Over all, this leads to consolidation –more people in fewer jurisdictions. The
jurisdictions which do not control the amenity have to compete on other grounds.
Lacking the amenity, those jurisdictions have to fit their niches even better to attract
residents. The balancing choice for individuals is between less-perfect government with
easy access to the amenity or near-perfect fit with a commute. If the alternative is poor
fit or high price, residents will choose the jurisdiction with the amenity.
Fortunately, if there are many neighboring areas, the cost of government can be
reduced by specializing as described by Oliver (2004). Residents expect to get their jobs
in one jurisdiction, their work in a second, their shopping in a third, their amenities in a
fourth, and their home in a fifth. An individual government has to provide much less
service –and as such can be cheaper –to its residents.
This suggests that fragmentation over-all is greater in metropolitan areas than in
non-metropolitan areas. In a non-metropolitan area, where there are few cities and few
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people, jurisdictions must provide all services and cannot specialize. If resources are
plentiful, multiple full-service general governments can be supported, but without the
large population of the metropolis, specialized governments cannot exist. Outside the
metropolis, a small government providing the same benefits is more expensive, and so
fragmentation outside the metropolis is lower.
For example, 600 people in a metropolis can form their own city to provide
residential services –police and street sweeping –while relying on the rest of the
metropolis to provide everything else. Police and street sweeping are cheaper than a full
service government, but the 600 residents still get good fitting full service government
across the metropolis. Some of the 600 residents will shop in the western neighbor, some
in the eastern neighbor, and everyone is happy. The effect is that each resident creates
personalized government –they only share a jurisdiction when it comes to sweeping and
police. If the 600 residents were part of a single, larger jurisdiction outside the
metropolis and did the same thing, the benefit would be less. They would get better fit
only for sweeping and police. All other fit remains unchanged because they all have to
use the same larger jurisdiction. Where in the metropolis, one resident visited parks in
the eastern neighbor and another in the western neighbor, outside the metropolis the parks
are all provided by the same city. The benefit of creating the newer, cheaper government
is less. If they want the same fit they get in the metropolis, the new city must provide
more services, such as the variety of parks –and this makes it more expensive. All else
equal, there will be less fragmentation outside the metropolis. 21
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A non-exclusive alternate explanation is that, in the metro area –or any area for that matter –where
services can be got from another jurisdiction due to state laws such as the Lakewood System, it is cheaper
to create expressive cities. The material benefits come from another jurisdiction –the new city exists
merely to express its residents’ preferences.
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People can also choose to locate where there are amenities. The poor chasing the
rich has already been mentioned, and is a good example. Amenities can attract a diverse
population, and as a result a very amenable place can have a diverse population at a given
time. In a single instance, a single jurisdiction may be big and diverse because many
different people moved there for the particular amenity. Over time, however, the diverse
preferences of the residents can assert themselves again. The rich move to more
expensive districts, for example.
Residents decide that their preferences are distinct enough from everyone else’s
that they are willing to pay a bit more for the amenity if they got better-fitting
government in return. These residents are ripe for organization by an entrepreneur. It
also results in sorting.
Sorting is implied in the creation of homogenous jurisdictions. Jurisdictional
borders are typically contiguous, so in order for an entrepreneur form a new city,
residents must be convinced to move within the proposed borders. If the population
cannot sort, the creation of new jurisdictions becomes more difficult.
The amenity may prevent sorting or make it prohibitively expensive. If the
amenity is geographically small –like Lower Manhattan –there is only limited territory in
which to make new, neighboring jurisdictions. Moving further out requires more
transportation, and so higher costs, that in turn make mobility more difficult and makes
new jurisdictions more expensive for potential residents (they would have to carry the
costs of the new jurisdiction and the commuting costs, rather than just the commuting
costs alone). A costly alternative is to organize a secession vote, but due to the costs it
may be a better balance just to put up with the less-perfect government even if sorting has

63

already happened. 22 If the amenity is jurisdiction specific –redistribution from rich to
poor, for example –sorting is pointless for creating new jurisdictions. Any new
government would lose access to the amenity and its benefits.
Mobility and sorting by amenity also allow the possibility that the organization of
an urban area could attract a certain type of resident. Fragmented metropolises might
attract movers because the many jurisdictions make moving less risky. If the first
jurisdiction does not work out, moving to a neighbor is relatively cheap. Consolidated
metropolises might attract the poor because of their greater need for redistribution or
liberals because of their connection to the Progressive movement’s consolidation
programs. Fragmented jurisdictions might also attract a diverse population –making
detecting causality impossible.
The latter concern is unlikely because of the implied need for sorting. If a
fragmented metropolis is already homogeneous, then there is no jurisdiction within it to
attract a diverse population. No jurisdiction is a good fit –so from the perspective of a
new entrant the fragmented metropolis is just as attractive as a consolidated one. The
fragmented jurisdictions can be worse because they do not take advantage of economies
of scale. A potential resident might think that, in the future, there might be a jurisdiction
which is a better fit, but this is also true of a consolidated metropolis. Entrepreneurs can
create a new jurisdiction in either place. The fragmented metropolis can consolidate, and
the consolidated metropolis can fragment. In all case, the diverse potential residents will
have to move again to sort into the new jurisdiction –making neither more attractive than
the other. The fragmented metropolis might be more attractive to a different resident
22

This seems to be the position of the residents of Staten Island, who periodically threaten secession, but
never do it.
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because it offers many options, but in this case the relevant point is that the resident is a
mover, and it requires that the fragmented metropolis already be diverse in order to offer
the many options.
The future of the metropolis will depend on what the population of the future
looks like. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) showed, using the natural experiment of
the Great Migration, that when the population of a metropolitan area becomes more
diverse, consolidation slows. Population diversity is, however, unavoidable. Even if a
homogenous metropolis continues to attract a homogenous population, the larger
population will inevitably have slight differences of opinion and slight differences in
preferences. The population may put up with these slight differences, but eventually
there get to be enough people with similarly different preferences to justify a new
jurisdiction. It may be less fragmented than a far more diverse metropolis, but it is still
fragmented. The only thing which would prevent it would be a lack of available
resources. People may have diverse preferences, but if there is no land to incorporate or
state laws preventing secession, a new government cannot be formed.

3.4 Hypotheses
Treating cities as interest groups –and accounting for the oddities of city
amenities and population mobility –has many implications for the organization and
governance of urban areas. If cities are like interest groups, then their behavior is about
controlling resources. Individual jurisdictions will try to avoid becoming more diverse
because the resulting jurisdiction would provide less-ideal services at a higher price, and
any economies of scale could be undercut by another jurisdiction offering a better fit.
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Particularly valuable amenities attract residents who will balance less-ideal government
in return for access to the amenity, leading to consolidation around the amenity.
However, outside the central jurisdiction, new cities will be smaller because –without the
amenity –they have to provide better fitting government, and that is only possible if the
population is homogeneous.
City behavior is also about maintaining autonomy. If the resources are available
to support separate cities, people with diverse preferences would rather have a city with
ideal services for them than economies of scale undercut by median-voter services.
Separate cities will cooperate, though, if it is necessary to achieve a shared goal.
In the following chapters I test two of these components. First, I test for
fragmentation driven by diversity and resources. Because it is theoretically expected for
there to be differences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, those two types
of area are analyzed separately. Second, I test for an inter-governmental network based
on goal similarity and the maintenance of autonomy.

3.4.2 Fragmentation
Cities are driven to fragmentation by diverse preferences. Residents prefer better
fitting government, will pay a higher price for it, and there are businessmen and
politicians ready to provide it. However, fragmentation is limited by cost. More
residents can be offered a lower price –but services have to become less ideal. If the
price is already low, jurisdictions can be smaller and thus more fragmented. The cost
limit increases with wealth as the wealthy can afford more expensive government. This
leads to the following hypotheses:
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1.) The number of jurisdictions increases with the diversity of the population.
2.) The number of jurisdictions increases with the wealth of the population.
3.) The number of jurisdictions decreases with the cost of government.

These are fairly direct economic predictions. As costs increase or income
declaims, consumption decreases. The niche theory of interest groups, however, also
predicts that the forms of diversity affect fragmentation. New organizations are not
solely about the difficulty of getting an agreement among those with diverse preferences.
Individuals are willing to spend more to have ideal services. Among the preferences
residents might be willing to pay more to satiate is a preference for larger jurisdictions.
Progressives were a major force for consolidation and their descendents, modern
Liberals, retain the preference. The poor may also prefer larger jurisdictions because of
the need for economies of scale and redistribution 23 to fund the government services the
poor require. Thus the following hypotheses:
4.) The number of jurisdictions decreases with higher levels of liberalism.
5.) The number of jurisdictions decreases with more poor residents.

Finally, jurisdictions must have access to resources –from money to political
authority. Interest group theories point to more resources than just members and dues.
While the tax base may be secure, cities which depend on contracting or
intergovernmental revenue cannot exist if such money is not available. Likewise, if a
city’s authority and autonomy are limited, then the city is less able to provide ideal
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Either overt, or implicit through progressive taxation
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services and is less attractive compared to larger jurisdictions with economies of scale.
Therefore:
6.) The number of jurisdictions increases with intergovernmental revenue (IGR).
7.) The number of jurisdictions decreases if IGR is limited to a few cities.
8.) The number of jurisdictions decreases with state restrictions on city powers.

These hypotheses are tested for metropolitan areas in chapter 4 and for nonmetropolitan areas in chapter 5.

3.4.3 Cooperation
City cooperation, and even government-to-government contact is rare given the
number of cities in the United States. This is expected if cities are like interest groups.
City-to-city contact depends on both jurisdictions having a common goal.
1.) City-to-city contact is more likely if both cities share common issues.

The more policy areas that jointly affect both cities, the more likely it is that both
cities will cooperate. In order for contact –information transfers, for example –to be
helpful, both cities must also have similar situations. It is not helpful to hear about how
another city solved its budget problems if that city’s budget is entirely different.
Therefore:
2.) City-to-city contact is more likely if both cities share common characteristics.
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One of the reasons to cooperate is that each city has different resources which,
together, can achieve more than either city can along. For this reason, if cities have
different resources available –one has population and another has wealthy residents, for
example –then they can gain more through cooperation and are more likely to cooperate.
If each city has the same resources available, then they can only cooperate by creating
economies of scale. Economies of scale reduce autonomy, and so must be particularly
good to overcome the costs in poorer fitting services.
3.) City-to-city contact is more likely if cities have different resources.

These hypotheses are tested in chapter 6 on a sample of Kentucky cities.

3.5 Summary and Conclusion
Scholars of metropolitan and urban government obsess over fragmentation and
consolidation, which is better, and in what circumstances. However, there is a more
pressing question: why has the public chosen fragmentation? The public has chosen
fragmented government because smaller governments are better able to provide the exact
services that residents desire. As the cost of transportation has declined, so has the cost
of government in metropolitan areas. Governments are able to specialize in serving
exactly what their residents want and leaving the rest to other jurisdictions. At the same
time, the public has become wealthier and better able to afford smaller, more expensive,
but better fitting governments. Continued fragmentation is expected.
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The expected widespread intergovernmental cooperation did not materialize for
the same reason governments fragmented. Residents wanted near-perfect fitting
government, and cooperation would limit their ability to get it.
This is consistent with the behavior of interest groups, which is not surprising
because cities are a type of interest group. Like interest groups, cities provide public and
private benefits to their residents. Like interest groups, cities must control resources to
provide benefits to their residents. Like interest groups, cities struggle to maintain their
autonomy. Like interest groups, cities can be any combination of expressive or material.
And like interest groups, cities try to serve a homogeneous niche to avoid losing residents
and resources to competitors.
The next three chapters demonstrate aspects of this theory in data from the United
States, and particularly from the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
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Chapter 4
Causes of Fragmentation in Metropolitan Statistical Areas
4.1 Introduction
The benefit of envisioning local government organization as a type of interest
group organization is providing a model which explains urban fragmentation. Local
residents want to gain something from forming a city, just as local steel workers want to
gain something from forming a union and local businesses want to gain something from
forming a chamber of commerce, but none of these organizations grows indefinitely. For
interest groups, fragmentation is explained by the desire for autonomy and the restrictions
on resources. These drivers of fragmentation are common across different types of
interest groups. Every interest group wants to control its own destiny and to that end it
needs to secure resources. If resources are inadequate to the interest group’s desires, it
has to trade with another interest group to continue providing services –giving up some
autonomy to maintain the agreement –or lose members to another organization which can
better or more cheaply provide the same good or service. While the specifics may change
from group to group or interest to interest, the rule remains. This and the next chapter
apply this logic to local government in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas to test
the hypothesis that autonomy and resource restrictions drive urban fragmentation.
These two chapters are split because of a difference in the approach of those
studying urban organization and those studying interest groups. The latter, while looking
at specific interests or organizations, are universalist. Resource constraints apply to all
organizations. The former, however, have overwhelmingly looked at metropolitan areas.
Metropolitan areas might differ from non-metropolitan areas in any number of ways, but
the theory proposed in Chapter 3 does not distinguish between the two types and obvious
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differences –such as population, income or race –can be measured directly. The same
process which produces fragmentation in metropolitan areas should produce
fragmentation in non-metropolitan areas. The analysis in this chapter looks only at
metropolitan areas so that it is consistent and comparable to other studies of local
government organization that have done the same. The choice of metropolitan areas also
allows for some new variables constructed during the aggregation. Most metropolitan
areas –as measured by Census MSAs –are in a single county, but there are many which
cover several counties within the same state. Much of the data for this study is county
level, so these multi-county MSAs allow for variables measuring sorting across counties.
This allows comparing multi-county MSAs where the population has sorted to multicounty MSAs where the population remains unsorted to single-county MSAs where the
population cannot sort across county lines. Without finer data, this cannot be done on a
county-level analysis.
As in chapter 3, the simplest form of the theory is that more resources and a more
diverse population (which therefore has more diverse preferences) lead to more separate
cities, and therefore more fragmentation. In this chapter, I analyze the effect of
population sorting, available resources, and population diversity on the number of general
local governments in a Census-defined Metropolitan Statistical Area for two periods 1992 and 2002. Because the dependent variable is count data, and because after the
initial analysis the data were revealed to be Poisson rather than negative-binomial, the
analysis was done via cross-sectional Poisson regression. Other analyses which help
illuminate the matter of local organization are also shown at the end.
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The rest of this chapter is divided into 5 additional sections.

Section 2 applies

the broader theory of local government organization specifically to the MSA. Section 3
introduces the dataset and how it was constructed. Section 4 provides some summary
statistics of MSAs and discusses what a “typical” MSA looks like within a state. In
section 5, the results of the main analysis are explained along with some supplemental
analyses for robustness and a variable only available in one year. The chapter ends with
some MSA specific conclusions in section 6.

4.2 Applying the Theory to the MSA
Treating urban organization like interest group organization implies that
individuals prefer to organize cities which are autonomous, controllable, and effective.
All three of these goals require that the organizers marshal resources including people,
money, and legal authority to achieve them. When a political entrepreneur begins
organizing a city, he or she is selling a bundle of goods to potential residents with
preferences for what a city needs to do and how well it must do it (effectiveness), the
level of external control that will be laid on the organization (autonomy), and how closely
the residents will be able to influence the organization’s behavior (control). If the
entrepreneur is to make a profit, the bundle has to be offered at a price which both covers
the cost of the organization (including return to the entrepreneur) and that new residents
are willing to pay in the form of various taxes. Since cities are providing many public
goods, the entrepreneur can lower the price of admission –and thus sell more –if he or she
can attract more residents.
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As a result, entrepreneurs are looking to optimize the proposed new city to
maximize the return to the entrepreneur. The closer it hews to the preferences of
individuals, the more they are willing to pay, but also the more expensive the proposal
becomes because fixed costs of city organization are being borne by fewer people.
However, making the proposed city too broad might not attract enough people (they are
poached by smaller, more amenable cities) to make the city viable. Too targeted or too
broad and residents will seek out cities which are cheaper or closer to individual
preferences. In either case, the entrepreneur loses money.
The number of cities, and thus the amount of fragmentation, depends on how
many entrepreneurs can produce functioning cities that are in the preference middle zone
by combining a population and the local resources. This does not, however, imply that
all cities need to be the same in population or money. If a city has popular amenities,
residents will accept less-than-ideal preference matches to access those amenities cheaply
(ie, they will share their government with people they do not necessarily agree with on all
things). If a city is rich, it need not have a large population to survive even if it was
organized around a very narrow set of preferences. A city with a large population can
use economies of scale with poorer residents whose personal income is low enough that
they prefer low cost to perfect preference match. 24
These factors make a metropolitan area an ideal place to test this theory of
organization because in a metropolitan area there are many cities, many people, and
many preferences which entrepreneurs can try to use. A metropolitan area can support a
market for cities, as proposed by Tiebout (1956). The same type of market for
24

This would be consistent with Epple and Zelenitz (1981) argument that competition did not result in
perfect efficiency because the inelasticity of land allowed governments to capture rents. This theory
substitutes entrepreneur for governments and comes to the same conclusion.
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organization in political interest groups in the broader population would exist for city
organizers in a metropolitan area.
The circumstances of city formation are then closest to the circumstances of
interest group formation in the metropolitan area, so the theory should work best in a
metropolitan area. All the raw materials of city organization are present so that the
production function can be estimated without worrying that some necessary catalyst is
missing (as might be the case in low-population, low wealth rural areas). The multicounty Metropolitan Statistical Areas also allow for limited testing of sorting.

4.2.2 A Model of Metropolitan Urban Fragmentation
The goal of this analysis is to model the production of local general governments
formed in a metropolitan area based on the population and resources. The entrepreneur
organizing the new city needs people with diverse interests to attract residents away from
existing jurisdictions, and also needs resources to operate the new city.
Interests attach to the characteristics of the population. Race and ethnicity,
religion, economic status, political ideology, and the different business communities all
have different preferences for how a city should be run. People in general have slightly
different preferences from each other and so the more people there are, the more varied
their possible preferences are. Preferences might be based on beliefs about government’s
role, economic interests about business climate or tax rates, and selection of their
neighbors. Whatever the preferences, the more diverse they are the more opportunities
there are for entrepreneurs to tailor an organization the entrepreneur can sell to the
residents. If the preferences are monolithic, entrepreneurs cannot offer better fitting
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services to a subset of the residents. At best they can offer the same services more
efficiently. As a result, entrepreneurs would produce fewer cities.
Resources come in many types. In this analysis they are money, population, and
legal authority. In all cases, more should make cities easier to build, and so result in
entrepreneurs founding more cities. Money and population are uncomplicated. Cities are
expensive and have minimum fixed costs (which vary location to location). More money
and more residents can support more cities of the same minimum size. Legal authority is
not so simple. The power to do what residents want is an important component to being
an effective organization, but states can place many restrictions on municipal powers.
The ability to borrow money is useful, but limited if a state imposes a debt limit or
balanced budget requirement. Allowing annexation is a useful power, but can be limited
by various voting requirements or county government vetoes. A state grant of power, in
other words, can be of limited use to some but very helpful to others.
Finally there are necessary controls and contextual characteristics. First, the
population is not fixed. There are people moving in to and out of jurisdictions all the
time and these choices are not random. Movers choose their new jurisdictions for
reasons. People moving into a jurisdiction bring new preferences and new resources and
can change the materials available for supporting existing cities and forming new ones.
Movers may also consider the number of cities and the demographics of the existing
population when they move.
Second, poor people might be attracted to rich or consolidated jurisdictions
because both wealth and consolidation make welfare policies easier to implement.
However, a large split between rich and poor is a form of diversity which could cause
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fragmentation as entrepreneurs create new cities to insulate the rich from high taxes or
which can more efficiently provide welfare policies to the poor without imposing those
taxes on the rich. Poor people may also interact with movers. Poor movers could choose
to move to consolidated cities, causing economic diversity, poverty, and movement to
correlate and effect the results, even though neither poverty nor mobility are expected to
directly influence the number of cities.
Third, while political diversity can lead to more fragmentation, the level of
desired consolidation is also a political belief. Consolidation was a Progressive policy
prescription initially and among the opponents of consolidation, both in politics and in
scholarship, are modern conservatives. As a result, having a diverse population of
liberals would result in fewer cities than an equally diverse population of conservatives
simply because liberals prefer their cities bigger.
Fourth, the theory requires not only the diversity of the population but the
presence of entrepreneurs. Two types of entrepreneurs would matter: private sector or
public sector (either of whom might also run for office). More entrepreneurs lead to
more people who could organize a new political organization, and so more entrepreneurs
also lead to more potential cities.
Fifth, the amenities of a location can affect the number of cities if they are highly
desirable. A popular but limited amenity, like access to a coast or a good nightlife,
attracts residents who will accept less perfect government or higher costs to attain it.
Surrounding cities have to perform even better to attract residents away from that
amenity. In these cases wealth, which would otherwise support many cities, appears only
in a few cities.
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Sixth and finally, a diverse population may not be enough to lead to the formation
of new cities if the population is not also sorted. Cities have to have contiguous borders
and can be restricted to compact borders. A diverse population which is not all living in
the same general area cannot have a border drawn around it to form a new city, requiring
either another expensive move or that the population put up with less-than-ideal city
government. Assuming that people have a preference for neighbors like themselves and
that mobility is not excessively expensive, sorting can be assumed for a given diverse
population, but in the case of multi-county metropolitan areas, it is unnecessary. If a
population has sorted across counties, the level of sorting can be measured directly. If
the various racial, ethnic, religious, and social status populations have sorted across
county lines, then there should be more governments produced across all counties.

4.3 The Dataset
With the many theories proposed to explain local government, the many resources
which constrain interest groups, and the special abilities of local governments, the dataset
was guaranteed to have many variables. There are many types of diversity that can effect
interest group formation, there are many resources interest groups might need, and within
each of these broad categories there are numerous potential measures.
Ultimately, nine separate sources were merged together to create one dataset of
county-level variables with some state-level variables. That dataset was then split into
counties with an MSA code and those without. For this chapter, the former were
aggregated via sums, means, or medians into single cases which had a common state
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FIPS code and MSA code. In other words, MSAs were split at state lines so as to
preserve state-level variation within the MSA.
The main part of the data, and the dependent variable, come from the Census of
Governments Financial Files for the years 1992 and 2002. These data were then matched
to demographic and income variables from the 1990 and 2000 census downloaded from
the National Historic Geographic Information System (NHGIS) at nhgis.org. Individual
county level variables came from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at the
Urban Institute, the Association of Religious Data Archives, the Economic Census’
County Business Patterns data and Changes in Employment data, David Leip’s US
Elections Atlas (uselectionsatlas.org), and Berry et al’s updated Citizen and Government
Ideology scores (1998). The state level variables regarding state laws governing cities
came from the US Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1993
publication of State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and Administration,
and the 2002 Home Rule in America: A 50 State Handbook.

4.3.1 Variables Regarding Local Government Organization and Finance (Census of
Governments Financial Files Data)
The concept which I seek to explain is urban fragmentation. For this analysis, this
was defined as the total number of local general governments in an MSA, using the
Census (and by extension Office of Management and Budget) definition. 25 This is the
sum of municipal and township governments. In most states this is not remotely
problematic as these are two separate government types (if townships exist in that state).
25

OMB defines an MSA as at least one urban core with a population of 50,000, neighboring counties with
a population of at least 10,000 or a single city with a population of 5,000, and any additional neighboring
counties where the population commutes into the central city.
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In five states –Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, and New York –municipalities of some
type can be included within townships. This causes some problems when dealing with
population share across governments.
For example, Washington Township of Decatur County, Indiana, had a population
of slightly more than 12,000 in the 2000 Census, or whom slightly less than 11,500 lived
in the city of Greensburg, and the other 500 lived in four other villages or unincorporated
territory which are not identified in the data. Which is the relevant measure of local
organization? Is it the single jurisdiction which encompassed 12,000 people within the
25,000 of the county, or the first jurisdictions within the township? Countywide, is it the
eight townships or the six incorporated cities?
For the count of general governments, it did not matter. Eight townships and six
incorporated cities make 14 general governments, and that is a meaningful definition of
general government fragmentation for that county. Whatever the distribution of powers
between cities and townships, they both represent general government forms that local
residents might choose to use to gain benefits for themselves. However, it did matter for
other variables that used population.
An alternate measure of fragmentation used in studies of metropolitan areas (such
as in Lewis, 2002, seeking to explain suburbanization in metropolitan areas) is a
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of population. Having fourteen general governments seems
like a lot of fragmentation until adding that nearly two fifths of them live in a single
jurisdiction. This measure is used in a supplemental analysis at the end of the chapter.
Here, the five states which allow sub-county governments to claim the same population is
problematic. Indices rely on exclusive categories to work. If populations can appear in
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multiple categories, then when the shares of the populations are squared and added, they
can sum to more than 1. Solving that problem requires allocating the shared population
to one category or another. One option was to subsume the non-incorporated township
populations into the non-incorporated county population, the other is to drop the cities all
together. Both measures were tried, both worked. For this analysis, in these five states,
townships are ignored for population Herfindahl indices. Their population is counted as
unincorporated county jurisdiction. This makes these five states act as the thirty states
without townships, rather than as 5 states that have townships but no cities. It also fits
better with a theory of organization built around autonomy and control as the point of
forming a city to provide services already provided by a township is to gain autonomy
over those service decisions.
The other population based problem involves cities which cross county borders.
The city population is credited to only one county, even if a portion of the population
technically lives across the county line. In most cases this is a small number and can be
treated as measurement error. In the case of Amarillo, Texas, the population of Amarillo
in 2000 was 173,627, which was –in the finance files –credited to Potter County,
population 121,073. Where this happened, I used the finance files numbers and treated
the county as being consolidated. This is then counteracted by the county which just lost
population (Randall County, population 120,725) across the border being treated as more
fragmented because it just lost a major population concentration. In the MSA
aggregation, all these border disputes problems disappear because the county lines no
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longer matter, and the 173,627 people of Amarillo, Texas are identified as being part of
the 226,522 members of the Amarillo Metropolitan Statistical Area. 26
The final unusual case to deal with is New York City. New York City is a single
jurisdiction that covers five counties: Bronx, Kings, Queens, New York, and Richmond.
Rather than deal with five counties each with a fifth of a government, they were
aggregated together in a single unit. If summation was not a proper aggregator, the
median case of the five was used (which was usually Queens).
Without the dependent variable, a county could not be used in the analysis and
ended up cluttering the dataset as the merges went on, so any county which did not
appear in the Census of Governments or lacked an identifier in the Government
Integrated Directory were dropped.. Most of these cases were in the 2002 finance files or
Government Integrated Directory. There were a total of 6,226 cases across two periods,
divided into 3,134 counties in 1992 and 3,092 counties in 2002. When aggregated to
MSA level and divided at state lines, there were 359 cases in each period, for a total of
718.
As the name suggests, the Census of Governments Finance Files also provides
data on government finances. Of particular interest for the question of local government
organization are the numbers for intergovernmental revenue and expenditure. If local
governments are like interest groups, then they need resources, and most obviously they
need money. For most interest groups, money comes from the resources of their
26

There is, however, undoubtedly some measurement error involved. The quoted
numbers come from the Census Quickfacts (July, 2010), the equivalent numbers in the
Census of Governments are 173,837 for the population of Amarillo, and 113,546 for the
population of Potter County, and 278,149 for the population of the Amarillo MSA. I
suspect either revisions to the Census estimates after the CoG data were published, or
errors in the reports of local government units.
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members –and the same for cities –but cities have two advantages over other groups.
First, they can tax, and cities can adjust their tax rates. Because expenditure is an
included variable –and closely related to revenues –this analysis uses tax base, which is
from another dataset. Theoretically, because cities can control their revenue by
controlling tax rates, but not the tax base they rely on, the latter is also a better measure of
financial resources. 27. Second, cities get access to intergovernmental transfers from other
local governments, their states, and the federal government. This revenue is a resource
which can support cities which might otherwise not be financially viable, so the total
amount of money, particularly federal and state money, transferred from other
governments is important to the number of governments.
However, merely having money in the MSA is not enough. Individual cities have
to have access to it, and it is not clear in the literature that all cities have equal access to
the money directed to a given MSA. The federal government may prefer specific highly
efficient cities (Volden, 2009) or cooperative cities (Bickers and Stein, 2004), or cities
with a particular demand for money (Stein, 1981), or even just big cities with many
potential voters in them. State governments can have similar preferences or other
preferences. In either case, the resource is not freely available to all. A large pot of
money going to a single city does not encourage fragmentation, but a small pot spread
widely does. And this is true regardless of source. For this reason, Herfindahl indices for
federal and state intergovernmental revenue were created. Likewise, at the local level,
both local IG revenue and expenditure may matter to city formation. If there are many
spenders or many buyers of local government services, a city can survive by being a
27

The tax base is the absolute limit of the money a city has access too. It cannot tax more than 100%.
Higher taxes make government more expensive and therefore less likely to survive –but that is a different
concept than resource availability.

83

provider (getting resources through payments from other cities) or reducing costs (by
outsourcing its tasks). Single buyers and sellers, however, can severely limit the
resources available to other governments. Total local government IG revenue is not
included because it is drawn directly from the same tax base the local governments are
using and so is already covered by the tax base variables included elsewhere.
The final variable from the Finance Files is the average city expenditure in the
MSA. This is a control for the cost of government in the MSA and is an easy number for
an entrepreneur to look at when deciding if there are adequate resources to organize a
new city. The measure includes the mix of costs associated with government and the
level of services residents want. A high average can indicate expensive government
services, preferences for service heavy government, or both. While the mix can vary
even within an MSA, the average represents the expected cost of government, which is
the number the entrepreneur will need to know when assembling enough resources.

4.3.2 Variables Regarding Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Population
( Decennial Census, by way of the National Historic GIS)
The main theorized drivers of urban fragmentation –the raw materials that
entrepreneurs use to produce new cities –are demographic diversity and available
monetary resources. In this study, the variables of interest are race and ethnicity,
economic resources and status, and choice of living location.
These characteristics of the population are available from the Census, but data
prior to 2000 are difficult to get electronically directly. Fortunately, NHGIS.org has
compiled historic Census data back to 1790 in an easy-to-download county-based format
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similar to IPUMS. 28 The only remaining difficulty is that Census questions and
definitions vary from census to census. For example, in 1990 urban residents were
classified as living in urban areas (city) or urban areas (non-city). In 2000 urban
residents were classified as living in urban areas or urban clusters. The definitions are
different, but they both rely on the classification of urban as living in a place of a set
population and density (1,000 persons/mile2). This can be resolved by assuming that
urban areas which are not cities are on the urban fringe where unincorporated urban areas
do not risk being annexed or surrounded, which corresponds approximately to the
definition of urban cluster. Urban (city) and urban area can then be treated as close in
meaning. The alternate solution is just to add all the urban residents together, but this
loses some variation and blurs conceptually those who live in cities and those who live
near cities, and entrepreneurs may prefer different types of organization for the different
types of urban residents. These kinds of problems are endemic to Census data, but most
of the variables are consistent decade to decade.
In Census data, race refers to the main racial categories of white, black, Asian or
Pacific Islander, Alaskan native or native American, or other. Ethnicity refers to
Hispanic or non-Hispanic. For the purpose of this study, these are all grouped together as
exclusive racial/ethnic groups (so Hispanic whites, blacks, Asians et cetera appear only as
Hispanic). Ethnicity can also include primary language which has also appeared as
important in other urban organization literature (Auffhammer and Carson, 2009). This is
also included in the Census data. In the US, it is primarily English and Spanish which are
of interest. All other languages are grouped in the data (ie: French, very important in

28

Right down to the user agreement.
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Louisiana, appears as an “other European Language,” and Chinese, Korean, and Japanese
which are important to the West Coast appear as “Asian Language”).
The Census Bureau also provides data on the economic status of residents. It
includes median income, persons in poverty (either total or in subgroups up to 2 times the
poverty line), housing value quartiles, and aggregates of income and housing stock.
Combined with race and ethnicity, these variables provide measures of socio-economic
status for individuals. Race/ethnicity and language variables are aggregated into two
more Herfindahl indices. If these indices are close to 1, this indicates little variation in
the culture –there is a clearly dominant race/ethnicity or language, which would translate
into fewer cities. The economic variables do not conform to an index easily, so instead
the economic diversity of the population is measured with the inter-quartile range of
housing values (while variance might be preferable, it is not available). Poverty and
wealth –in the form of housing stock and aggregate income, which are also two major tax
bases –are measured separately. More wealth should lead to more cities. Poverty is a
control variable with an unpredicted sign.
These measures of the culture of the city are useful, but Census Bureau also
produces two other variables. First, it provides the mobility measure, which is the
number of people who moved into the county in which they are being counted in the last
5 years (the question specifically is whether they lived in the same county 5 years prior).
Mobility is another control without a predicted sign. It also provides the median value of
housing and median income. While these are related to wealth and tax base, the purpose
they serve in this analysis is controlling for amenities within the MSA. If median
housing is expensive, this reflects good amenity values. It is a control variable and could
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be positive or negative. Median income is a measure of the community’s barriers to entry
(ie: how expensive it is to live there, beyond the price of housing), and is again a control
variable. 29 Expensive barriers could reduce the number of cities, or increase the number
of cities since there is nowhere else for new residents to go.
In the analysis of MSAs, the race/ethnicity and language variables are also coded
to check for sorting. Due to the constraints of the model described below, this was
limited to the concentrations of whites, blacks, Hispanics, English speakers and Spanish
speakers. Also, since the theory discusses homogenous groups, the catch-all categories
of “Asian” or “Other European” do not fit the theory. Again, these variables used
Herfindahl indices, but unlike the other Herfindahl indices in the analysis, a value close
to 1 indicates sorting into a single county either by choice or because there are no other
counties available. Sorting by community would be more theoretically helpful, but is not
possible with the historical data which are aggregated at the county level. If it is by
choice, then it indicates sorting and should result in more cities. If it is because there are
no other counties to move into, it indicates that everyone has to live in a comparatively
compact area and therefore sorting is at least easier, leading again to more cities.
Concentrations of blacks may reduce the number of cities due to black block-voting and
the historical fear of being divided across so many jurisdictions they lose voting power.
Similar indices were computed for those in poverty (total number) and for those
in the 8 poverty categories up to 2 times the poverty line, however the latter indices
tended to be highly collinear and cause problems in non-linear models. Dropping the 8
category indices and using the total in poverty was considered, but the 8 indices had
29

Household Median Income and Median Housing value correlate at .6544. The assumption that housing
values capture amenity values and income captures cost of living can be relaxed to a more general “place
is expensive” without changing the theory.
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effects routinely on the likelihood functions at greater than 95% confidence and the
variation across categories indicated that not all poverty was the same. To keep these
indices as controls for poverty, the eight indices were factored, producing a single strong,
positive factor, indicating that if one category of poverty was concentrated in a single
county, the others were as well. This is likely driven by the number of single-county
MSAs. If the poor are concentrated in a single location, however, this is incentive to
have fewer cities for two reasons:first, the poor might prefer it, and second because the
poor, being all in one place, are no threat to any wealthy who can move away to the
handful of other cities available.
Finally, the number of people who changed counties in the prior 5 years is
included to control for mobility. Mobility itself is not theorized to have any particular
influence on the number of cities. Movers have no way to know where future cities
might spring up prior to the entrepreneurs beginning their organization, and therefore are
attracted by the existing cities and currently planned cities. Once moved, they are then
able to influence the number of cities –but not based on their status as movers. However,
the number of movers can subtly change the make-up of the population such that projects
which were not possible prior to the new movers are now possible. Many movers
correlated with race, poverty, or industry becomes an omitted variable and biases the
results in unpredictable ways.

4.3.3 Variables Regarding the Level of Existing Organization by Non-Profits and
Businesses (from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at the Urban Institute, the
Economic Census, and the Association of Religious Data Archives)
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The next set of variables come from several sources and relate to pre-existing
social organization and entrepreneurial ability. These organizations can be thought of as
interest groups who might want their own city, or another form of social diversity, or as a
practice field for organizers. In all cases, the hypothesized effect is the same: more
organization, more diversity, more differences should lead to more cities.
The first set of variables relate to the number of organizers available. These
organizers have a gift for getting other people to join groups, or for getting other people
to take their services, but there are two ways to do this: through non-profits or through
businesses. The number of registered non-profit organizations comes from the National
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) and reflects the level of non-profit organizers in
the MSA. Due to restrictions on the data, the 1992 Census of Governments data had to
be merged with 1995 NCCS data. For similar comparison, the 2002 CoG data was
merged with 2005 NCCS data. In both cases, the data are the number of registered nonprofits in the third quarter of the year. For-profit organization, through businesses, is
measured using the Change in Employment data from the Economic Census. Businesses
which had no employees in quarter 1 and had employees in quarter 4 were recorded as
business births, while businesses with employees in quarter 1 but none in quarter 4 were
recorded as deaths. Both of these numbers are useful measures of private sector
entrepreneurialism. High numbers of births reflects the ease of organization, while high
numbers of deaths reflects risk taking. Economic effects are controlled for in the
measures of wealth described above. Unfortunately, the Economic Census only started
recording these data at the county level in 1999 –in the middle of the two time periods of
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this panel. As a result, it is excluded from the main analysis, but does appear in the
supplemental analysis for 2000.
The business organization measures which are used for both periods are the
employment and payroll statistics from the County Business Patterns (CBP) data. These
data report how many employees, and total payroll, for businesses in each county by
industry code and sub-code. Complicating a straight-forward analysis is that in the
middle of the panel (1997) the industry codes changed from Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) to North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). The
NAICS has many more codes than SIC, and so a county economy could appear more
diverse simply because it is being divided more ways. To solve this problem, the 2002
CBP 2-digit NAICS codes were converted to the 1-letter SIC categories. 30 This was not
quite a 1-to-1 match, but it offered the fewest places for error. The crosswalk is included
as an appendix.
The concept of business organization is again one of diversity. If there is a
diverse business community, the different businesses will have different needs from the
cities, and may prefer one which is more amenable to their concerns. Heavy industry
might want a proactive city which builds a lot of infrastructure, while service industries
want a city which does not tax them, for example. Once again, Herfindahl indices were
created for employment and payroll. If the employment index is close to 1, it indicates
that the MSA has the bulk of its workers in a single industry. If the payroll index is close
to 1, it indicates that –wherever the workers are –most of the payroll in the MSA comes

30

The full conversion is an appendix to the dissertation, The 10 categories are: Agriculture, Mining,
Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance/Insurance, Services,
and Public Services. The last category does not appear in the CBP data.
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from a single industry. Consolidation of industry should reduce the opportunities for, and
the available entrepreneurs for, new cities.
Finally, some research in Europe (Auffhammer and Carson, 2009) has suggested
that religious divisions can lead to multiple cities. The same could happen in the United
States. In Wisconsin, Lutherans and Catholics live in close proximity and might each
prefer their own governments. Data on religious adherents comes from surveys of
congregation rolls collated by the Association of Religious Data Archives. These surveys
are approximately decadal. The surveys are not, however, exhaustive. For example,
black churches typically do not participate and there are no rolls of atheists/agnostics or
spiritual-but-not-religious people. Also, since adherent cross borders to be in their
congregations, the county populations cannot be substituted for the denominator in any
index. The non-religious are therefore treated as an unorganized separate body for
purposes of the religion Herfindahl index. Because the congregations in each survey vary
decade to decade, and because many denominations are regional, the index was created
by using the major categories of Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant,
Orthodox, and Other.
These variables also allow, in the case of multiple county MSAs, for testing of
sorting, and so each of the industries, and the major religious denominations including
“Other” had its own index created measuring whether it was sorted into a single county
or spread across multiple counties in the MSA. The indices work exactly like the ones
for race and language. Values close to 1 indicate sorting into single counties and should
result in more cities.
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Likewise, the nine industries were formed into indices for employment and
payroll to model whether the industries were concentrated in one county. Unfortunately,
these measures tended to be highly collinear, not significant, and cause problems with
non-linear models, and yet routinely affected the likelihood at more than 95% confidence.
To include them as controls, both employment and payroll concentration across counties
were factored, which each produced strong single positive factors indicating that if one
industry was concentrated in a single county, the others would be too.

4.3.4 Variables Related to Political Organization and Ideology (from David Leip’s Atlas
of US Presidential Elections, and from Berry et al, 1998)
The final set of county characteristics (there are still state characteristics to come)
are political. A perfectly good reason to desire a new city is because half the city is
constantly outvoting the other half or forcing compromises that annoy everyone. If the
residents of an urban area cannot agree on who they wish to represent them and govern
them, it would make sense to separate and each select their own governments. Entirely
separate from the organizational question (which party, or which set of representatives) is
the ideology question.
The political organization variable is measured by the results of gubernatorial
elections in the first year past the decennial census -1990-1993 and 2000-2003. For
states that have 2 year terms for governors (New Hampshire and Vermont) the offpresidential year was used because it was easier to code. The county election returns
were purchased from David Leip’s Atlas of US Presidential Elections website, which is a
private collation of data from State Secretaries of State and political almanacs of election
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returns. The two largest vote-getters in the state were used –and if that did not include
the Democratic Party, those numbers were saved separately. The ratio of majority party
to second-party was calculated giving a number with a minimum of 1 (perfect parity) and
getting larger. If third parties took more than 10% of the vote combined, a dummy
variable was coded to mark the presence of of third parties (10% was chosen because in
3-party races this was enough for a third party to take at least one county, while in 4-ormore party races it might not be). The sign of the ratio is not necessarily predicted by
theory. If it is close to 1, elections are competitive meaning it might not in anyone’s
interest to split the jurisdiction. On the other hand, close elections are also the ones
where there might be enough people to justify a new jurisdiction. The opposite problem
occurs with high numbers. A dominating majority gives a reason to form a new city, but
there may not be enough people to make it work. Nonetheless, the tentative prediction is
that a high ratio should cause fragmentation in the MSA. Third parties are unequivocal.
An organized third party should be able to produce new cities. The number of Democrats
was preserved separately for 2 reasons. First, Democrats tend to be an urban party, and
so may have a party interest in fewer cities. Second, if Democrats are all clustered
together in one place, it implies partisan sorting, which might lead to more cities.
As important as the partisan organization is the ideological bent of residents.
Urban consolidation was a Progressive policy and so more liberal populations may prefer
fewer larger cities, even if they are Republicans. These data come from a dataset created
by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson in a 1998 AJPS article and maintained on
Fording’s website to the present. The ideology scores are based on the votes state
residents made for US Representatives and Senator and that Representative’s scores by
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Americans for Democratic Action and Committee on Political Education (both liberal
advocacy groups) to provide measures of state and citizen liberalism. I hypothesize that
an MSA located in a more liberal state will have fewer cities, all else equal. It is this
variable that knocks the District of Columbia out of the analysis, as it elects no national
representatives, and so value could not be calculated.

4.3.5 Variables Regarding State Laws Governing Local Government Organization (from
State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and Administration, and Home Rule
in America: A 50 State Handbook.)
The last variables are the state laws governing the powers given to cities. There
are 10 such variables chosen because they were appropriate and mostly consistent across
the two publications that housed the data. State Laws Governing Local Government
Structure and Administration has many charts describing the laws, but most of them are
dichotomous –whether the state in question has such a law. Home Rule in America
typically has more variation in the charts, but to merge them together, that variation was
lost in favor of a 1/0 variable. Also, in the case that the latter source was missing a
state’s data, it was assumed that there was no change.
The first of the variables is the presence of Home Rule –a law granting authority
to cities that the state cannot tamper with outside certain restrictions. If the state lacks
Home Rule, it is coded a 0. If it is protected by statute, it is coded a 1. If it is protected
by the state Constitution, it is a coded a 2. The second variable is whether the state courts
have adopted Dillon’s Rule, which is the judicial doctrine that cities are creatures of the
state and the state can do whatever it wants to them. This is coded 1 if present, 0
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otherwise. Oddly some states have both –and Connecticut manages to constitutionally
protect Home Rule while simultaneously having a Dillon’s Rule court.
The third and fourth variables are whether there are statutory limitations on
incorporation or annexation (coded 1 for yes, 0 for no). Fifth through eighth cover
whether annexation may be done 5.) Voluntarily, 6.) via city ordinance, 7.) only with
county government permission, and 8.) via a vote of the effected residents. Despite all
relating to annexation, they are neither mutually exclusive laws, nor are they highly
correlated (strongest correlation is .2746 between ordinance and voluntary annexation)
and so they are kept individually rather than being factored or otherwise formed into an
index. Variables 9 and 10 are whether the state requires cities have a balanced budget
and whether the state caps the debt cities may take on.
Finally, there are fixed effects for all states, with Alabama being the excluded
case by virtue of being first alphabetically.

4.4 The Typical MSA
Much discussion of urban areas, cities, and metropolises tends to be based off the
familiar references –New York City seems popular. Edward Glaeser blogs for the New
York Times Economix blog addressing many issues, but particularly urban issues. Table
4.4.1 looks at his choice of American examples for a month of blogging on urban issues
near when his book Triumph of the City was published. 31

31

Identified by the phrase book title appearing in his byline
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Table 4.4.1: Popular City Examples (from the New York Times Economix blog)
Date of Entry and Title
1 February 2011, “It’s always the urban pot
that boils over.”
8 February 2011, “Assessing the Daley
Legacy in Chicago.”
22 February 2011, “Can Detroit find the
Road Forward?”
8 March 2011, “How Seattle Transformed
Itself.”

City Examples
Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, and New
York City
Chicago, New York City, New Orleans,
Cleveland, Detroit, and Boston
Detroit and Flint
Seattle, Detroit, St. Louis,

Even when restricted only to the Sunbelt in a later article, his examples are
Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, Phoenix, and Charlotte. These are all well known cities and so
they make good examples –people can be assumed to understand a comparison of
Chicago’s economic wellbeing to Detroit’s. Are they typical examples, though?
The answer is that they probably are not, but this section will look explicitly at the
question of “what is a typical MSA?” The goal of this section is to avoid thinking about
“urban organization” as “the organization of New York.” New York is an unusual place
–it is five counties and many more cities living under a single government because of a
state law (albeit one approved by referendum in New York in 1898, and which the New
York Assembly revisited as recently as 1989 32). Rather, when discussing deviations from
average or median cities, examples should be of actual mean or median cities, or in this
analysis, mean and median MSAs. Table 4.4.2 shows the mean, median, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum of MSAs on four measures of size: population,
aggregate income, median home value, and number of counties across the 2 periods of
the analysis.

32

The basic outline of the story was included in a report in City Journal at the time of the Staten Island
secession vote. Archived on the Internet at http://www.city-journal.org/article02.php?aid=1519
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Table 4.4.2 Summary Statistics of Select Size of MSA measures
Measure
Population (100k)
Aggregate Income (1b, 2002$)
Median House Value (100k,
2002$)
Number of Counties

Standard
Mean Median Deviation
Minimum Maximum
6.06
2.43
11.07
0.05
129.00
.000
50.334
2.26
0.35
6.02
1.06
2.34

0.90
1.00

0.55
2.23

0.44
1.00

4.69
20.00

The first thing to note are that the data are right skewed. Aggregate income is
most skewed with a skewness of 6.055, and the median house value is least with a
skewness of 2.738. 33 In this case the heuristic of mean greater than the median also
works. The second thing to notice is that the average MSA has 600,000 people, with 2.25
billion dollars in income, with median housing values just above $100,000 spread across
slightly more than 2 counties within a single state. 34 However, given the skewness, the
median is a better measure of “typical,” and these MSAs are much smaller. Median
MSAs have roughly a third of the population, slightly less than a sixth the income, have
only one county, but only slightly less housing value. When separated by period, it is
notable that these measures increase from 1992 to 2002, except for the number of
counties which shrinks slightly.
No city is exactly average or exactly median on all four measures. Table 4.4.3,
however, shows 9 MSAs that are within a quarter standard deviation on all 4.

33
34

They are also all leptokurtic, with high peaks and long tails.
All dollar amounts are constant 2002 dollars.
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Table 4.4.3 MSAs which are close to Average
MSA
Fresno
Las Vegas
Huntsville
Mobile
Daytona Beach
Pensacola
Springfield
Akron
Canton--Massillon

State
CA
NV
AL
AL
FL
FL
IL
OH
OH

Population
Income
(100k)
(Billions)
7.5558 2.12394
7.5924
0.945
3.42376
1.8652
5.40258
1.3935
4.93175
3.7077
4.12153
1.3353
3.43513
0.855
6.9496
2.1694
4.06934
2.9294

Median
Housing (100k) Counties Year
1.804254
2
1992
1.061831
2
1992
0.9485
2
2002
1.015
2
2002
1.0175
2
2002
0.9585
2
2002
0.924
2
2002
1.1605
2
2002
0.95
2
2002

Even when separated by period, the average MSA is still small compared to the
common examples. The five closest-to-average MSAs are shown in table 4.4.4 for 1992
and for 2002. Based on their appearances in both periods, perhaps Mobile, Alabama and
Akron, Ohio could be dubbed the most average MSAs in the US from 1992 to 2002.

Table 4.4.4 Five MSAs Which Are Close to Average Within Their Period
MSA

State

Population (100k)

Income (billions)

Housing Value (100k)

AL
FL
IN
OH
SC

4.76923
4.89483
6.04526
6.57575
4.53331

0.048668
0.173412
0.571819
0.05782
0.061349

0.751489
1.063754
0.792526
0.83228
0.931667

AL
FL
FL
OH
OH

5.40258
4.93175
4.12153
6.9496
4.06934

1.3935
3.7077
1.3353
2.1694
2.9294

1.015
1.0175
0.9585
1.1605
0.95

1992
Mobile
Sarasota--Bradenton
Gary
Akron
Columbia
2002
Mobile
Daytona Beach
Pensacola
Akron
Canton--Massillon
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But these are average MSA, and the data have a hard right skew. What are the
median MSAs? With the high peak in the data, there are 134 MSA-state-years within a
quarter standard deviation of the median. They range across Auburn, Alabama,
Bloomington, Illinois, Lawrence, Kansas, and College Station, Texas. 35 Table 4.4.5
shows the five most median MSAs in each period.
However defined, the typical MSA is smaller than the 8-million people of New
York City, let alone the tri-state area, so when contemplating the scale of organization in
the next section it is important to recognize that most of the places contemplating their
level of fragmentation are not huge and faceless blocks of people, but rather a few
hundred thousand from whom an entrepreneur need only find enough to found a city –not
enough to compete with a mega-metropolis. In these terms, the task ahead of the
entrepreneur is much less daunting.
Table 4.4.5 Five MSAs Which Are Close to Median Within Their Period 36
MSA

State Population (100k)

Income (billions)

Housing Value (100k)

1992
South Bend
Lincoln
Galveston--Texas City
Lubbock
Portland--Vancouver
2002
Merced
Gainesville
Bloomington--Normal
Erie
Lubbock

IN
NE
TX
TX
WA

2.4705
2.1364
2.1739
2.2263
2.3805

0.046
0.031
0.323
0.370
0.071

0.6438
0.7925
0.7605
0.6887
0.9490

CA
FL
IL
PA
TX

2.1055
2.1795
2.7788
2.8084
2.4262

1.110
0.550
1.158
1.169
0.632

1.111
0.973
1.148
0.853
0.691

35

A colleague mentioned that most of the cities on that list are college towns, but confirming that and
then theorizing why is outside the scope of this analysis.
36
And that is Portland-Vancouver, Washington. It is the portion of the MSA on the other side of the state
line. On that grounds it might be excluded as being part of another MSA –that problem is not present in
the other examples.
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4.5 Analysis of Metropolitan Fragmentation by Entrepreneurial Use of Population
Diversity, Local Resources, and State Laws
To test the effects of population diversity, local resources, and state laws
(theorized to be done via an entrepreneur) on MSA fragmentation, the number of general
governments was regressed on many measures and controls. As the number of general
governments in an MSA is a count variable, the initial analysis was done with crosssectional negative binomial regression, which is a non-linear maximum likelihood
estimation method and a special case of cross-sectional Poisson regression. However,
during the initial analyses, the model could not find a solution to the regression specified.
The data were then run as a cross sectional Poisson regression, which could find a
solution, and had the same or nearly the same log-likelihood (the difference was literally
zero in most cases, making reference to the X2 table superfluous) indicating that the
proper distributional specification for the model was Poisson. The implications of this
are discussed in the next section.
The other discovery in initial tests was the colinearity problems of the poverty and
industry sorting variables already mentioned. Those two categories of variables were
factored into two factors, which were singular, strong, and positive, that can be
interpreted as the propensity of all the categories within each factor to be forced into
single counties, whether by geography or choice. Once modeled with the factors, the
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likelihood functions were still worse than the failing models with all the variables
included, but they converged. 37
Those problems dealt with, the model was ready for specification. The vector of
variables, their means, and their hypothesized impacts, and reasons are presented in Table
4.5.1. The Poisson model itself is estimated by maximum likelihood, specifying a
Poisson distribution of the dependent variable. It is a numeric calculation, meaning that
the calculation adjusts the parameters until the likelihood function cannot go higher.

37

The three indices prevent a likelihood ratio test because the model with all the variables is not a special
case of the one with three indices. Without a statistical test, this is still justified, first because it allowed
the model to be solved and second because there were strong factors in all three sets of indices. The only
reason the variables are not jettisoned entirely for being proxies for the number of counties (already
included in the model) is that some of the variation –however buried in geography –does relate to sorting,
which is theoretically important.
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Table 4.5.1 Summary of Model Parameters for Cross-Sectional Time Series Poisson Regression (2 periods, N=718)
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Variable
General Governments
MSA Population (100k)
Urban Areas population (100k)

Mean
St. Dev.
33.27577
48.6953
6.05533 11.06878
4.83560 9.864178

Prediction Theory
DV
+
People a resource, more diverse preferences
+
People a resource, more diverse preferences

Urban Cluster population (100k)
Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)
Average City Expenditure (1b)
Total State revenue to MSA (10m)
Total Federal revenue to MSA (10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal revenue
to MSA
HHI of state revenue to MSA
HHI of local revenue to MSA
HHI of local intergovernment expenditure
to MSA
Aggregate Income for the MSA (1b)
HHI of income concentration across
counties
Household Median Income (10k)
Persons in Poverty (100k)
Poverty concentration factor
Aggregate Housing Value (10b)
Median Housing Value (100k)
Housing Value Interquartile Range (100k)
Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)
Ratio of Majority to Minority Party voters

0.29726 0.3798731 +
1.00909 1.502714 ?
0.07453 0.3635765 32.24948 122.9769 4.71643 18.89659 -

People a resource, more diverse preferences
Control variable
Expensive governments are harder to organize
A single recipient can control the MSA
As can a single buyer

0.56187 0.2440408 0.96216
1.4533 0.50589 0.2645982 +

Concentration indicates not all have access
Concentration indicates not all have access
Vibrant market for local goods can support cities

0.57321 0.3343219 +
2.25846 6.023189 +

Vibrant market for local goods can support cities
Income Tax base a resource

0.80012
3.88005
0.65183
3.1E-09
1.87439
1.05816
0.69251
2.65098
1.64611

Concentration indicates not all have access
Wealthier residents can afford more cities
Wealthy try to avoid the poor
Unitless control of concentrated poverty
Property base is a resource
Control for local ammenities
Gap of rich to poor encourages new cities
NFP entrepreneurs can become city founders
Being outvoted an incentive to make a city

0.2486309
0.8187621
1.365133
0.9997927
3.927196
0.5475544
0.3778097
4.415923
0.7257001

+
+
+
?
+
+
+
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Table 4.5.1 Continued
3rd Parties (1/0)
Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)
Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)
Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)
Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)
Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)
Annexation allowed by City Ordinance
(1/0)
Annexation allowed with County
Permission (1/0)
Annexation requires referendum (1/0)
State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)
State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
Citizen Liberalism (state)
Government Liberalism (state)
Total number of Democrats (100k)
HHI of Democrat concentration
HHI of Racial Diversity across MSA
HHI of White concentration across
counties
HHI of Black concentration across
counties
HHI of Hispanic concentration across
counties
HHI of Language Diversity across MSA
HHI of English primary language
concentration

Mean
0.09331
1.74234
0.13649
0.91504
0.97493
0.75070

St. Dev.
0.2910758
0.5801612
0.3435477
0.6741052
0.1564456
0.4329115

Prediction
+
+
-

0.54457 0.4983569 0.22145
0.46100
0.40370
0.80641
45.45297
45.76505
0.83843
0.76919
0.68435

0.4155111
0.4988244
0.4910199
0.3953893
11.43944
23.53155
1.391833
0.2621629
0.1708592

-

Theory
Being outvoted an incentive to make a city
Protects city interests
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Liberals prefer consolidation
Liberals prefer consolidation
Democrats prefer consolidation
Can only control where they have majority
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences

0.75015 0.2792196 +

Sorting required for more cities

0.85433 0.2065288 +

Sorting required for more cities

0.79729 0.2428424 +
0.71059 0.1192594 -

Sorting required for more cities
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences

0.75789

Sorting required for more cities

0.272118 +
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Table 4.5.1 Continued
HHI of Spanish primary language
concentration
HHI of Religion Diversity across MSA
HHI of Mainline Protestant concentration
HHI of Evangelical Protestant
concentration
HHI of Catholic concentration
HHI of Orthodox concentration
HHI of Other Religions concentration
Number of Counties
HHI of Employment Diversity across MSA
HHI of Payroll Diversity across MSA
Employment Concentration Factor
Payroll Concentration Factor
State Fixed Effects
State/MSA pair Random Effect

Mean

St. Dev. Prediction Theory

0.79249 0.2448225 +
0.43422 0.1213245 0.77374 0.262918 +

Sorting required for more cities
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Sorting required for more cities

0.77158
0.80337
0.41943
0.81569
2.33565
0.23837
0.24563
-5.6E-09
-2.1E-09

Sorting required for more cities
Sorting required for more cities
Sorting required for more cities
Sorting required for more cities
County borders give variety to local laws, options for cities
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Unitless control of concentration of employment
Unitless control of concentration of payroll
Control for state time-invariant characteristics
Grouping for the panel. Random effect chosen to preserve
degrees of freedom and because MSA/County borders are
somewhat arbitrary and not chosen by residents.

0.264324
0.2455918
0.4698754
0.2446862
2.233293
0.0362605
0.0534503
0.9971463
0.9963808

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

The following model is used to estimate differences from the mean from
differences across cases:

𝐸 [𝑌𝑖𝑡 |𝑥𝑖𝑡 ] = 𝑒 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽+[𝛼𝑖 +𝜀𝑖𝑡]

Where:

Y= the number of general governments
e= Euler’s constant
x= a vector of explanatory variables including measures of diversity, resources,
and sorting
β= the coefficient weights to be estimated
α= the random effect variation
ε= error (epsilon chosen rather than e because there is already an e in the model)
i is the identifier for an MSA/state, and
t is the identifier for the period.

The model uses random effects on MSAs to preserve degrees of freedom and to
allow the several more fixed effects to work within the numerical calculation. This
requires assuming the expected value of x it a is zero, or that the MSA characteristics
measured do not correlate with the unmeasured characteristics of the MSAs. This is
jurstified because the MSAs are chosen by Census based on measured characteristics, but
their borders are determined separately and arbitrarily by borders of the constituent
counties. The other assumption required is that Y be distributed Poisson, which is
justified by the likelihood ratio tests already described. The estimation procedure is done
via MLE and the reported coefficients are deviations from the mean, just as in OLS.
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4.5.2 Summary of Results
Due to the size of the model, the specific parts are reported separately below, but
the model over-all is supportive of several parts of the theory and the entire regression is
reported at the end. Table 4.5.2 shows the model descriptive and test statistics. The 718
cases only form 358 groups of 2 because Washington, DC lacked one variable and so
dropped out in both periods. The fixed effect for Massachusetts was dropped for being
collinear with some other variable. The model’s results are significantly different from a
null model of all parameters=0 at the .1% alpha level.
Table 4.5.2 Poisson Regression Summary and Tests
Obs
Groups
Obs/Group
Loglikelihood
Wald(101)
X2

718
358
2
-2303.6307
2389.36
P>0.001

The data show strong support for the resource view of city organization, with the
predicted signs and significance on the costs of city government and the financial
resources available to entrepreneurs. State laws, with the exception of statutory home
rule, have the expected signs and significances as well. Resident diversity and
preferences are more mixed. Liberalism has the expected sign and significance, but
while Democrats are signed as expected (positively), they are not significant. Racial,
religious, and employment heterogeneity have the expected signs, but only religious
diversity is significant. Payroll heterogeneity is signed positively, and not significant.
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Language diversity is significant but unexpectedly positive. Measures of sorting are
insignificant except for concentrations of poverty and concentrations of whites and
blacks. Poverty and black concentration are associated with fewer cities, but white
concentration leads to more. Of 48 state fixed effects, 31 are significant and 35 are
negative relative to excluded Alabama, suggesting there are additional state level
characteristics that affect fragmentation but are not measured in this analysis.

4.5.3 Results for Measures of Finance and Urban Population.
Table 4.5.3 Results for Measures of Finance and Urban Population
General Governments
MSA Population (100k)
Urban Areas population
(100k)
Urban Cluster population
(100k)
Moved Counties in last 5
years (100k)
Average City Expenditure
(1b)
Total State revenue to
MSA (10m)
Total Federal revenue to
MSA (10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of
federal revenue to MSA
HHI of state revenue to
MSA
HHI of local
intergovernmental
revenue to MSA
HHI of local
intergovernment
expenditure to MSA

Coef.
Std. Err
Z
P>|z| Significant Predict/Right
-0.00348 0.00379 -0.92 0.359
+ no
0.02415

0.01345

1.80

0.073 +

+ yes

0.10701

0.05709

1.87

0.061 +

+ yes

0.08654

0.04292

2.02

0.044 *

?

-2.99602

0.54210

0.00236

0.00166

1.42

0.157

+ yes

0.00023

0.00037

0.63

0.531

+ yes

-0.26827

0.07059

-3.80 >0.001 **

- yes

0.02507

0.00883

2.84 >0.001 **

- no

-0.22344

0.06405

-3.49 >0.001 **

- yes

-0.11100

0.04669

-2.38

- yes

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI
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-5.53 >0.001 **

0.017 *

- yes

The surprising result of this portion of the analysis is how little urban population
matters. Neither a large population, nor an urban population, nor a population living on
the edges of an urban population seems to strongly affect the number of general
governments. The MSA population is insignificant and the urban populations are
significant only at 10%. At 10%, 5 million urban or 1 million urban cluster residents
predicts one additional city. Also surprisingly unimportant are super-governments’
largesse. Rather, the statistically significant measures are local factors: are federal and
state funds going to a single city or township jurisdiction? Are there many buyers and
sellers, and how expensive is government in the MSA? These measures tend to support
the theoretical predictions. Consolidation of funds is associated with consolidation of
governments, and higher average cost governments are fewer governments. If
entrepreneurs cannot expect to get access to funds because all funds go to few
jurisdictions then they will not be less able to organize a new government. The exception
to this rule is state funds, which are significant, but are associated with fragmentation
when such funds are concentrated. However, these coefficients are small. At their best,
several of these measures would have to be consolidated to reduce an MSA by one
general government.
It is the cost of government which deters city formation. If there are large
expenditures involved (1 billion 2002 dollars in this case) per city that is enough to
reduce the MSA by nearly 3 general governments. If residents have high cost
preferences, or if government services are high cost, or other factors increase the average
cost of government, then individual residents are unwilling to create another one.
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Finally, there is mobility. Those who changed counties in the previous five years
are associated with more general governments. Slightly more than a million movers
indicates a new general government –but this would be more people than live in the
average MSA. As a control variable, movers serve their purpose. The exact
interpretation of this primary effect is difficult, though. It could be endogenous, with
movers attracted to the choices of a fragmented MSA. It could be that a population with
many movers is a place with many people in the market for government, and so is a
profitable place for entrepreneurs.

4.5.4 Results for Measures of Economic, Not-for-Profit, and Political Organization
Once again, what does not seem to matter is almost as interesting as what does for
measures of economic, not-for-profit, and political organization. Neither aggregate
income, nor the wealth of residents, nor the spread of residential wealth has a significant
impact on the number of general governments. Even being politically outvoted is not
significant. Rather, the significant measures are the concentration of poverty and the
presence of third parties. Both are also signed as predicted. This leaves poverty
concentration ambiguous. It could be either that the poor prefer consolidated cities and
so, if they all move to a single location they do not create new cities (recalling that
mobility has been controlled for) or it could be that the wealthy are not threatened by
poor people in a neighboring jurisdiction. Third parties –not a majority of the state
electorate –may satisfy their preferences with local governments of their own.
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Table 4.5.4 Results for Measures of Economic, Not-for-Profit and Politics
General Governments
Coef.
Std. Err
Z
P>|z| Significant Predict/Right
Aggregate Income for the
MSA (1b)
0.00072
0.00184
0.39 0.698
+ yes
HHI of income
concentration across
counties
-0.03539
0.07568
-0.47 0.640
- yes
Household Median Income
(10k)
0.01179
0.05364
0.22 0.826
+ yes
Persons in Poverty (100k)
Poverty concentration
factor
Aggregate Housing Value
(10b)
Median Housing Value
(100k)
Housing Value
Interquartile Range (100k)
Registered Not-for-Profits
(1k)
Ratio of Majority to
Minority Party voters
3rd Parties (1/0)

0.00324

0.06528

0.05

-0.67688

0.19309

0.01464

0.01657

0.88

-0.18481

0.10455

-1.77

0.13235

0.13164

0.00455

0.960

-3.51 >0.001 **

+ yes
- yes

0.377

+ yes

0.077 +

?

1.01

0.315

+ yes

0.01581

0.29

0.773

+ yes

0.01742

0.02159

0.81

0.420

+ yes

0.12367

0.04967

2.49

0.013 *

+ yes

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI

Finally, median housing value is significant at 10%, and may be a type 1 error,
but its sign is interesting. Being negative it indicates that expensive housing –holding the
total value of housing constant –is associated with fewer cities. A million dollar median
house reduces an MSA by a single general government. This could be evidence for
agglomeration effects where the benefit of living in the particular jurisdiction
simultaneously bids up the value of housing and reduces the opportunities for more city
organization. It could also be nothing.
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4.5.5 Results for Measures of State Laws, State Liberalism, and Democrats
Despite the theory’s emphasis on resources and population, the variables on state
laws, liberalism, and Democrats are where much of the data point. Most of the variables
are significant and pointed the right way, though many are quite small in their impact.
The unexpected results are from statutory and constitutional home rule protection,
which despite protecting cities from state power, are still associated with fewer general
governments. Perhaps home rule protections are not that strong, or come with strings that
are not measured in this analysis. How home rule protections would, of themselves,
reduce the number of general governments is not in this theory. Dillon’s Rule states,
however, are unsurprising. In states with an unsympathetic judiciary there are, on
average, slightly more than 2 fewer cities in their MSAs. All the other restrictions on
cities likewise make them less powerful, therefore less effective, and therefore less useful
to entrepreneurs trying to organize new cities. Annexation by ordinance does not fit the
pattern, but is also statistically insignificant. This might signify that it does not matter, or
that the ability to annex without many vetoes is a power cities desire.
Citizen liberalism is significant and signed as expected, but is small enough that it
would only have a noticeable effect (1 fewer general government) in the most liberal
places. Government liberalism, is signed the opposite of the expectation and is also
significant. What this means is unclear. The weight is small, so its practical effect is
close to none. Finally, the number and distribution of Democrats are signed as expected,
but not statistically significant.
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Table 4.5.5 Results for Measures of State Laws, State Liberalism, and Democrats
General Governments
Statutory Home Rule
Protection (2/1/0)

Coef.

Std. Err

Z

P>|z|

Significant Predict/Right

-0.43868 0.06527 -6.72 >0.001 **

+ no

Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)
Laws limiting Incorporation
(1/0)

-2.39153 0.32450 -7.37 >0.001 **

- yes

-0.03572 0.02473 -1.44

0.149

- yes

Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)
Annexation allowed
voluntarilly (1/0)
Annexation allowed by City
Ordinance (1/0)
Annexation allowed with
County Permission (1/0)
Annexation requires
referendum (1/0)
State requires Balanced
Budget (1/0)

-0.60300 0.18075 -3.34

0.001 *

- yes

-0.03948 0.03449 -1.14

0.252

- yes

0.146

- no

0.015 *

- yes

State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
Citizen Liberalism (state)
Government Liberalism (state)
Total number of Democrats
(100k)
HHI of Democrat
concentration

0.05065 0.03487

1.45

-0.14432 0.05906 -2.44

-0.17633 0.04103 -4.30 >0.001 **

- yes

-0.15087 0.03476 -4.34 >0.001 **

- yes

0.05432 0.04941

1.10

0.272

-0.01070 0.00290 -3.68 >0.001 **
0.00190 0.00065

2.92

- no
- yes

0.004 *

- no

-0.02060 0.02586 -0.80

0.426

- yes

-0.42957 0.60263 -0.71

0.476

- yes

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI

4.5.6 Results for Measures of Racial, Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Diversity
Cultural diversity is inconsistent across the dataset. None of it is particularly
significant, and signs are both positive and negative. Religious diversity is enough to
have 1 fewer general government if the entire population fits under one broad category of
religion, but sorting is not significant. Language concentration, however, is positive,
indicating that if the entire metropolis speaks the same language, it can support four more
general governments despite the linguistic homogeneity. This is contrary to the theory,
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which was that more linguistic homogeneity would allow for fewer cities. This might be
because everyone speaking the same language likely implies everyone speaks English,
whereas in Europe where the variable was originally used, it might imply one of several
languages.. Why having all linguistically homogenous MSAs speak the same language
would reverse the effect found in Europe is unknown. While insignificant, the language
sorting variables are signed as expected. The more interesting results are the different
signs and magnitudes of black and white concentrations.
The white population concentrating into a single MSA leads to a reduction in the
number of governments which is quite large, despite sorting being a first step to creating
more governments. The concentration of the black population works as expected, but is
much smaller. There are several possibilities. Whites, being the majority or plurality of
the population in most places, may not find their race to be particularly salient. They
may choose to fragment on different grounds than race. Thus, putting many whites in
one place is really akin to putting many diverse interests together in one place rather than
many people with one interest in one place.
The black population, however, is a minority population and so considers race
salient. Their sorting, then, does lead to race-based organization. This would also be
consistent with white flight, though these data cannot answer that question directly as
they do not distinguish white moving away from blacks or blacks moving away from
whites, or anyone moving out of a central city.
The main finding of these variables is how little race, ethnicity, religion and
language matter in the decision to create new cities. Culturally diverse populations do
not require numerous cities to get along.
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Table 4.5.6 Results for Measures of Race/Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Diversity
General Governments Coef.
HHI of Racial Diversity
across MSA
-0.10490
HHI of White
concentration across
counties
-3.83477
HHI of Black
concentration across
counties
0.52457
HHI of Hispanic
concentration across
counties
-0.50495
HHI of Language
Diversity across MSA
4.98349
HHI of English primary
language
concentration
0.75211
HHI of Spanish primary
language
concentration
0.12547
HHI of Religion
Diversity across MSA
-1.04330
HHI of Mainline
Protestant
concentration
0.04978
HHI of Evangelical
Protestant
concentration
0.27036
HHI of Catholic
concentration
-0.01485
HHI of Orthodox
concentration
0.05234
HHI of Other Religions
concentration
0.04067

Std. Err

Z

P>|z| Significant Predict/Right

0.22650 -0.46

0.643

- yes

1.70074 -2.25

0.024 *

+ no

0.25249

0.038 *

+ yes

0.45291 -1.11

0.265

+ no

2.33275

2.14

0.033 *

- no

0.52692

1.43

0.153

+ yes

0.27223

0.46

0.645

+ yes

0.43412 -2.40

0.016 *

- yes

0.28729

0.17

0.862

+ yes

0.25225

1.07

0.284

+ yes

0.02766 -0.54

0.591

+ no

0.09552

0.55

0.584

+ yes

0.02382

1.71

0.088 +

+ yes

2.08

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI
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4.5.7 Results for Measures of Industry Consolidation and Number of Counties
Table 4.5.7 Results for Measures of Industry Consolidation and Number of Counties
General
Governments
Number of Counties
HHI of Employment
Diversity across
MSA
HHI of Payroll
Diversity across
MSA
Employment
Concentration
Factor
Payroll
Concentration
Factor

Coef.

Std. Err

Z

P>|z|

Significant

Predict/Right

-1.92936

0.98181

-1.97

0.049 *

+ no

-0.57788

0.61561

-0.94

0.348

- yes

0.09015

0.42626

0.21

0.832

- no

0.19214

0.38415

0.50

0.617

+ yes

-0.23087

1.04587

-0.22

0.825

+ no

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI

These final variables are essentially all insignificant. Only the number of counties
is significant, and it is marginal. These variables are also of unusual sign and magnitude.
It does not appear in these data that industry consolidation has a notable impact on MSA
consolidation, and what impact it does have is contradictory.

4.5.8 Robustness and Additional Analyses
There are additional ways to measure some of these concepts. The ones
attempted were consolidating urban areas and urban clusters into simply a sum of
“urban” residents, testing for an interaction between population and government
liberalism, and testing quadratic terms on the population diversity in case the relationship
was non-linear. None of these robustness checks turned up differences from model to
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model, and so the current model was reported. The final robustness check included a
Herfindahl index measure of population concentration across cities and townships. This
did not cause many changes (only making urban area and urban cluster population
positive and significant), but was itself highly significant and highly negative, indicating
that a consolidated population tends to live in a consolidated MSA. This remains
excluded from the main model, though, to keep the two definitions of fragmentation
distinct. 38
Two additional analyses were done to supplement this analysis. First, number of
general governments is not the only possible measure of urban fragmentation. Many
general governments may have very few people, and so an MSA is de facto quite
consolidated because all residents choose to live in a single jurisdiction despite options.
To test this, a panel regression was performed of the same variables on a Herfindahl
index of municipal and county populations (townships were excluded where they were
coterminous with municipalities) ranging from 1/n to 1, where 1 is all residents living in a
single jurisdiction and n is the number of jurisdictions. While the regression itself is
statistically distinct from a regression with all parameters=0, very few of the parameters
themselves are significant.
Movers are again significant and have a preference for population fragmentation,
consolidated revenue is associated with consolidated populations, and annexation via
referendum and balanced budget requirements both associate with consolidation. All else
is noise. Individuals’ choices about where to live do not seem to be based on the same
factors that determine the number of jurisdictions.
38

Also, because, while many cities have zero intergovernmental revenue, or zero black population, or zero
Catholics, no city has zero population, so the concentration of the population is endogenous to the
number of general governments.
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The second analysis was only on 2002 data, still a Poisson regression, so that
private sector entrepreneurship could be tested. Again the regression is distinct from an
all-zero parameters model, and the number of new business starts was positive and
significant, indicating that private sector entrepreneurship does have a role to play in city
formation. The model with only 2002 data is largely the same as the panel, but there are
some other differences. First, many more variables are statistically significant, and
several switch signs. Notable sign switchers include: aggregate income (positive to
negative), third parties (positive to negative), Dillon’s Rule (negative to positive), debt
limits (negative to positive), and industry consolidation (which settled on negative).
Second, several more states were dropped for colinearity. Unfortunately, how much of
this is due to bizarre behavior in 2002 and how much of this is due to the added measure
of entrepreneurship is unclear. The complete supplemental regression follows Table
4.5.8 (the cross-sectional time series Poisson regression) and is Table 4.5.9.
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Table 4.5.8 Full Cross-Sectional Time Series Poisson Regression with State Fixed
Effects for Impact of Resources and Population Diversity on MSA Fragmentation
Obs

718

Groups

358

Obs/Group
Loglikelihood

2
-2303.6307

Wald(101)

2389.36

X-sq

P>0.001

General Governments
MSA Population (100k)

Coef.

Std. Err

z

P>|z|

-0.00348

0.00379

-0.92

0.359

Urban Areas population (100k)

0.02415

0.01345

1.80

0.073

Urban Cluster population (100k)

0.10701

0.05709

1.87

0.061

Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)

0.08654

0.04292

2.02

0.044

-2.99602

0.54210

-5.53

>0.001

Total State revenue to MSA (10m)

0.00236

0.00166

1.42

0.157

Total Federal revenue to MSA (10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal
revenue to MSA

0.00023

0.00037

0.63

0.531

-0.26827

0.07059

-3.80

>0.001

HHI of state revenue to MSA

0.02507

0.00883

2.84

>0.001

HHI of local revenue to MSA
HHI of local intergovernment
expenditure to MSA

-0.22344

0.06405

-3.49

>0.001

-0.11100

0.04669

-2.38

0.017

0.00072

0.00184

0.39

0.698

-0.03539

0.07568

-0.47

0.640

Household Median Income (10k)

0.01179

0.05364

0.22

0.826

Persons in Poverty (100k)

0.00324

0.06528

0.05

0.960

-0.67688

0.19309

-3.51

>0.001

0.01464

0.01657

0.88

0.377

Median Housing Value (100k)
Housing Value Interquartile Range
(100k)

-0.18481

0.10455

-1.77

0.077

0.13235

0.13164

1.01

0.315

Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)
Ratio of Majority to Minority Party
voters

0.00455

0.01581

0.29

0.773

0.01742

0.02159

0.81

0.420

3rd Parties (1/0)

0.12367

0.04967

2.49

0.013

Average City Expenditure (1b)

Aggregate Income for the MSA (1b)
HHI of income concentration across
counties

Poverty concentration factor
Aggregate Housing Value (10b)
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Table 4.5.8 Continued

Coef.

Std. Err

z

P>|z|

Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)

-0.43868

0.06527

-6.72

>0.001

Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)

-2.39153

0.32450

-7.37

>0.001

Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)

-0.03572

0.02473

-1.44

0.149

Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)

-0.60300

0.18075

-3.34

0.001

Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)
Annexation allowed by City Ordinance
(1/0)
Annexation allowed with County
Permission (1/0)

-0.03948

0.03449

-1.14

0.252

0.05065

0.03487

1.45

0.146

-0.14432

0.05906

-2.44

0.015

Annexation requires referendum (1/0)

-0.17633

0.04103

-4.30

>0.001

State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)

-0.15087

0.03476

-4.34

>0.001

0.05432

0.04941

1.10

0.272

-0.01070

0.00290

-3.68

>0.001

0.00190

0.00065

2.92

0.004

Total number of Democrats (100k)

-0.02060

0.02586

-0.80

0.426

HHI of Democrat concentration

-0.42957

0.60263

-0.71

0.476

HHI of Racial Diversity across MSA
HHI of White concentration across
counties
HHI of Black concentration across
counties
HHI of Hispanic concentration across
counties

-0.10490

0.22650

-0.46

0.643

-3.83477

1.70074

-2.25

0.024

0.52457

0.25249

2.08

0.038

-0.50495

0.45291

-1.11

0.265

HHI of Language Diversity across MSA
HHI of English primary language
concentration
HHI of Spanish primary language
concentration

4.98349

2.33275

2.14

0.033

0.75211

0.52692

1.43

0.153

0.12547

0.27223

0.46

0.645

HHI of Religion Diversity across MSA
HHI of Mainline Protestant
concentration
HHI of Evangelical Protestant
concentration

-1.04330

0.43412

-2.40

0.016

0.04978

0.28729

0.17

0.862

0.27036

0.25225

1.07

0.284

HHI of Catholic concentration

-0.01485

0.02766

-0.54

0.591

HHI of Orthodox concentration

0.05234

0.09552

0.55

0.584

HHI of Other Religions concentration

0.04067

0.02382

1.71

0.088

Number of Counties
HHI of Employment Diversity across
MSA

-1.92936

0.98181

-1.97

0.049

-0.57788

0.61561

-0.94

0.348

HHI of Payroll Diversity across MSA

0.09015

0.42626

0.21

0.832

State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
Citizen Liberalism (state)
Government Liberalism (state)
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Table 4.5.8 Continued
Employment Concentration Factor
Payroll Concentration Factor
AK
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI

Coef.

Std. Err

z

P>|z|

0.19214

0.38415

0.50

0.617

-0.23087
-1.51732
-1.51784
-0.97197
-0.86110
1.63381
-1.09882
-0.84790
-2.04608
0.42178
0.14123
0.36083
-0.88573
-0.69046
-0.29916
-1.25360
-1.53047
-0.23042
-0.90758
0.14320
0.60556
-2.18464
-0.62177
-2.03588
1.35448
0.47273
-1.01232
-0.62225
-1.72682
0.14625
0.32205
0.58190
-0.05127
-1.04053
-1.12780
0.49635
-1.13645

1.04587
0.33471
0.29964
0.27676
0.30786
0.34999
0.39291
0.27125
0.31542
1.12486
0.37268
0.26514
0.28686
0.27964
0.33083
0.31308
0.31493
0.33996
0.29726
0.26415
0.27194
0.35196
0.29241
0.41604
0.31720
0.43216
0.48509
0.26546
0.36974
0.24829
0.19088
0.31898
0.26353
0.31350
0.30513
0.25002
0.50046

-0.22
-4.53
-5.07
-3.51
-2.80
4.67
-2.80
-3.13
-6.49
0.37
0.38
1.36
-3.09
-2.47
-0.90
-4.00
-4.86
-0.68
-3.05
0.54
2.23
-6.21
-2.13
-4.89
4.27
1.09
-2.09
-2.34
-4.67
0.59
1.69
1.82
-0.19
-3.32
-3.70
1.99
-2.27

0.825
>0.001
>0.001
>0.001
0.005
>0.001
0.005
0.002
>0.001
0.708
0.705
0.174
0.002
0.014
0.366
>0.001
>0.001
0.498
0.002
0.588
0.026
>0.001
0.033
>0.001
>0.001
0.274
0.037
0.019
>0.001
0.556
0.092
0.068
0.846
0.001
>0.001
0.047
0.023
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Table 4.5.8 Continued
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
_cons
Random Effect
/lnalpha
alpha

Coef.
Std. Err
z
P>|z|
0.000
-1.31052
0.28963 -4.52
>0.001
-0.19933
0.36906 -0.54
>0.001
-1.37166
0.29886 -4.59
0.107
-1.22060
0.26330 -4.64
>0.001
-0.56343
0.34991 -1.61
0.109
-2.11010
0.51831 -4.07
0.002
-0.43402
0.27060 -1.60
0.002
-0.89762
0.28536 -3.15
0.810
0.89010
0.28525 3.12
>0.001
-0.06289
0.26150 -0.24
>0.001
-1.81269
0.43919 -4.13
>0.001
5.82240
0.95404 6.10
-2.01095
0.133861
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0.103837
0.0139

Table 4.5.9 Supplemental Poisson Regression Including Private Sector
Entrepreneurship with 2002 Data Only
N=358
chi2(91)=13748
P>Chi2>0.001
Loglikelihood=-1256.3687

General Governments
MSA Population (100k)
Urban Areas population (100k)
Urban Cluster population (100k)
Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)
Average City Expenditure (1b)
Total State revenue to MSA (10m)
Total Federal revenue to MSA (10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal revenue
to MSA
HHI of state revenue to MSA
HHI of local revenue to MSA
HHI of local intergovernment
expenditure to MSA
Aggregate Income for the MSA (1b)
HHI of income concentration across
counties
Household Median Income (10k)
Persons in Poverty (100k)
Poverty concentration factor
Aggregate Housing Value (10b)
Median Housing Value (100k)
Housing Value Interquartile Range (100k)
Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)
Business Births
Business Deaths
Ratio of Majority to Minority Party voters
3rd Parties (1/0)
Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)
Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)
Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)
Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)
Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)

Coef.
Std. Err
z
P>|z|
-0.02843
0.00472 -6.03 >0.001
-0.05625
0.02148 -2.62
0.009
-0.00920
0.05865 -0.16
0.875
0.05311
0.03545
1.5
0.134
-3.02651
0.43820 -6.91 >0.001
0.01161
0.00245 4.74 >0.001
-0.00259
0.00042 -6.16 >0.001
-0.22667
-0.43770
-0.42143

0.07957
0.11158
0.06916

-2.85
-3.92
-6.09

0.004
>0.001
>0.001

0.05593
0.00544

0.04772
0.00176

1.17
3.09

0.241
0.002

-0.69029
0.03875
0.32665
-0.63655
0.08179
-0.28867
0.34296
0.08919
0.07226
-0.05271
-0.07803
-0.46763
-0.04957
1.01425
0.04340
0.69687
-0.84079

0.08926
0.04244
0.06885
0.13792
0.02037
0.12792
0.12413
0.01408
0.03378
0.03260
0.03054
0.20222
0.10561
0.19163
0.42617
0.66309
0.46161

-7.73
0.91
4.74
-4.62
4.02
-2.26
2.76
6.34
2.14
-1.62
-2.55
-2.31
-0.47
5.29
0.1
1.05
-1.82

>0.001
0.361
>0.001
>0.001
>0.001
0.024
0.006
>0.001
0.032
0.106
0.011
0.021
0.639
>0.001
0.919
0.293
0.069
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Table 4.5.9 Continued
Annexation allowed by City Ordinance
(1/0)
Annexation allowed with County
Permission (1/0)
Annexation requires referendum (1/0)
State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)
State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
Citizen Liberalism (state)
Government Liberalism (state)
Total number of Democrats (100k)
HHI of Democrat concentration
HHI of Racial Diversity across MSA
HHI of White concentration across
counties
HHI of Black concentration across
counties
HHI of Hispanic concentration across
counties
HHI of Language Diversity across MSA
HHI of English primary language
concentration
HHI of Spanish primary language
concentration
HHI of Religion Diversity across MSA
HHI of Mainline Protestant concentration
HHI of Evangelical Protestant
concentration
HHI of Catholic concentration
HHI of Orthodox concentration
HHI of Other Religions concentration
Number of Counties
HHI of Employment Diversity across MSA
HHI of Payroll Diversity across MSA
Employment Concentration Factor
AR
CA
CO
FL
HI
ID
IN

Coef.

Std. Err

z

P>|z|

-0.62706

0.19822

-3.16

0.002

0.44938
-0.35843
-0.56391
0.90701
0.03404
-0.02696
-0.03661
-0.68575
-0.30776

0.21667
0.19391
0.11974
0.45291
0.01796
0.00692
0.02628
0.56165
0.17025

2.07
-1.85
-4.71
2
1.9
-3.9
-1.39
-1.22
-1.81

0.038
0.065
>0.001
0.045
0.058
>0.001
0.164
0.222
0.071

-7.69485

1.09366

-7.04

>0.001

0.01932

0.16382

0.12

0.906

1.21648
10.91754

0.52810
1.60290

2.3
6.81

0.021
>0.001

-0.81941

0.59464

-1.38

0.168

0.01421
-1.01411
-0.42448

0.20993
0.31022
0.31683

0.07
-3.27
-1.34

0.946
0.001
0.18

0.35339
0.09474
0.25876
0.00218
-1.89182
-0.71068
-0.11850
0.13169
-0.39435
0.14655
-1.03413
0.12799
1.83554
-1.59693
0.95759

0.20212
0.03788
0.13186
0.01479
0.84203
0.59822
0.41628
0.37198
0.30343
0.24222
0.29809
0.17322
1.18999
0.69987
0.15772

1.75
2.5
1.96
0.15
-2.25
-1.19
-0.28
0.35
-1.3
0.61
-3.47
0.74
1.54
-2.28
6.07

0.08
0.012
0.05
0.883
0.025
0.235
0.776
0.723
0.194
0.545
0.001
0.46
0.123
0.023
>0.001
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Table 4.5.9 Continued
IA
KS
KY
LA
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NV
NJ
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
WA
WV
WI
WY
_cons

Coef.
Std. Err
z
P>|z|
-0.01329
0.20751 -0.06
0.949
0.77622
0.59697
1.3
0.194
0.91464
0.67070 1.36
0.173
-0.15539
0.66919 -0.23
0.816
-0.33492
0.58815 -0.57
0.569
0.62022
0.23213 2.67
0.008
2.77393
0.49383 5.62 >0.001
0.27295
0.35768 0.76
0.445
0.14385
0.57232 0.25
0.802
-1.98309
0.47170
-4.2 >0.001
-0.53856
0.91617 -0.59
0.557
-0.74770
0.64504 -1.16
0.246
2.71656
0.54706 4.97 >0.001
-0.22699
0.27423 -0.83
0.408
-0.34681
0.38693
-0.9
0.37
0.83275
0.60368 1.38
0.168
0.37837
0.34704 1.09
0.276
-0.35007
0.35620 -0.98
0.326
0.42262
0.35292
1.2
0.231
0.54832
0.28281 1.94
0.053
0.20401
0.32587 0.63
0.531
0.51258
0.45287 1.13
0.258
0.65015
0.34760 1.87
0.061
0.29686
0.53653 0.55
0.58
-2.53170
0.32265 -7.85 >0.001
1.78729
0.47960 3.73 >0.001
-2.56389
0.37120 -6.91 >0.001
0.20730
0.35060 0.59
0.554
-1.48086
0.71621 -2.07
0.039
2.32722
1.35779 1.71
0.087
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4.6 Conclusions on the Fragmentation of MSAs
This analysis of MSA fragmentation across the two periods of 1992 and 2002
shows three important things. First city formation depends on the resources available to
the organizers of the new city; second, political and financial issues are the main
population determinants of fragmented MSAs; and, third the creation of new cities is
done one city at a time without concern for other organization.
The evidence for the first conclusion is that the availability of money –not just its
presence, was a requirement for city formation, and that limitations on city powers –
including limitations on getting money in the form of debt limits and balanced budget
requirements –and the high cost of cities were all inhibitors of MSA fragmentation. This
is consistent with the theory that entrepreneurs organize cities like they organize interest
groups. If the entrepreneur cannot get the necessary resources to operate the group and
achieve its political ends, he or she will be unable to find customers or residents. Even if
those resources are available, if the cost is too high, customers or residents will still not
buy into the new organization. The supplemental analysis on 2002 data also suggests that
the entrepreneur is an important component in this process, and that having more of them
is a resource itself in forming new urban organizations.
The evidence for the second conclusion is that only liberalism and poverty
mattered consistently of any of the population diversity measures. Race, ethnicity,
language, religion, and industry were all of small or dubious effect, but liberalism
mattered and poverty mattered. This suggest that the formation of cities is primarily
about political power and economic interest (transfer payments would be the likely
reason, but that is beyond this analysis as well). This makes sense in hindsight. Cities
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specialize in making policy and are political bodies, and much of government is about
who gets to spend the money on what. Everything else is secondary –though African
Americans seem to have distinct preferences from white Americans.
The final conclusion comes not from the results of the model, but from the
discovery that the data are Poisson. Poisson data only respond to deviations from the
mean. Variance and over-dispersion –characteristics of negative-binomial distributions –
do not affect Poisson. Whether there are six cities has no impact on whether there will be
a seventh. The number of cities depends on the characteristics of the population and state
and their differences from the mean. In other words, the population decides how many
cities to have based on its preferences and resources, not how many cities it already has.
This conclusion is bolstered by the finding that preferences and resources do not
impact population fragmentation, even though both definitions of fragmentation are
correlated above |.4|. 39 These resources and preferences are driving the number of
general governments, but not by causing the population to fragment.
Finally, there are some intriguing possibilities for further research. Most
tantalizing is why the median housing value is negative. Is this the result of
agglomeration and amenity as might be suggested by Glaeser, or is it a measure that the
wealthy do not feel the need to build separate cities, or is it nothing but random noise?
Second, what influence does private entrepreneurship have on the number of cities?
Third, do all types of governments follow this pattern, or only general governments?
These are projects to be pursued in improving the state of knowledge about urban
organization in the United States.
39

-.4343. The negative is because higher numbers of general governments are more fragmentation, but a
higher HHI of population fragmentation is more consolidated.
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Chapter 5
Causes of Fragmentation in the Rest of the United States
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I analyzed urban fragmentation in the metropolitan area.
This was in keeping with the existing literature on urban fragmentation and consolidation
and also allowed consideration of multi-county MSAs to test the effect of population
sorting by race, industry mix, and poverty on urban fragmentation. As other interest
groups; resources, ideology, and partisanship were causes for the initial fragmentation of
the population. Based on the Poisson distribution of the data, the best explanation is that
the chosen number of cities and level of urban fragmentation is determined by the
population taking multiple factors into account.
However, interest group theories are expected to work outside the metropolis, and
so an interest group theory of urban fragmentation should also work in non-MSA
counties. That analysis is the subject of this chapter. While substantially the same as the
analysis of chapter 4, there are changes necessitated by the different unit of analysis.
Because non-MSA counties lack groupings like MSA counties, there are no multi-county
MSA counties. As the data are still most often aggregated at county level, none of the
sorting variables can be carried over to this analysis. In turn, the sorting factor variables
also cannot be carried over.
The data, however, remain Poisson, and the theory remains the same. Non-MSA
counties should behave like their MSA counterparts, with more diverse populations
choosing more fragmentation as constrained by their resources. Predicting from the
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MSA analysis, the types of diversity that should matter are also predictable: economic,
political, and ideological. Nonetheless, there are theoretical reasons why there may be
differences across the analyses.
First, some assumptions built into the model may not apply to rural areas, and are
not accounted for in the model. Entrepreneurial interest group theories rely on a market
for organizations. Entrepreneurs expect to make a profit off their organization, and their
efficiency is driven by trying to under-price their competitors to attract residents.
Furthermore, residents have to be able to move in order for a new entrepreneur to attract
new residents to his or her organization. These assumptions may not be true in non-MSA
areas. The lack of people who can move, the distances that must be traveled, and the
increased power of county governments (because counties provide more services in rural
areas) could all thwart the organizer of a new city. These are also all very difficult to
measure –and for this analysis are not measured. These problems might also be
surmountable and compensated for by the lack of existing governments. A developer in a
dense MSA may have to locate his or her new city some distance from the population
center, but in the less developed non-MSA area, the developer can locate much closer –
diminishing the need for lots of movers and reducing the distance that must be traveled.
The ultimate defense of keeping the same model, however, is that non-MSA does not
mean “rural,” and that many of these counties are still populous and diverse enough for
entrepreneurs to work them. This is addressed in a subsequent section.
Second, the variables that most influenced MSA fragmentation may be different
from the ones influencing non-MSA populations. The different levels of racial and
cultural diversity, income, housing values, and urbanization turn the non-MSA counties
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into a different market. Entrepreneurs will change their organization plans to match the
new clientele.
The rest of this chapter is in 5 sections. The second section discusses the
differences in the dataset between chapter 4 and chapter 5 and reprises the predicted
results of the analysis. Section three presents some of the summary statistics for the nonMSA counties to describe what a typical non-MSA county is like, and how such counties
differ from their typical MSA counterparts. Section four analyzes the data and adds
supplemental analyses to check for robustness and other interpretations of the results.
Finally, the chapter ends with non-MSA specific conclusions.

5.2 Differences Between the MSA and Non-MSA Datasets and Theories
While theories of urban organization distinguish between metropolitan settings
and other settings, interest group theories do not. Therefore, the same theory which
explains urban fragmentation in the metropolis should also explain urban fragmentation
outside the metropolis. However, while the metropolitan setting provides the
theoretically desired market for urban organization –the non MSA county, which is
defined by its lack of population and lack of contact with other populations, does not.
Non-MSA counties may lack some catalyst for organization that is attached to their low
number of residents. For example, small cities are expensive cities because they cannot
spread their fixed costs over many residents. Low population areas may be more
consolidated simply, despite their diversity, because there are not enough people to
support new cities and because new cities must provide all the services their residents
desire. As a result, racial, economic, and political variables may appear to have no effect.
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Where this tipping point is would be the subject of another analysis –here I use the
Census definition of a Metropolitan Statistical Area as the divide between places where
there are large populations in a small area which could allow residents to commute
around.
This does not appear in the actual data. Non-MSA counties have fragmentation
ranging from 0 jurisdictions (the county, as the unit of analysis, is not counted) to 82
jurisdictions –but the possibility justified splitting the MSA and non-MSA analyses.
Further, though the theory predicts the same in both MSA and non-MSA contexts, it is
not a required assumption for the models to work, and so can be tested.
While the data are drawn from the same source, there are some differences. First,
because the unit of analysis for this study is the county, there are no county-sorting
variables. Without more fine-grained analysis of the county and community borders,
there is no way to measure sorting within the county, so all that can be measured is
diversity. The assumption that diversity leads to sorting is possible, but it can be relaxed
to simply interpret the results of diversity variables as the result of “living in the same
county with different people” rather than the results of having multiple atomized
communities.
Second, all measures which were based on the MSA are now based on the county.
Average expenditure in the MSA is now average expenditure in the county; concentration
of federal money in the MSA is now concentration of federal money in the county; and so
on. The interpretations are the same, but the borders are different. The three factorized
indices for poverty, payroll, and employment concentration are also gone.
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There is a third difference, but it is special. Many of the variables in this analysis
are on a much smaller scale. What were millions of dollars in the MSA are only
hundreds of thousands in the far-flung counties. However, while rescaling the variables
would benefit interpretation of this particular chapter, it makes comparisons between the
two chapters difficult. As the magnitudes of the difference are not so large as to add an
unseemly number of zeros to the means or coefficients, the same units were kept.
Housing values are still reported in hundreds of thousands of 2002 dollars, even though
the mean housing value median is just under $65,000 .

5.2.2 A Model of Non-Metropolitan Urban Fragmentation
While the possibility that something could differ between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas justifies doing separate analysis, the theory does not actually predict
differences. As a result, the predicted effects of the various categories of variables are
the same here as in the preceding chapter. The MSA analysis revealed several variables
that behaved contrary to the theory (language diversity, for example) but the theoretical
predictions are maintained –first because it is possible things are different in MSAs and
non-MSAs, and second because this serves as an opportunity to test the theory on a
different dataset. If the results conflict or agree, this is interesting and useful information
entirely separate from whether it predicted ahead of time. 40

40

In other words, the “benefit” of changing my prediction between chapters is that I would get more
predictions “right” if there really is no difference between MSA and non-MSA datasets. Setting aside that
the point of this analysis is that MSA and non-MSA may differ in unmeasured ways, this is at best a
bragging rights benefit. If the coefficients agree between the analyses, this reveals a possible flaw in the
theory to be addressed in further research. If the coefficients conflict, this points to a possible difference
between MSA and non-MSA populations. Both of those options advance knowledge –and I can still brag
in the latter case.
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As before, the predicted outcomes are based on a theory of entrepreneurs,
preferences, and resources. With more people come different preferences that an
entrepreneur can tap to form new cities and earn a profit. When those preferences are
linked to personal characteristics like race, language, and status they can be measured.
The more diverse the population, the more preferences there are, and the more
opportunities there are for entrepreneurs to found additional cities. As resources –again
meaning primarily tax base –increase so do the number of cities that can be founded. If
the state limits city powers, the city is less useful to the residents and has fewer resources.
The controls also have not changed. Movers are included because they can
change the population characteristics and because if movers correlates with poverty or
race, the omitted variable bias would affect the interpretation of those measured diversity
types. Poor people may be attracted to rich and consolidated areas because of the
potential for redistribution and cheap government –but a large number of poor can also
cause fragmentation as the rich try to escape the pull on their tax dollars, and so the effect
of poor people is ambiguous (but still thought to be more likely to fragment the county).
Democrats and liberals are still expected to prefer consolidation, but outvoted political
minorities (either third parties or consistently beaten second parties) should form
additional cities. More entrepreneurs should be associated with more cities. Nice
amenities –showing up in housing prices –should reduce the number of cities (because it
is hard to compete with a nice amenity). Sorting, however, does not appear in this model
because the data are not available. It is assumed, but not provable –and that assumption
can be relaxed.
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The data are from the same dataset as used in the previous chapter, and so details
of the dataset can be referred to there. Again, all the sorting variables required multiple
counties and so are not present in this dataset. The only other difference is that these
counties are not part of any OMB or Census Bureau defined Metropolitan Standard Area.

5.3 The Typical Non-MSA County
If the traditional error when discussing MSAs is to envision the enormous
metropolises of Chicago or New York, the easy error when discussing non-MSA areas
would be to envision the empty-quarter of the country –places like Loving, County
Texas, population 67 in 2002. Loving, like New York, is an unusual place. 41

Table 5.3.1 Select Measures of Non-MSA County Size
Variable
Population (100k)
Aggregate Income (1b,
2002 dollars)
Median House Value
(100k, 2002 dollars)

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation Minimum

Maximum

0.231

0.162

0.221

0.001

1.86742

0.985

0.033

5.188

0

192.9

0.649

0.581

0.334

0.000

7.5

Again, the data are right skewed and leptokurtic, but with their peaks much
further to the left than in MSAs. This is true by definition for population (population
centers with 100,000 people are part of the definition of MSA), though not of aggregate
income or housing value. Where the mean MSA had 600,000 residents, the average nonMSA county has only 23,000. The MSA’s $2 billion in aggregate income is only $985
41

Loving is the smallest county in the United States, and so it makes a good example, but it is also missing
from the 2002-period of the data due to missing identification data, so more extensive discussion of the
county is not possible.
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million in non-MSA, and average median house value drops from $100,000 to just under
$65,000. The skewness, however, suggests using medians to measure “typical.” The
median county has 16,000 residents, $33 million in aggregate income, and median
median housing values of $58,000 –again, much lower than the MSA levels. Across the
two periods, there are slight increases in population and median house value from 1992 to
2002, but there is a massive increase in aggregate income from a mean of $6.1 million to
$1.9 billion in the same period. 42

Table 5.3.2 Non-MSA Counties Which Are Close to Average

County
Marengo
McNairy
Union
Meriwether
Shelby
Clark

State
Alabama
Tennessee
Mississippi
Georgia
Illinois
Arkansas

Year Population (100k) Income (Billions)
2002
0.22539
0.5653
2002
0.24653
0.7456
2002
0.25362
0.4175
2002
0.22534
1.276
2002
0.22893
0.5747
2002
0.23546
1.54

Median
Housing (100k)
0.659
0.614
0.683
0.663
0.666
0.679

Much like the MSAs, no county is exactly average on all three measures, however
unlike MSAs, there are many more counties within a quarter standard deviation, and even
an unwieldy number within 15%. Nonetheless, there are six counties within 11% of a
standard deviation. Notably, all but one are east of the Mississippi and range from
Illinois in the north to Tennessee in the middle to Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi in
42

$800 thousand to $390 million in the median case. This did trigger an investigation into whether there
was an error in the dataset –but after recreating the variable from scratch all summary statistics were the
same –so this massive increase in income, despite a much more modest increase in population and
housing value is presumably real. The increase –while proportionately much larger than the 3 billion to 4
billion increase for MSAs –is still absolutely smaller than the MSA growth in the same period. This might
reflect economic development in non-MSA counties, missing data in 2002, or richer people moving out of
MSAs.
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the south. Also unlike the MSAs, they are all from 2002, likely because of the explosion
in income between 1992 and 2002.
Table 5.3.3 Five Counties Which are Close to Average Within Their Periods 43
County
1992
Paulding
Uintah
Montgomery
Assumption
Panola
2002
Gage
Fayette
Polk
Clark
Montgomery

Population (100k)

Income (Billions)

Median
Housing (100k)

Ohio
Utah
North Carolina
Louisiana
Texas

0.205
0.222
0.233
0.228
0.220

0.006
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.004

0.542
0.563
0.557
0.577
0.550

Nebraska
Texas
Missouri
Arkansas
North Carolina

0.230
0.218
0.270
0.235
0.268

1.063
2.898
2.309
1.540
1.112

0.686
0.716
0.770
0.679
0.772

State

Table 5.3.4 Five Counties Which are Close to Median Within Their Periods
County
1992
Iowa
Arenac
Brooks
Crawford
Nottoway
2002
Richland
Grayson
Benton
Osage
Mercer

Population (100k)

Income (Billions)

Median
Housing (100k)

Iowa
Michigan
Georgia
Wisconsin
Virginia

0.146
0.149
0.154
0.159
0.150

0.0003
0.0011
0.0017
0.0001
0.0002

0.553
0.539
0.548
0.549
0.553

North Dakota
Virginia
Tennessee
Kansas
Illinois

0.180
0.179
0.165
0.167
0.170

0.182
0.250
0.331
0.070
0.364

0.672
0.658
0.670
0.676
0.685

State

43

th

Worth mentioning because it was an example in chapter 4: Decatur County, Indiana was the 6 closest
county to average in 1992 –being slightly poorer than Assumption County, Louisiana.
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Typical non-MSA counties, as these tables show, are much smaller than MSAs –
roughly a twentieth as big in population. They are poorer, having much less aggregate
income even after the 10 year growth and they have less valuable houses –though highest
housing values are within $100,000 of the MSA values. They are not, however, the
middle of nowhere with no resources and no population.
Whether by means or medians, these counties are small but not deserted, and
should have adequate people and resources to entice entrepreneurs to organize local
governments within their borders. The level of fragmentation and the drivers of
fragmentation in these smaller jurisdictions are the subjects of the next section.

5.4 Analysis of Non-Metropolitan County Fragmentation by Entrepreneurial Use of
Population Diversity, Local Resources, and State Laws
The analysis of the non-MSA counties proceeded as in chapter 4, starting with
cross-sectional negative binomial regression. Once again, the model did not converge,
and once shifted to a cross-sectional Poisson regression model the likelihood function
converged to the same likelihood which failed under negative binomial. The Poisson
regression had one fewer parameter but gained the same likelihood, indicating via
likelihood ratio test that that the Poisson specification was the correct one.
Lacking the sorting variables, the collinearity problems of the model in chapter 4
are absent, so once Poisson was determined to be the correct model, it was ready for
specification. Table 5.4.1 shows the vector of variables, their means, standard deviations,
hypothesized signs, and the theoretical reason for them. Poisson regression is an MLE
estimate performed by a numerical process with the requirement that the dependent
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variable be distributed Poisson. Given that assumption, the computer makes minor
adjustments to the parameters until the likelihood function cannot be increased further.
The data are then used to estimate the parameters of the following model:

Where:

𝐿𝑛�𝐸 [𝑌𝑖𝑡 |𝑥𝑖𝑡 ]� = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + [𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ]
Y= the number of general governments
e= Euler’s constant
x= a vector of explanatory variables including population diversity and resources
β= the coefficient weights to be estimated
α= the random effect variation
ε= error
i is the identifier for a county, and
t is the identifier for the period.

The model uses random effects on counties to preserve degrees of freedom and to
allow the several more fixed effects to work within the numerical calculation. This
requires assuming the expected value of x it a is zero, or that the county characteristics
measured do not correlate with the unmeasured characteristics of the counties. This is
justified because the county borders are determined by states rather than their residents,
and arbitrarily. The other assumption required is that Y be distributed Poisson, which is
justified by the likelihood ratio tests already described. The estimation procedure is done
via MLE and the reported coefficients are deviations from the mean, just as in OLS.
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Table 5.4.1 Summary of Model Parameters for Cross-Sectional Time Series Poisson Regression (2 periods, N=4549)
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Variable
General Governments
County Population (100k)
Urban Areas population (100k)
Urban Cluster population (100k)
Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)
Average City Expenditure (1b)
Total State revenue to County (10m)
Total federal revenue to County (10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal revenue to
County
HHI of state revenue to County
HHI of local revenue to County
HHI of local intergovernment expenditure to
County
Aggregate Income for the County (1b)
Household Median Income (10k)
Persons in Poverty (100k)
Aggregate Housing Value (10b)
Median Housing Value (100k)
Housing Value Interquartile Range (100k)
Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)
Ratio of Majority to Minority Party voters
3rd Parties (1/0)
Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)

Mean
Std. Dev.
9.08419 10.79155
0.23125 0.22130
0.00718 0.06229
0.08212 0.11597
0.04139 0.05121
0.00651 0.01314
0.82436 1.52311
0.08059 0.20846

Prediction
DV
+
+
+
?
+
+

Theory
People a resource, more diverse preferences
People a resource, more diverse preferences
People a resource, more diverse preferences
Control variable
Expensive governments are harder to organize
Government funds are a resource
Government funds are a resource

0.63434
0.65688
0.59736

0.38384 0.23228 0.33390 -

Concentration indicates not all have access
Concentration indicates not all have access
Vibrant market for local goods can support cities

0.56942
0.98487
3.00904
0.03330
0.03813
0.64912
0.49810
0.12182
1.69052
0.07298
1.76852

0.43900
5.18775
0.65411
0.03254
0.05794
0.33396
0.24827
0.12278
0.82676
0.26014
0.53490

Vibrant market for local goods can support cities
Income Tax base a resource
Wealthier residents can afford more cities
Wealthy try to avoid the poor
Property base is a resource
Control for local amenities
Gap of rich to poor encourages new cities
NFP entrepreneurs can become city founders
Being outvoted an incentive to make a city
Being outvoted an incentive to make a city
Protects city interests

+
+
+
+
?
+
+
+
+
+
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Table 5.4.1 continued
Mean
Std. Dev.
Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)
0.15960 0.36627
Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)
0.97780 0.52818
Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)
0.98813 0.10832
Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)
0.76852 0.42182
Annexation allowed by City Ordinance (1/0)
0.60035 0.48988
Annexation allowed with County Permission (1/0)
0.18290 0.38662
Annexation requires referendum (1/0)
0.38074 0.48562
State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)
0.43966 0.49640
State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
0.80919 0.39298
Citizen Liberalism (state)
40.94331 10.96823
Government Liberalism (state)
40.95848 22.79506
Total number of Democrats (100k)
0.03497 0.04298
HHI of Racial Diversity across County
0.78424 0.19798
HHI of Language Diversity across County
0.77464 0.10186
HHI of Religion Diversity across County
0.51912 0.16367
HHI of Employment Diversity across County
0.29024 0.12411
HHI of Payroll Diversity across County
0.31380 0.14314
State Fixed Effects
County Random Effect

Prediction
-

Theory
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Restricts city power
Liberals prefer consolidation
Liberals prefer consolidation
Democrats prefer consolidation
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Homogenous population has homogenous preferences
Control for state time-invariant characteristics
Grouping for the Panel. Random effect chosen to
preserve degrees of freedom and because county
borders are arbitrary and not chosen by residents.

5.4.2 Summary of Results
Due to the size of the model, the different sections are reported separately, as they
were in chapter 4. Table 5.4.2 shows the descriptive and test statistics of the model. The
4548 non-MSA counties divide across the periods with 2291 counties in 1992 and 2258
in 2002. The discrepancy comes from variation in responses to the Census of
Governments and, where identifiable, tend to be counties with small populations like
Loving, Texas and Kalawao, Hawaii. The fixed effect for Delaware was dropped as only
one county (Sussex) in Delaware was included in the dataset, and so that county perfectly
predicted its fixed effect. New Jersey has no non-MSA counties. The model’s results are
significantly different from a null model of all parameters=0 at the .1% alpha level.
Table 5.4.2 Poisson Regression Summary and Tests
Obs
Groups
Obs/Group
Loglikelihood
Wald(85)
X-sq

4548
2293
1 to 2
-10634.3
9432.38
<0.001

The likelihood function for the non-MSA has a lower likelihood than the MSA
data. A direct comparison is not possible because the two analyses use different datasets
and are not nested in each other. All that can be said is that the non-MSA data
probability has a lower peak probability. The probability is not zero and the Wald test for
all-zero parameters shows that the results are distinct from zero.
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Despite the lower peak probability, on the measure of returning significant results
for the variables of interest, the non-MSA data perform better, but again the models are
not the same. The MSA data has the sorting variables which soak up additional variation.
Within this model, the theory of urban fragmentation and organization is better supported
than in the MSA model on all counts. Resources and population diversity both account
for fragmentation as expected. There are, however, interesting anomalies which differ
either from the theory or from the MSA data results. Large tax bases in income and
property are associated with more consolidation –even controlling for urban population.
Home rule statutes continue to have the opposite sign of what was predicted, but a
Dillon’s Rule judiciary which was insignificant and signed as expected in the MSA
analysis is significant and oppositely signed in the non-MSA analysis. Population, which
was insignificant and negative in the MSA analysis, is a significant positive factor in nonMSA counties. Finally, there are unusual findings in the population diversity. Where
racial diversity had no significant effect in MSAs –but was slightly negative as expected
–in non-MSA counties racial diversity is significant and positive, meaning more socially
homogenous counties are also more fragmented.

5.4.3 Results for Measures of Finance and Urban Population
Unlike in the MSA analysis, in the non-MSA county population is significant.
Total county population matters so much that adding just under the 50,000 that would
turn the county into an MSA in its own right (if they all went into a single jurisdiction)
would add nearly an entire new general government to the prediction. Also unlike in
MSAs, urban population also has a significant impact –but it is negative. Where new
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urbanites were expected to desire new cities to suit their needs, in the non-MSA counties
new urbanites seek out consolidated urban areas.
Table 5.4.3 Results for Measures of Finance and Urban Population
General Governments
County Population (100k)
Urban Areas population (100k)
Urban Cluster population
(100k)
Moved Counties in last 5 years
(100k)
Average City Expenditure (1b)
Total State revenue to county
(10m)
Total federal revenue to county
(10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of
federal revenue to MSA
HHI of state revenue to county
HHI of local revenue to county
HHI of local intergovernment
expenditure to county

Coef.
Std. Err.
1.78078 0.22464
-0.56056 0.20100

P>|z| Significant
<0.001 **
0.005 *

Predict/Right
+ yes
+no

-0.84864

0.18013

<0.001 **

+no

-0.57541
-35.15892

0.53528
2.09530

0.282
<0.001 **

?
-yes

0.07596

0.01096

<0.001 **

+ yes

0.05042

0.04262

0.00188
-0.80776
-0.03596

0.01904
0.04811
0.02386

0.921
<0.001 **
0.132

-no
-yes
-yes

0.04264

0.01890

0.024 *

-no

0.237

+ yes

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI

Vastly increasing the number of people living in dense urban areas or less dense
urban clusters –suburbs, for example –rather than in rural areas reduces the fragmentation
of adding to the population by between 30 and 50%. Intergovernmental resources behave
much closer to theory and the MSA analysis. In general, intergovernmental transfers are
associated with fragmentation as if the money was a resource necessary for government
organization. Also as theorized, if the intergovernmental transfers are concentrated in
few governments, the resource is not available to other governments which either never
form or starve from lack of resources. Federal revenue concentration (the Herfindahl
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Index) is positive and not significant, which is contrary to theory. The other interesting
result is that intergovernmental spending and receiving at the local level has reversed
signs. The receipt of local money is insignificant but signed negatively. If there are few
governments receiving payments from their peers there will be fewer governments –
much like one massive company could starve its competitors for business. There is,
however, a small, significant, and positive effect of intergovernmental expenditure. If
local intergovernmental expenditure were consolidated in a single jurisdiction, the
average number of jurisdictions would increase by .04.
As in the MSA analysis, the dominant variable in this section is the average cost
of government. As expected, it is negative, indicating that higher average cost
government –driven either by preferences or cost of services –leads to fewer
governments. The -35 estimated coefficient is somewhat misleading, however, as the
largest average expenditure is only .236 (236k 2002 dollars). In the most extreme case,
that would be 8 fewer expected general governments.
Finally, movers –which is still a control variable –is worth noting not because it is
significant (it is not), but because it has the opposite sign from the MSA analysis.

5.4.4 Results for Measures of Economic, Not-for-Profit, and Political Organization
The results for socio-economic and political variables are mixed. While there is
good evidence that increases in the number of poor people and greater wealth inequality
lead to fragmentation, and that non-for-profit organizers and third parties can organize for
additional cities, the financial resources expected to fund this fragmentation are signed
negatively. Wealthy counties are consolidated counties despite having the financial
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ability to support multiple cities. Median housing values are significant and negative,
giving some credence to the amenity rather than type 1 error interpretation in Chapter 4.
Table 5.4.4 Results for Measures of Economic, Not-for-Profit and Politics
General Governments
Aggregate Income for the county
(1b)

Std. Err.

P>|z| Significant

Predict/Right

-0.00080

0.00156

0.608

+no

-0.07519

0.03030

0.013 *

+no

0.72008

0.87185

0.409

+yes

Aggregate Housing Value (10b)

-0.99703

0.45912

0.030 *

+no

Median Housing Value (100k)
Housing Value Interquartile
Range (100k)

-0.26026

0.09681

0.007 *

?

0.18213

0.09134

0.046 *

+yes

Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)
Ratio of Majority to Minority
Party voters

0.56675

0.19099

0.003 *

+yes

0.01873

0.01212

0.122

+yes

3rd Parties (1/0)

0.18008

0.03474

Household Median Income (10k)
Persons in Poverty (100k)

Coef.

<0.001 **

+yes

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI

5.4.5 Results for Measures of State Laws, State Liberalism, and Democrats
The results for measures of state laws, liberalism, and Democrats are more
consistent with the proposed theory. Limits on annexation ability and financial powers
are generally negative as expected. Lacking the resources which allow a city to be
useful, there is less reason to organize one. The unexpected results are also generally the
same as in the MSA analysis. Statutory and constitutional home rule protection has a
negative sign –indicating fewer general governments. The power to annex via city
ordinance is positive again, and this time significant, bolstering the counter-case from the
metropolitan analysis that city-ordinance annexation is a desirable power of local
government and not a restriction on local government powers. Statutory debt limits are
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positive and significant. Citizen liberalism is signed as expected (just as in the MSA
analysis), but not significant.
The unusual results are in Dillon’s Rule judiciaries, government liberalism, and
the number of Democrats. None of these variables is significant –perhaps indicating that
liberalism, Democrats, and courts are not terribly important away from the urban centers.
Government liberalism and the number of Democrats are both signed counter to
expectation, as is the Dillon’s Rule judiciary. Dillon’s rule is also signed differently from
the MSA analysis which raises an interesting question: why would a state-wide law have
different effects outside the MSA. This is a subject for future research.
Table 5.4.5 Results for Measures of State Laws, State Liberalism, and Democrats
General Governments
Statutory Home Rule Protection
(2/1/0)

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>|z| Significant

-0.20691

0.04934

0.16420

0.42984

0.702

-no

Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)

-0.00278

0.01536

0.856

-yes

Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)
Annexation allowed voluntarily
(1/0)
Annexation allowed by City
Ordinance (1/0)
Annexation allowed with County
Permission (1/0)
Annexation requires referendum
(1/0)
State requires Balanced Budget
(1/0)

-0.39079

0.13118

0.003 *

-yes

-0.04257

0.02470

0.085 +

-yes

0.07543

0.02752

0.006 *

-no

-0.17873

0.04066

<0.001 **

-yes

-0.30080

0.02874

<0.001 **

-yes

-0.18604

0.02072

<0.001 **

-yes

0.18355

0.03068

<0.001 **

-no

-0.00132

0.00183

0.471

-yes

0.00067

0.00050

0.181

-no

0.08874

0.17215

0.606

-no

Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)

State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
Citizen Liberalism (state)
Government Liberalism (state)
Total number of Democrats
(100k)

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI
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<0.001 **

Predict/Right
+no

5.4.6 Results for Measures of Population and Industry Diversity
Because this chapter’s analysis lacks all the sorting measures present in the MSA
analysis, the last two sets of measures are combined together into measures of population
and industry diversity.
Table 5.4.6 Results for Measures of Population and Industry Diversity
General Governments
Coef.
Std. Err.
HHI of Racial Diversity across
County
0.36345 0.09574
HHI of Language Diversity
across County
0.00927 0.16068
HHI of Religious Diversity across
County
-0.27221 0.09791
HHI of Employment Diversity
across County
-1.03000 0.19655
HHI of Payroll Diversity across
County
-0.27528 0.15436

P>|z| Significant
<0.001 **

Predict/Right
-no

0.954

-no

0.005 *

-yes

<0.001 **

-yes

0.075 +

-yes

+ significant at 90% CI
* significant at 95% CI
** significant at 99.9% CI

Once again, the evidence is mixed. Language diversity is insignificant and signed
the opposite of expected, but signed the same as in the MSA analysis. Racial diversity is
significant and signed the opposite of expectation where in the MSA it was signed as
expected and insignificant. Religion is consistent across both analyses and even has a
similar magnitude affect. Population diversity based on community characteristics
depends on race and religion, but in the non-MSA counties, racial homogeneity is
associated with more general governments (it was fewer in MSAs) and religious
homogeneity is associated with fewer (the same as in MSAs).
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Industry consolidation is less ambiguous. Employment and payroll homogeneity
both point towards fewer general governments, are both significant (though payroll only
at the 10% level), and finally point the same direction.

5.4.7 Robustness and Additional Analysis
As in chapter 4, the analysis was repeated with some differences in variables to
check for robustness. First, the two categories of urban were summed and included as a
measure only of urban residents. Second, a possible interaction between citizen and
government liberalism was tested. Third, racial heterogeneity was tested with a quadratic
term. As in the MSA analysis, no change was statistically significant. 44
The next robustness check was to include a Herfindahl index of population
fragmentation across the general governments. This distinguishes between counties with
many general governments, but where most of the population lives in one –such as the
much discussed Decatur, Indiana –and counties with more dispersed populations. This
had no effect on the results other than itself being significant. 45
After the robustness checks, two additional analyses were done to supplement the
main analysis, just as in chapter 4. The first is to replace the measure of governmental
fragmentation with the measure of population fragmentation and switch the procedure
from cross-sectional time series Poisson regression to panel regression with a continuous
44

The interaction of government liberalism and citizen liberalism got close, though, which warrants a
footnote on the measure because a better measure might get different results. Rather than multiply the
two numbers together –which does not make much sense since they run from 0 to 100 with the middle at
50 –I created a dichotomous measure that the government was liberal –ie greater than 50. The
interaction is then the liberalism of the population given that the government is already liberal. A
measure which can tease out whether the government is more liberal than the population or vice versa
may find something interesting.
45
Again, population fragmentation is endogenous to the number of general governments, so it is not itself
interpretable.
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dependent variable that ranges from 1/n to 1 where n is the number of general
governments. Unlike in the MSA analysis, this analysis did produce significant results.
The results were largely the same as the main model, but did differ in some places. The
model is presented in table 5.4.7. The Herfindahl measure of population fragmentation is
reverse coded relative to the number of general governments –so a negative number in
the main model has the same effect as a positive number in this model.
The coefficients within the model which are significant and different are:
1.) The concentration of federal revenue (significant and correctly signed in the
Population model, opposite sign and insignificant in the Governments model)
2.) Concentration of local government expenditure (significant and correctly signed
in the Population model, opposite sign and insignificant in the Governments
model)
3.) Aggregate Housing Value (significant and correctly signed in the Population
model, opposite sign and insignificant in the Governments model)
4.) Voluntary Annexation (significant and negative in both models)
5.) Annexation by City Ordinance (significant and positive in both models)
6.) Annexation by Referendum (significant and negative in both models)
7.) Government Liberalism (positive in both models, significant in the Population
model)

The financial and economic differences are in favor of the theory –the population
fragments when there are resources to allow it, even though these measures also predict
fewer general governments. The annexation variables are more confusing. Voluntary
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and referendum annexation were associated with fewer cities –as expected given that
these restrictions make cities less powerful –and yet the population is more fragmented in
both cases. Annexation by city ordinance is the reverse. It predicts more cities –possibly
because it is a valued ability rather than a restriction –and yet results in more
consolidated populations. Finally, government liberalism had little effect on the number
of general governments, but does result in a more consolidated population.

Table 5.4.7 Supplemental Panel Regression with Population Fragmentation as
Dependent Variable
Obs

4548

Groups

2293

Obs/Group 1 to 2
Wald(85)
X-sq

4517.51
<.001

Herfindahl Index (HHI) Population Fragmentation in
County
County Population (100k)

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>|z|

-0.11921

0.06652

0.073

Urban Areas population (100k)

0.09344

0.06479

0.149

Urban Cluster population (100k)

0.10700

0.05838

0.067

Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)

0.04026

0.08963

0.653

Average City Expenditure (1b)

3.64157

0.34337

<0.001

-0.00567

0.00336

0.091

Total federal revenue to county (10m)

0.01618

0.01473

0.272

Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal revenue to County

0.03432

0.00627

<0.001

HHI of state revenue to county

0.38546

0.01447

<0.001

HHI of local revenue to county

0.02579

0.00734

<0.001

HHI of local intergovernment expenditure to county

0.03550

0.00619

<0.001

-0.00034

0.00045

0.445

0.00145

0.00828

0.861

Persons in Poverty (100k)

-0.47038

0.24572

0.056

Aggregate Housing Value (10b)

-0.43753

0.14065

0.002

Median Housing Value (100k)

0.12370

0.02428

<0.001

Total State revenue to county (10m)

Aggregate Income for the county (1b)
Household Median Income (10k)
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Table 5.4.7 Continued

Coef.

Housing Value Interquartile Range (100k)

Std. Err.

P>|z|

-0.07694

0.02388

0.001

Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)

0.08697

0.06288

0.167

Ratio of Majority to Minority Party voters

0.00620

0.00335

0.064

3rd Parties (1/0)

0.00468

0.01276

0.714

Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)

0.03844

0.01335

0.004

Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)

-0.49098

0.14425

0.001

Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)

-0.00123

0.00815

0.880

0.05766

0.06793

0.396

-0.02031

0.00923

0.028

0.02078

0.00861

0.016

Annexation allowed with County Permission (1/0)

-0.00064

0.01232

0.959

Annexation requires referendum (1/0)

-0.02956

0.01049

0.005

State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)

0.01850

0.00727

0.011

State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)

-0.00807

0.01042

0.439

Citizen Liberalism (state)

-0.00070

0.00056

0.214

Government Liberalism (state)

0.00061

0.00016

<0.001

Total number of Democrats (100k)

0.06238

0.08166

0.445

HHI of Racial Diversity across County

0.01354

0.02474

0.584

-0.01026

0.04427

0.817

HHI of Religion Diversity across County

0.07309

0.02516

0.004

HHI of Employment Diversity across County

0.15728

0.05163

0.002

0.03992
-0.73433
-0.50918
-0.49779
-0.63926
-0.65036
0.01115
-0.45401
-0.57333
-0.65688
-0.06843
-0.54061
-0.52137
-0.67177
-0.58046
-0.44961

0.04445
0.14770
0.15022
0.14282
0.14734
0.14414
0.13628
0.14396
0.14393
0.18404
0.04147
0.14349
0.14320
0.14397
0.14505
0.14381

0.369
<0.001
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.935
0.002
<0.001
<0.001
0.099
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.002

Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)
Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)
Annexation allowed by City Ordinance (1/0)

HHI of Language Diversity across County

HHI of Payroll Diversity across County
AK
AR
CA
CO
CT
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
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Table 5.4.7 Continued
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
_cons

Coef.
Std. Err.
P>|z|
-0.56975
0.14472
<0.001
-0.60052
0.14839
<0.001
-0.58694
0.14952
<0.001
-0.70727
0.16665
<0.001
-0.76270
0.14363
<0.001
-0.78579
0.14373
<0.001
-0.44270
0.14377
0.002
-0.55890
0.14371
<0.001
-0.53007
0.14439
<0.001
-0.09571
0.04242
0.024
-0.04887
0.04916
0.320
-0.64599
0.15497
<0.001
-0.51931
0.14579
<0.001
-0.46443
0.14507
0.001
0.00807
0.03233
0.803
-0.67299
0.14459
<0.001
-0.73596
0.14341
<0.001
-0.69023
0.14476
<0.001
-0.72782
0.14615
<0.001
-0.73295
0.14309
<0.001
-0.80651
0.21048
<0.001
-0.42315
0.14409
0.003
-0.64048
0.14400
<0.001
-0.56748
0.14377
<0.001
-0.50698
0.14322
<0.001
-0.74827
0.14689
<0.001
-0.57181
0.16333
<0.001
0.09355
0.03411
0.006
-0.52243
0.14446
<0.001
0.09464
0.04482
0.035
-0.74419
0.14449
<0.001
-0.54143
0.14713
<0.001
0.45783
0.16931
0.007

sigma_u
sigma_e

0.10035
0.12534
(fraction of
variance due
0.39063 to u_i)

rho
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The final analysis used the 2558 cases from 2002 and added the number of
business births and deaths to measure the effect of private sector entrepreneurs on the
number of general governments. The model was distinct from an all-zero parameter
model. Without the time-series, several state fixed effects were dropped for their
collinearities with other variables. As in the MSA analysis, one of the measures of
private sector entrepreneurship is significant, but it is the other one. In the MSA analysis,
it was new business starts, which was a measure of entrepreneurial capital. In the nonMSA analysis, it is business deaths, which was the measure of entrepreneurial risk taking.
Other than the two new variables and the collinearities, the model remains unchanged.
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Table 5.4.8 Full Cross-Sectional Time Series Poisson Regression with State Fixed
Effects for Impact of Resources and Population Diversity on County Fragmentation
Obs

4548

Groups

2293

Obs/Group

1 to 2

Loglikelihood
Wald(85)
X-sq

-10634.3
9432.38
<0.001

General Governments

Coef.

County Population (100k)

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

1.78078

0.22464

Urban Areas population (100k)

-0.56056

0.20100

-2.79

Urban Cluster population (100k)

-0.84864

0.18013

-4.71 <0.001

Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)

-0.57541

0.53528

-1.07

Average City Expenditure (1b)

-35.15892

7.93 <0.001
0.005
0.282

2.09530 -16.78 <0.001

Total State revenue to county (10m)

0.07596

0.01096

6.93 <0.001

Total federal revenue to county (10m)

0.05042

0.04262

1.18

0.237

Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal revenue to County

0.00188

0.01904

0.10

0.921

HHI of state revenue to county

-0.80776

0.04811 -16.79 <0.001

HHI of local revenue to county

-0.03596

0.02386

-1.51

0.132

0.04264

0.01890

2.26

0.024

Aggregate Income for the county (1b)

-0.00080

0.00156

-0.51

0.608

Household Median Income (10k)

-0.07519

0.03030

-2.48

0.013

0.72008

0.87185

0.83

0.409

Aggregate Housing Value (10b)

-0.99703

0.45912

-2.17

0.030

Median Housing Value (100k)

-0.26026

0.09681

-2.69

0.007

Housing Value Interquartile Range (100k)

0.18213

0.09134

1.99

0.046

Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)

0.56675

0.19099

2.97

0.003

Ratio of Majority to Minority Party voters

0.01873

0.01212

1.54

0.122

3rd Parties (1/0)

0.18008

0.03474

5.18 <0.001

-0.20691

0.04934

-4.19 <0.001

0.16420

0.42984

0.38

0.702

Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)

-0.00278

0.01536

-0.18

0.856

Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)

-0.39079

0.13118

-2.98

0.003

Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)

-0.04257

0.02470

-1.72

0.085

0.07543

0.02752

2.74

0.006

-0.17873

0.04066

HHI of local intergovernment expenditure to county

Persons in Poverty (100k)

Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)
Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)

Annexation allowed by City Ordinance (1/0)
Annexation allowed with County Permission (1/0)
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-4.40 <0.001

Table 5.4.8 Continued

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

Annexation requires referendum (1/0)

-0.30080

0.02874 -10.46 <0.001

State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)

-0.18604

0.02072

-8.98 <0.001

0.18355

0.03068

5.98 <0.001

-0.00132

0.00183

-0.72

0.471

Government Liberalism (state)

0.00067

0.00050

1.34

0.181

Total number of Democrats (100k)

0.08874

0.17215

0.52

0.606

HHI of Racial Diversity across County

0.36345

0.09574

3.80 <0.001

HHI of Language Diversity across County

0.00927

0.16068

0.06

0.954

HHI of Religion Diversity across County

-0.27221

0.09791

-2.78

0.005

HHI of Employment Diversity across County

-1.03000

0.19655

-5.24 <0.001

-0.27528
0.15436
1.30033
0.44525
-0.23842
0.46306
0.51088
0.42513
0.18158
0.45232
0.95863
0.43436
-0.95038
0.38561
0.52841
0.43488
0.41287
0.42943
-16.42654 7483.86000
-0.27205
0.14949
1.52881
0.42616
1.19782
0.42493
0.78009
0.42859
1.47719
0.43222
-0.04986
0.42984
0.63983
0.43447
0.62186
0.43815
1.00610
0.45567
1.14045
0.52347
1.33541
0.42651
2.02615
0.42750
-0.14373
0.42896
0.97893
0.42799
-0.09926
0.43468
0.82037
0.14943

-1.78 0.075
2.92 0.003
-0.51 0.607
1.20 0.229
0.40 0.688
2.21 0.027
-2.46 0.014
1.22 0.224
0.96 0.336
0.00 0.998
-1.82 0.069
3.59 <0.001
2.82 0.005
1.82 0.069
3.42 0.001
-0.12 0.908
1.47 0.141
1.42 0.156
2.21 0.027
2.18 0.029
3.13 0.002
4.74 <0.001
-0.34 0.738
2.29 0.022
-0.23 0.819
5.49 <0.001

State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)
Citizen Liberalism (state)

HHI of Payroll Diversity across County
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH

-1.01646
0.40457
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0.29159
0.45132

-3.49 <0.001
0.90 0.370

Table 5.4.8 Continued
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
0.26800
0.44089
0.61 0.543
1.52007
0.43007
3.53 <0.001
0.12479
0.11775
1.06 0.289
2.10867
0.43018
4.90 <0.001
1.52598
0.42686
3.57 <0.001
0.59306
0.43199
1.37 0.170
0.06313
0.44027
0.14 0.886
1.42429
0.42412
3.36 0.001
0.44874
0.66041
0.68 0.497
0.46344
0.43164
1.07 0.283
1.58403
0.42908
3.69 <0.001
0.65570
0.43132
1.52 0.128
0.12576
0.42726
0.29 0.769
1.10877
0.44194
2.51 0.012
0.07976
0.45917
0.17 0.862
-0.48307
0.13197 -3.66 <0.001
0.58140
0.43390
1.34 0.180
0.03902
0.16217
0.24 0.810
1.27994
0.42966
2.98 0.003
0.07400
0.44412
0.17 0.868
2.64506
0.48247
5.48 <0.001
-1.99366
0.04860
0.13620
0.00662

_cons
/lnalpha
alpha
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Table 5.4.9 Supplemental Poisson Regression Including Private Sector
Entrepreneurship with 2002 Data Only
N=2258
chi2(75)=17221.55
P>Chi2>0.001
Loglikelihood=-5559.5618

General Governments

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

County Population (100k)

2.356452

0.223622

10.54

<0.001

Urban Areas population (100k)

-1.57358

0.176053

-8.94

<0.001

Urban Cluster population (100k)

-1.52922

0.15242

-10.03

<0.001

Moved Counties in last 5 years (100k)

0.495666

0.416599

1.19

0.234

Average City Expenditure (1b)

-37.1601

2.283265

-16.27

<0.001

Total State revenue to county (10m)

0.060731

0.010611

5.72

<0.001

Total federal revenue to county (10m)
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of federal revenue to
County

0.126583

0.044441

2.85

0.004

0.056351

0.022881

2.46

0.014

HHI of state revenue to county

-0.92445

0.048335

-19.13

<0.001

HHI of local revenue to county
HHI of local intergovernment expenditure to
county

-0.0486

0.026171

-1.86

0.063

0.030693

0.021872

1.4

0.161

Aggregate Income for the county (1b)

0.002085

0.001257

1.66

0.097

Household Median Income (10k)

0.104988

0.032134

3.27

0.001

Persons in Poverty (100k)

-1.15033

0.836323

-1.38

0.169

Aggregate Housing Value (10b)

-3.61388

0.497839

-7.26

<0.001

Median Housing Value (100k)

-0.63486

0.091538

-6.94

<0.001

Housing Value Interquartile Range (100k)

0.483838

0.07838

6.17

<0.001

Registered Not-for-Profits (1k)

-0.00799

0.135504

-0.06

0.953

Business Births

-0.00044

0.000268

-1.64

0.1

Business Deaths

0.001559

0.000294

5.31

<0.001

-0.0539

0.01446

-3.73

<0.001

3rd Parties (1/0)

0.656353

0.27162

2.42

0.016

Statutory Home Rule Protection (2/1/0)

-0.00025

0.090036

0

0.998

Dillon's Rule Judiciary (1/0)

-0.48435

0.44315

-1.09

0.274

0.4538

0.153956

2.95

0.003

Laws limiting Annexation (1/0)

-1.78919

0.727257

-2.46

0.014

Annexation allowed voluntarily (1/0)

-0.57864

0.161847

-3.58

<0.001

Annexation allowed by City Ordinance (1/0)

0.285584

0.131805

2.17

0.03

Ratio of Majority to Minority Party voters

Laws limiting Incorporation (1/0)
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Table 5.4.9 Continued
Annexation allowed with County Permission
(1/0)

Coef.
-0.33321

0.114066

-2.92

0.003

Annexation requires referendum (1/0)

0.283525

0.229077

1.24

0.216

State requires Balanced Budget (1/0)

-0.55405

0.139378

-3.98

<0.001

State imposed Debt Limit (1/0)

0.721456

0.15361

4.7

<0.001

Citizen Liberalism (state)

-0.00611

0.008144

-0.75

0.453

Government Liberalism (state)

-0.00723

0.001557

-4.64

<0.001

Total number of Democrats (100k)

0.301031

0.595177

0.51

0.613

HHI of Racial Diversity across County

0.364762

0.095141

3.83

<0.001

HHI of Language Diversity across County

0.331479

0.14654

2.26

0.024

HHI of Religion Diversity across County

-0.52203

0.090231

-5.79

<0.001

HHI of Employment Diversity across County

-1.26359

0.214699

-5.89

<0.001

HHI of Payroll Diversity across County
AZ
AR
CA
CO
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NY
NC
ND
OK

-0.21599
-0.65817
-0.15801
0.16554
0.399717
-0.74643
0.384526
-11.0421
-0.34613
-0.08463
1.15569
0.038994
0.061602
-1.53344
-0.49112
1.138807
0.485392
1.902253
-0.06134
-0.26839
-0.55943
1.107422
0.235096
0.755195
1.269359
1.564841
-0.28688

0.165802
0.212382
0.137849
0.30821
0.168744
0.321003
0.164126
617.0612
0.333514
0.116182
0.146421
0.20411
0.145642
0.339293
0.322116
0.390073
0.139998
0.101954
0.137877
0.294845
0.167392
0.572927
0.617203
0.263514
0.370512
0.220154
0.316511

-1.3
-3.1
-1.15
0.54
2.37
-2.33
2.34
-0.02
-1.04
-0.73
7.89
0.19
0.42
-4.52
-1.52
2.92
3.47
18.66
-0.44
-0.91
-3.34
1.93
0.38
2.87
3.43
7.11
-0.91

0.193
0.002
0.252
0.591
0.018
0.02
0.019
0.986
0.299
0.466
<0.001
0.848
0.672
<0.001
0.127
0.004
0.001
<0.001
0.656
0.363
0.001
0.053
0.703
0.004
0.001
<0.001
0.365
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Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

Table 5.4.9 Continued
OR
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WV
WY
_cons

Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
-0.01625
0.167949
-0.1
0.923
0.809566
0.333028
2.43
0.015
-0.45244
0.324296
-1.4
0.163
-0.04392
0.153008
-0.29
0.774
0.763201
0.138064
5.53
<0.001
-2.23021
0.672976
-3.31
0.001
-0.88659
0.475906
-1.86
0.062
0.03502
0.511447
0.07
0.945
-0.92901
0.165948
-5.6
<0.001
3.941049
0.885841
4.45
<0.001

5.5 Conclusions on the Fragmentation of Non-MSA Counties
Non-MSA counties provide a plethora of significant coefficients, interesting
developments in the supplemental analysis, and differences from MSAs to provide many
possible conclusions. The three conclusions from the MSA analysis are broadly
supported: cities depend on resources to form, politics and finance matter to city
formation, and cities are organized one city at a time. However, the specifics differ.
Non-MSA counties do not fragment based on the distribution of
intergovernmental revenue, but rather based on the total amount granted –with federal
money having a larger effect than state money. The price of government is tremendously
important to entrepreneurs in organizing new governments outside MSAs where it was
only one of many concerns within the metropolis. They are similar, however, in their
response to restrictions on their powers. A state which imposes restrictions on local
governments has fewer of them both in and out of the metropolis. Whatever the
resources and population, there is evidence that an entrepreneur is still needed to organize
the new city.
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While both MSA and non-MSA analyses showed fragmentation based on social
and economic diversity, more socio-economic measures were significant outside the
MSA –including race, which was associated with consolidation. Non-MSA counties also
fragment based on industry concentration both of employment and payroll. Outside the
metropolis, politics and wealth still matter, but so do industry, religion, and race. 46
For all the differences, the distributional finding was the same. General
governments were distributed Poisson, indicating that the creation of a general
government was decided on the merits of the particular government, not by reference to
the number of existing governments. Even here, however, things are not the same. In the
metropolis, resources and preferences led to governmental fragmentation, but had no
impact on population fragmentation. That was not true outside the metropolis.
Furthermore, outside the MSA some state laws and material resources drove the creation
of general governments one way, but population fragmentation the other.
This, obviously, suggests additional research possibilities. What explains how the
population fragments when it has wealth, but not the governments? What explains how
the city annexation leads to more cities but more consolidated populations, and how
annexations which require the consent of non-city residents lead to fewer cities but a
more dispersed population? What explains how population fragmentation is related to
the drivers of city fragmentation outside the MSA but not inside the MSA? Finally, why
do different resources matter inside and outside the MSA? Some suggestive answers will
be provided in Chapter 7.
46

Though it is worth noting that the magnitudes of the race, religion, and language indices are not very
different. Race is oppositely signed, but both analyses put it around |.3|, and religion is a -.5 in this
analysis and -1 in the MSA. The difference is their significance –which may point to something interesting
in the difference in variation between MSAs and non-MSAs. Alternately, it could be the result of the lack
of sorting measures in the non-MSA analysis.
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Finally, there is one additional caveat that cannot be removed. Counties can
become MSAs if they gain sufficient population density -100,000 residents in a
population center. As such, some of the unexpected findings might be driven by
population constraints. Urban, for example, is also defined by population density. As a
result, if the population of a non-MSA county is increased to a certain point, and those
new residents moved to cities which were close to each other, the county would be
reclassified as an MSA. There may not be any counties with lots of cities and lots of
urban residents because those places graduated into the other dataset. In other words,
urban residents may be associated with consolidation because all the urban residents
associated with fragmentation end up in the MSA dataset.
While this possibility cannot be ruled out, it is not necessarily worrisome. The
maximum size of a county in this dataset is only 186,000 (York, Maine in 2002), and the
maximum urban population is 120,000 (Imperial, California in 2002). The line between
MSA and non-MSA is relatively thin, and so the edge cases seem unlikely to be
influencing the estimates unduly.
As with the results of the population fragmentation analysis, this suggests more
research to be done. First, are there more categories than just MSA and non-MSA?
Should jurisdictions be placed on a continuum? Is there a difference for the preference in
number of cities between those who live in MSAs and those who do not? What drives
that difference if it exists? How does it interact with the annexation laws used in this
analysis? These important questions remain to be answered.
One aspect that may be important to understanding the unexpected findings of this
and the previous chapter is that not every interest group is the same. While all interest
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groups are expected to organize through similar entrepreneurial methods, not every
interest group has the same goals or resource needs. Economic or material interest
groups have different needs than expressive or ideological interest groups, and if there are
differences between MSA and non-MSA, or even between counties, on the type of
interest group community this could affect the interpretation of the results. This too,
would be an interesting further line of research, though it would require a different
approach and more qualitatively detailed data.

Copyright © Matthew L Howell 2011
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Chapter 6
The Network of Local Government
6.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have demonstrated that American cities are fragmented
by diverse populations provided there are adequate resources to support additional
governments. When government is cheap or resources are plentiful and individuals have
diverse preferences, those same individuals are willing and able to form smaller, more
ideally organized governments. The smaller jurisdictions guard their autonomy as a way
to protect the continued good-fit of their governments.
However, the purpose of this dissertation is not only to explain urban
fragmentation, but to develop a theory of urban organization as a type of interest group
organization. Interest groups not only fragment like cities, they also have cooperative
and competitive relations with each other like cities. Like small interest groups, however,
the small jurisdiction has difficulty providing for its residents only from its own
resources. The small organization lacks economies of scale, so services are more
expensive. The limited resources of the small organization also make it difficult to
accomplish complicated tasks without help. The resources necessary to keep the
organization functional –the ones which organizations must control –are not necessarily
the same resources necessary to control policy. Without control of those resources, the
first organization must work with the organization which does control that resource or
compete with that organization to get control of the resource. Competition is expensive,
and so cooperation is the preferred method. Organizations also cooperate to get better
results from their existing resources –through economies of scale, for example.
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Cooperation among groups is strategic. Groups choose partners based on who
controls resources, whether another partner can make existing resources more valuable,
and how much autonomy must be surrendered to make the alliance work. Much like the
formation of a new city is a balance of the benefit of autonomy and fit against low cost,
cooperation is a balance of low cost and new benefit options against decreased autonomy
and potentially worse fit. The same constraints which drive interest groups to this kind of
cooperation also drive cities to the same.
Cooperation can be systemic or ad hoc. In either case, cooperation happens along
lines of contact between organizations. Cooperative action implies communication.
Communication implies a network. This chapter investigates the relationship between
resources, goals, and inter-city contact. In the next section, I explain out the basics of
network theory as it applies to inter-city cooperation. Section 3 applies network theory to
contact and cooperation between cities. In section 4, I describe the dataset of Kentucky
mayors collected and analyzed in this chapter. In part 5, I analyze a contact network of
Kentucky mayors to test the antecedents of inter-city contact. Finally, I conclude the
chapter in part 6 with conclusions from the analysis.

6.2 The Literature of Network Theory
Social networks describe the connection of individuals (called nodes) to one
another through a variety of relational ties. A network might describe friends or family
or coworkers or the lobbying of various interest groups. In most networks, the first use of
social connections is to share information (Granovetter, 1985). The shape of the network
affects how information is shared (Granovetter, 1973). If the network is dense, which is
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to say that there are many connections between members, then information spreads
quickly through the network. As each person shares the information with all their
contacts, the information reaches exponentially more people. 47 As a result, everyone in
the network knows more or less the same things. This is helpful for routine information,
but more exotic requests would require a connection to another network –one where
someone might have an answer.
A highly centralized network –one where there are a few major actors and
everyone is connected to those major actors, such as a single-center metropolis –would be
controlled by those major actors and the “peripheral” actors would be less powerful
(Leavitt, 1951). Centralized networks are less dense, so information has to pass through
choke-points to spread across the network. The person occupying the choke point is a
gatekeeper and can use that power to help or harm. (Brass, 1984).
In addition to the spread of ideas (Burt, 2004, Brass, 1995), networks also allow
for the spread of resources (John and Cole, 2000). Much like the connections in a
production line, government policy or lobbying relies on being able to connect those who
have the necessary resources. For this reason, centrality is itself a resource (O’Toole and
Meier, 2004, Selznick, 1943, 1948, Smith, 2000).
The existing network can explain how cooperation starts –two cities with a
connection recognize shared information or resources and negotiate an agreement, for
example. Network studies also illuminate how the networks start, and so can tell
something about how groups and cities form the networks which later affect cooperation.
The major theory is homophily –the idea that similar people like to be together
(McPherson, et al, 2001). Those with more in common have more things to talk about,
47

One person reaches 4, those four reach 16, and so on.
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and as a result tend to have established relationships. In large collections of homophilous
people, the members seek out those who are still more similar (Mehra, Kilduff, and
Brass, 1998). In a room full of international businessmen, the Americans will find each
other. Within the collection of Americans, the African-Americans will find each other.
And the groups may subdivide even further. In addition to being a similar story to the
way interest groups and cities form –seeking ever more similar people to share the
network and organization –this also fits with how interest groups interact with each other.
They look for similar people. The similarity of the individuals also provides times and
places where networking happens (Feld, 1981).
Similarities not only give network members something to talk about, it gives them
a place to do it –a social focus. If several individuals shared several foci, they would
have strong relationships because of the numerous opportunities to interact. If those foci
were “compatible,” allowing work from one focus to be done in another, these
individuals could also accomplish more by “doubling up” on their interactions. Company
work might be done at a company softball game, for example. A “large” would have
many members, but they would be loosely connected to each other. The broad focus
would attract many people for many different reasons and reduce the homophily of the
whole group. If the focus was narrow, the group would be small, but also densely
connected. And like interest groups, cities, and network, each large focus would have
many smaller foci within it (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 1998). Those smaller groups
might be determined by unique characteristics of the individuals –in the specific study,
people tended to search out small groups by sex, race, and age –or by some common
interest, such as agriculture groups break into smaller groups by particular crop
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(Salibsury, 1969). In the case of Atlanta, the large focus was city government and its
ceremonies and functions, but it included smaller foci for businessmen and AfricanAmerican leaders to do the business of their interests and the business of the city
simultaneously. In interest groups, there are typically many more people interested in the
policy than actually working on it –a smaller focus inside a larger one (Larsen,
Vrangbaek, and Traulson, 2006, Howlett, 2002). 48

6.3 Networks in Interest Groups and Cities
For interest groups to cooperate, there must be a network. When interest groups
cooperate, it is because of shared goals (Hojnacki, 1997), or what network scholars call
homophily. Where interest groups differ in their network is that, because they value
autonomy, simply having something in common is not enough. Networks are not free to
maintain and resources spent maintaining the network are resources not spent on
producing goods or getting a direct return or avoiding being undercut by another
organizer. The benefit of maintaining a network must be greater than the cost and
constraints, through additional resources, new information, or better production. Groups,
and by extension cities, must have something in common and they must benefit from
communicating about it.
There are two ways cities can benefit through cooperation. The first is the
economy of scale. If cities face similar problems and residents desire similar solutions,
then banding together to provide a single service can save both organizers money by

48

Another way to integrate this research with interest group organization would be to think of the large
social focus as the latent group –they have a common interest and can talk with each other, but they lack
strong ties. Those members of the latent group who are organized to real action will have stronger ties
with each other, but also a narrower social focus –their activism.
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reducing redundancy and spreading the fixed costs over more people. Because the
services desired are common to both cities, no residents are worse off, the loss in
autonomy is made up in the lower cost, and the entrepreneur earns the profits. 49 For this
to work, cities have to be close enough to each other to share the service and the
transportation costs not to swamp the savings.
The second way cities can benefit through cooperation is through an alliance to
use resources they control. Interest groups may trade different types of resources: group
1 brings money while group 2 brings voters, for example. For cities, this is possible, but
cities also have sole control of their territory. While land may be a generic resource for
an interest group, for a city, land is very specific (Molotch, 1976). A road has to connect
all the right parcels, and if another city controls part of the route, cities must cooperate on
the road. A city always has a resource to trade –its consent (Fischel, 2001). Where there
are large differences in city resources, trade is more likely because it is easier for the
larger jurisdiction to provide compensation to the smaller to get consent (Volden, 2007).
The interaction between cities in this way can also have an influence on
fragmentation. The purpose of this section is to establish the nature of local government
networks –making their effects on fragmentation a future project –but the potential
interaction will affect the design of this study. Cooperation in an urban area can allow
for additional fragmentation by allowing cities to pool resources to face large problems
and contract with each other to take advantage of comparative efficiencies. This was
why, for example, the distribution of local intergovernmental revenue was included in the
prior chapters. However, this assumes that cities predominantly associate with their
49

“Profits” for a city might mean votes for mayor, lower taxes on residents, or higher returns for land
developers and realtors.
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geographic peers, and it is not obvious that they should. Large cities may be far more
interested in maintaining relationships with other large cities than with their smaller
suburban neighbors. By studying a state-wide network, this type of cooperation and
contact can be explicitly tested.
There is a difference between cities and social networks in that cities are
organizations, not individuals. Networking between members is possible, but when
speaking of the relationship between organizations, it is really the network of
entrepreneurs that matters. The entrepreneur is the one who organizes the group and
makes sure everyone gets the benefits necessary to gain compliance. If the entrepreneur
does not want to work with another organization, the membership will have a hard time
forcing him or her to so. The entrepreneur is the one distributing benefits.
Because the entrepreneurs of the cities are the people who form the group, the
similarity of entrepreneurs is also important. The more things entrepreneurs have in
common, the easier it is to communicate, and the less costly it is. When maintaining the
network is fun, entrepreneurs are willing to give up some compensation to do it (Stone,
1989 makes this point explicitly about the coalition governing Atlanta –part of the reason
it was stable for so long was because the members liked each other and did not want to
break up the coalition).
Finally, there is the matter of social focus for the city. A social focus is anything
which provides a time, place, and topic for sustaining a network. For cities, this could be
many things, but their immediate super-jurisdictions are good candidates. Councils of
Government, county government meetings, and other regional committees are places
where cities would need to send representatives, where they would have something to
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talk about, and time to do it. In Kentucky, Area Development Districts might fill this
goal. ADDs are multi-county and multi–city organizations which plan, coordinate, and
organize funding for economic development among their members. Mayors and County
Judge-Executives are members of the governing body and have a monthly meeting –an
ideal focus for local government cooperation. The focus reduces the cost of networking
and also provides an impetus to talk about common issues if that is what the meeting was
about.
If cities act like interest groups, then cities should have contact with each other
when they 1.) Share goals, 2.) are close enough to gain economies of scale or have
different resources, 3.) where the entrepreneurs are similar, and 4.) have a focus that
reduces the cost of contact. Sharing goals for an interest group is not just about sharing a
policy issue, it is also about having similar preferences. This is most likely when the
same interests dominate the city and when their populations are most alike. For cities,
the entrepreneur is the person who organizes the governing coalition, which I will assume
is the elected mayor. This generates the following hypotheses:
1.) If cities share policy concerns, then the mayors are more likely to have contact
2.) If cities share major interest groups, then the mayors are more likely to have
contact
3.) If the cities share demographics, then the mayors are more likely to have
contact
4.) If the cities are close to each other, then the mayors are more likely to have
contact.
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5.) If the cities have different resource levels, then the mayors are more likely to
have contact.
6.) If the mayors share similar social characteristics, then the mayors are more
likely to have contact.
7.) If the cities share counties or regional governments, then the mayors are more
likely to have contact.

6.4 A Network of Kentucky Mayors
To answer the hypotheses posed in the prior section requires data about the
contact network of mayors. Who talks with whom? With the cooperation of the
Kentucky League of Cities, I contacted 374 mayor members of the League, explained the
project, and asked them to take a survey. The survey asked questions about what the
mayors perceived as their most prominent city policy issues, prominent internal civic
organizations, personal characteristics of the mayors, and which mayors (from a list of all
373) they had official mayor-to-mayor contact. The definition of “official” was left up to
the mayor to so as not to preclude mayors who considered social contact a part of their
job from describing that part of their network. The survey instrument and contact letter
are included as Appendix 2. Of 374 mayors, 58 responded to the survey by time of the
analysis (15.5%). 50 Five mayors did not complete the survey, for a total response rate of
14.2%.
The data collected in the survey were matched to data from two additional
sources. Population, median income, median home value, and demographic data were
50

For future use, the survey was left open for an additional week, but there was not time to analyze the
additional data.
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collected from city-data.com, a source of city information intended for potential movers.
The city-data.com data are aggregated from other public sources, such as the Bureau of
the Census. The Census data set was dated 2009. Additional data on geographic and
political (as in city class and Area Development District –voting and party data were not
available at the city level) characteristics were taken from ESRI ARCMap data from
2000. Geographic and Area Development District characteristics had not changed since
2000. Several cities –including some included in the survey –were reclassified in June
2011. These cities were left with their pre-2011 classifications because cooperation prior
to 2011 would be based on powers and size from 2010 and earlier..
To analyze the network, each variable (a vector) was converted to a matrix where
the intersection of row and column indicated the degree of similarity between CityR and
CityC . In the case of contact between the mayors of R and C, a 1 indicated that at least
one of the mayors claimed to contact the other city. Both mayors identified each other in
33% of the cases. A 0 indicated no contact. For categorical data, such as which county
or Area Development District the city was located in, a 1 indicates an exact match, else it
is marked a zero. For level data, such as the percent of the population which was white
or the number of residents, the absolute difference of the two jurisdictions was used.
Summary statistics of the characteristics of the responding mayors and cities are
displayed in table 6.4.1.
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Table 6.4.1 Characteristics of Mayors and Cities in Sample
Variable
Mayor's Age
Population
Median Income (2009)
Median Housing Value (2009)
% White
County Seat (1/0)
Years in Office
Female (1/0)
Highest degree achieved

Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
53
59.960
11.031
31
82
58
4406 5,897.498
129
27952
58 39,137.800 21,890.750
10,001 134,063
57 106,478.600 52,584.200
34,010 267,999
58
87.700
10.178
53.1
99.6
58
0.397
0.493
0
1
54
5.400
5.662
1
28
54
0.185
0.392
0
1
49
2.510
1.276
0
5

The mayors who responded average 60 years old, 82.5% men, 39% were the
mayors of county seats and had served for an average of 5.4 years. They are also
overwhelming white (only one minority respondent, an African American) and averaged
between some college and a bachelor’s degree. The average city had a median household
income of $39,000 and median house value of $106,000 in 2009. It was 88% white and
had 4,400 residents. Nine of the 58 cities were located in Jefferson County (15.5%) and
were suburbs of Louisville. By comparison, the state of Kentucky had median household
income in 2009 of $40,000, median housing value of $117,000, 51 and the state was
87.8% white. Jefferson County held 17% of the population. 52
While the data from the survey are, where comparable, statistically close to the
Kentucky averages, the response rate is still quite small and none of the responders is
larger than a class 3 city. It is also possible that mayors who respond to this survey may
be more prone to networking as they are both members of KLC and were interested in a

51
52

City-Data.com provides these comparisons.
Data taken from the Census Bureau’s Quickfacts tables on October 23, 2011.
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networking survey that would be shown at the Kentucky League of Cities convention and
expo. Finally, compared to demographic data provided by the League, the mayors who
responded are older, whiter, and more likely to be men than average in Kentucky.
The network of mayors is described in table 6.4.2 and a diagram of the network is
shown in figure 6.4.1. Degree centrality is the count of how many contacts a given
mayor has. The average mayor in this sample has 2.58 contacts. Betweenness is a
measure of the number of unique paths which connect two separate mayors which pass
through a third mayor in the graph of the network (see figure). It is measured by
calculating the number of paths between cities j and k which pass through i for all cities j
and k –and then summing those proportions. The average mayor has 32 paths (of 3,306
possible city-pairs). If normalized by dividing the sum of actual proportions by the total
number of possible paths (ie: if every proportion was 1), the average city has 2% of the
total possible paths. However, the majority of cities have no paths connecting two other
cities pass through them.
Figure 6.4.1 shows a geographic diagram of the network of mayor contacts. The
graph has a bias towards equal-distance between connected nodes and so physical
distance is roughly proportional to social or network distance –that is, if two nodes are
close to each other in the chart, then they also are close to each other along the network
connections.
As the diagram shows, of those cities which have contact with other cities, most
of them are part of the same network component. There is a recognizable network
centered on Lyndon and Saint Matthews (suburbs of Louisville), Winchester (a neighbor
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to Lexington), and Greensburg (located in central and southern Kentucky). 53 There is a
much smaller network centered on Calhoun (a city near Owensboro). The other 13 cities
did not have contacts within this network to any other city in the sample. 54

53

After the analysis was completed I had a conversation with Ed Burtner, Mayor of Winchester, who
pointed out that the reason he and the mayors of Lyndon, Midway, and Greensburg know each other is
because they all serve on the Kentucky League of Cities Executive Board together.
54
Some of them report contacts to cities not in this sample. The pattern is the same when expanded to
all 373 cities. There is one primary component, a few smaller ones, and many cities with no contact at all.
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Table 6.4.2 Measures of Network Centrality of Sample

Degree
Betweenness
Standardized
Betweennnes

Mean
Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2.586
2.804
0
15
32.534
71.285
0
439.838
2.039
4.467
0
27.559

Figure 6.4.1 Network Diagram of the Sample of Kentucky Mayors 55

55

For legibility, the cities of Monticello, Murray, Saint Matthews, and Southgate were moved slightly so
they did not block the label for the neighboring cities.
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6.4.2 Variables
The hypotheses regarding inter-mayor contact argue that homophily –similarity –
of policy issues and city preferences and mayors themselves should lead to a higher
probability of contact. The existence of a social focus should also lead to more
probability of contact. However, interest groups which cooperate also need to have
different resources to justify the loss of autonomy. Therefore, differences –not similarity
–in size (population resources), legal authority, and financial resources should be
associated with higher probabilities of contact between mayors.
The measures for each of these types of similarity and difference were computed
as difference matrices. For categorical data each cell in the matrix represents the dyad
cityr -cityc . If the cell has a 1 in it, that means that both cityr and city c both share the trait.
Otherwise, the cell is zero. For example, if City R was concerned about strategic
planning, then R’s variable vector would have a 1 in it. If City C also had a 1 in that
vector, then the matrix for strategic planning would have a 1 in the cell at the intersection
of City R and CityC . For data with a level, such as distance in miles, each cell is the
absolute difference between cityr and city c . Table 6.4.3 shows the density (mean) of
each matrix variable. For continuous variables, the standard deviation is the standard
deviation. For categorical variables, standard deviation is the total number of matches
out of 3,306 city-pairs. 56

56

For categorical data, measures of dispersion do not have a firm meaning. Density is not a measure of
centrality but rather a measure of how many nodes touch each other.
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Table 6.4.3 Summary of Variable Similarity (continuous marked by units)

Variable

Density
Issues/Proximity

Mayor Contact
Distance (miles)
Budgets
Development

0.045
99.947
0.212
0.339

Std
Deviation

150
69.921
702
1122

Hypothesis
Affect
Variable

DV
+
+
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Grants
Strategic
Planning
Recession

0.073

240 +

0.033
0.006

110 +
20 +

Gov. Relations

0.004

12 +

Safety

0.127

420 +

Sanitation

0.093

306 +

Std
Hypothesis
Deviation Affect

Density
Mayor Characteristics
Difference in
Years in Office
5.604
5.72
Same Sex
0.693
1982 +
Same Race
0.962
2652 +
Same Profession
0.152
404 +
Difference in
Education Level
1.446
1.082
Difference in
Age (years)
12.257
9.651
City Characteristics
Difference%
White
10.593
9.7463
Difference %
Religious
16.653
14.4423
Difference
Population
(people)
5,352.094 6396.566

Table 6.4.3 Continued
Variable

Density
Issues (cont)

Std
Deviation

Streets
Taxes

0.017
0.034

56
132

Zoning

0.004

12

Interest Groups
Businessmen
Chamber of
Commerce
Churches
179

Civic Groups
County Gov.
Development
Corp.
Special Districts
Neighborhoods
Utilities

0.229

756

0.127
0.103

420
342

0.115

380

0.229

756

0.017
0.001
0.017
0.033

56
2
56
110

*Unemployment is County Level.

Hypothesis
Std
Hypothesis
Affect
Variable
Density
Deviation Affect
City Characteristics (cont)
Same
+
+
Occupation
0.229
730
+
+
Same Industry
0.3
956
Difference Med.
+
+
Income ($)
21,729.8 22050.52
Difference Med.
+
House value ($)
56,506.41 48344.81
Same Largest
+
+
Denomination
0.516
1646
Difference %
+
Unemployed*
2.013
1.853
+
+
Same County
0.032
104
Commute
+
(people)
2,000.025 2700.409
Difference %
+
BA+
13.784
11.6963
+
Difference Class
1.066
0.8484
+
+
ADD
0.098
324
+
+

The first set of variables regarded issue similarity. Geographic distance is
included as well to cover spill-over issues that affect both jurisdictions. From Agranoff
and McGuire (2003), discussion with the Kentucky League of Cities, and personal
experience, I drew a list of 14 policy issues as issues of interest to cities about which they
might cooperate. I asked the mayors to mark three which were most prominent in their
city. Economic Development was the most often cited issue, followed by budgeting, and
then public safety. 57 No mayor listed purchasing or collective bargaining, and only one
mayor listed civic events (such as festivals or parades) as major issues. There were six
“other” responses (lost revenue, water quality, and unfunded mandates). Spillover, which
is measured by distance, was calculated using the great-circle route based on the
longitude and latitude of cities as listed in the ESRI Kentucky map data. This is the
shortest distance traveling on the surface of the globe, rather than traveling on roads.
The second set of variables was the interest group community facing each city.
Mayors were again asked to choose 3 groups from a list of 11 groups. County
governments and local individual businessmen were tied for most cited, followed by the
area chambers of commerce, and then local civic groups (Rotarians, for example). No
mayor listed industry councils or racial community leaders. There were three “other”
responses (retirees, neighboring governments, and the local college). Area Development
Districts, were not included in the question because cities are constituents of ADDs and
the goal of the question was to learn of the constituent groups of the city. County
residents (and their elected officials) can also be residents of the city.

57

While visiting the KLC Expo in Lexington, KY on October 4, I spoke with several mayors and city
commissioners. Commissioner Robert Blythe of Richmond, KY, mentioned that there had been a recent
court case regarding the pay scale for public safety workers –especially fire fighters. This was going to
have a big impact on budgeting. The two are not, therefore, completely unrelated.
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The third set of variables was characteristics of the mayors. Mayors presumably
have an easier time interacting with mayors who are personally similar to themselves.
Mayors were allowed to answer these questions freely. The responses were then coded
as numbers so that differences could be calculated. The numbers for categorical values
do not matter, only whether they match. For continuous values, such as “number of years
served,” text answers –such as “two terms” –were converted to numbers, such as 9, two
four year terms plus the one year of the current term. Mayor’s previous occupation was
categorized by three-digit NAICS industry code with the following exceptions: business
owners were categorized together, rather than by the business they ran; elected officials
were grouped separately from other government officials, and real estate developers were
separated from realtors. In all three cases this is because business owners, elected
officials, and developers are all potential government entrepreneurs and so are different
from the rest of their industry. Where multiple previous careers were listed, the first
career listed was used. Where the previous career was ambiguous across three-digit
codes, they were called a match with others within the 2-digit code. 58
For these first three groups of variables, similarity should increase the probability
of cooperation. All three sets of variables represent areas of potential confluence of
interests. The fourth set includes some variables which may need to be different to
encourage communication.
The fourth set of variables was city characteristics. The percent of the population
which was black, Hispanic, and white was collected, but the variables co-vary muddying

58

Came up in only 2 cases: “health care” and “blue collar.” In total, Kentucky mayors came from the fields
of Legal Services, Education, Company Management, General Government Support, Public Safety (police),
National Security (Military), Churches, Health Services, “blue collar” (presumably mining, utilities,
construction, or manufacturing), elected officials, real estate developers, and business owners.
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the analysis. Whites being the majority in all cases, large differences between cities on
this measure indicate that one city has a more sizable minority population than the other.
That, in turn, reflects a difference in the local context between cities. Largest occupation
is the modal NAICS industry of men living within the jurisdiction while largest employer
is the modal NAICS industry of businesses located within the jurisdiction by
employment. The same religious denomination is by major religious denominations –in
this case Southern Baptist or Catholic, with two Methodist cities. In addition to these
variables, being in the same county and same ADD are expected to produce contact
between mayors. These represent similarly situated jurisdictions. Differences in the
median income, median property value, county unemployment, population, population
with higher education, and city class represent different resources which might induce
contact to combine resources to accomplish a goal. Net commuters represent that a
jurisdiction has jobs –controlling for unemployment, while median property value and
median income indicate financial resources. Different city classes have different taxation
and legal powers. An educated population is a resource of its own in addition to simply
having population. These could also be treated as similarities. While differences in
financial resources might give two cities cause for contact (trade additional population
and jurisdiction for financial support), it could also be that rich cities only want to work
with other rich cities. To determine which is correct, the next section analyzes the data.
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6.5 Analysis of the Network of Kentucky Mayors
For analysis, the data matrices were loaded into UCINET 6, a dedicated social
network analysis software suite. The hypotheses listed at the end of section 3 regard
predicting the existence of a tie –a 1/0 variable –so a limited dependent variable
formulation is the proper model. However, the distributional assumptions of probit and
logit are clearly inappropriate in the case of a contact matrix, and in any case, no standard
type of regression is designed to work with matrices rather than vectors.
To regress a contact matrix on similarity matrices, each matrix is broken up into a
vector of dyads. Each dyad represents a city-pair where each row is a relationship with a
city and each column is a variable. Therefore, for the variable “contact” the row is city i to-city j and the column is a 1 if cityi and city j have contact, and 0 otherwise. For
distance, the cell is the distance in miles separating the cities, and so on. These vectors
can be regressed. However, the regression is biased because network relationships are
dependent on each other. If i and j are connected, and j and k are connected, then it is
likely that i and k are connected as well. If the distance from i to j is known and the
distance from j to k is known, then the distance from i to k is restricted by mathematics.
The more nodes in the network, the more restricted the possible values are. These linear
dependencies in the rows bias the standard errors and cannot be removed.
There are several possible solutions to this problem. With the data constraints on
this survey, the solution used here is UCINET’s Quadratic Assignment Procedure, or
QAP (pronounced “quap”). QAP computes correlations and produces standard errors
through the creation of data permutations. First, the dyads are correlated and the
estimated correlation saved. QAP then reforms the original dependent variable matrix
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and randomly permeates the rows and columns so that a new matrix created, but filled
with random noise. It then repeats the correlation, saves the estimate, and repeats the
process. After thousands of permutations, it has a distribution of estimates that come
from random noise and the mean of that distribution can be compared to the original
estimate from the non-noise data. The distribution’s standard errors can be calculated,
and so 95% confidence intervals can be calculated. The procedure then counts the
number of correlations between the explanatory variable and the random noise which
were as strong as those correlations computed between the real dependent variable. For
negative values it counts how many were as small, and for positive how many were as
large. The percent equally small (large) or smaller (larger) is the p-value. The process
works the same way for multiple regression (called MRQAP –“mer-quap”). Because of
the small sample size, non-linear models such as probit or logit are not possible, so the
MRQAP estimation will be a linear probability model. The results of this LPM are
displayed in Table 6.5.1.

6.5.2 Results
The model explains approximately 19% of the observed variation and has X2
probability of less than .001. There is a lot of noise, but the estimated coefficients are
distinguishable from each other and not all zero. Unexpectedly, similarity of issues is
usually negative –indicating that if two mayors share the same issues they are less likely
to have contact. They are also mostly indistinguishable from zero. The two issues with
significant coefficients –recession response and strategic planning –are both signed as
expected. Distance is signed as expected, but insignificant. Sharing concern for both
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planning and recession response would make two given mayors 18.1% more likely to
have contact with each other.
Of the possible interest group community matches, only church groups are
significant, and that only at 10%. If two mayors both had contact with churches in their
cities, they are 3.6% more likely to have contact with each other. While not significant,
half of the potential interest group similarities are negative. Both having contact with
county governments, development corporations, special districts and utilities lead to less
probability of contact between mayors.
Mayor characteristics are uniformly insignificant except for the difference in age.
For every decade separating two mayors in age they are 1% less likely to have contact
with each other. The other variables, while not significant at standard levels, are mixed.
Differences in education and past profession are associated with less contact as predicted.
However, being the same race and same sex are associated with less likely contact, and
the greater the experience gap, the more likely mayors are to have contact with each
other.
The most significant variables are among the city characteristics. Having similar
demographics and being in the same county were both associated with higher
probabilities of contact, as expected. Differences in income, however, do not lead to
more likely contact, but less. It is significant, but small. The largest possible difference
is $124,000, which corresponds to just under 12.5% less probability of contact. The most
interesting variable –due to its high significance –is sharing an Area Development
District. Not only is it highly statistically significant, but just sharing an ADD increases
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the probability of mayor-to-mayor contact by 20%. Cities which chare both county and
ADD are 35% more likely to communicate with each other.
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Table 6.5.1 Results of MRQAP Linear Probability Model Predicting Inter-Mayor Contact in Kentucky Cities
Contact
Intercept
Distance (100
miles)
Budget
Economic
Development
Grants
Strategic Planning

Coeff.
P-value
0.154
Issues

As Large

As Small

187

-0.007
-0.003

0.772
0.694

0.228
0.664

0.772
0.694

-0.010
-0.019
0.056

0.376
0.298
0.049*

0.625
0.702
0.049

0.376
0.298
0.951

Recession
Gov. Relations
Public Safety

0.125
-0.019
0.012

0.056+
0.496
0.222

0.056
0.504
0.222

0.944
0.496
0.779

Sanitation
Streets
Taxes

-0.019
0.003
-0.006

0.186
0.386
0.101

0.814
0.386
0.9

0.186
0.614
0.101

Zoning

-0.008

0.609

0.391

0.609

Businessmen
Chambers of
Commerce
Churches
Civic Groups

Interest Groups
0.012
0.324

0.324

0.677

0.009
0.036
0.018

0.285
0.062
0.205

0.716
0.939
0.795

0.285
0.062+
0.205

Contact

Differences in length
of Term (in years)
Same Sex
Same Race
Same Profession
Education (ordinal)
Age (difference in
years)
Difference % White
Population (difference
in 1000s)
Same Occupation
Same Industry
Difference in Income
(1000s $)
Difference in Housing
Value (1000s $)
Same Denomination
Difference in
Unemployment (%)
Both County Seats
Same County

Coeff.

P-value

As Large

As Small

Mayor Characteristics
0.001
-0.014

0.13
0.183

0.13
0.818

0.871
0.183

-0.064
0.017
-0.007

0.103
0.133
0.104

0.898
0.133
0.897

0.103
0.867
0.104

-0.001
0.045*
City Characteristics
-0.001
0.037*

0.956

0.045

0.963

0.037

0.001
-0.014
-0.001

0.249
0.168
0.488

0.249
0.833
0.513

0.751
0.168
0.488

-0.001

0.024*

0.977

0.024

0.000
0.000

0.527
0.411

0.473
0.411

0.527
0.59

-0.002
-0.011
0.150

0.324
0.137
0.002*

0.677
0.863
0.002

0.324
0.137
0.999

Table 6.5.1

Continued
Coeff.
P-value
As Large
Interest Groups (cont)

Contact

County
Government
Development
Corporations
Special Districts
Neighborhood
Associations
Utilities

-0.010

0.236

0.764

0.236

-0.031
-0.074

0.19
0.278

0.81
0.722

0.19
0.278

0.025
-0.033

0.223
0.11

0.223
0.891

0.778
0.11
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+ significant at 10% level
* significant at 5% level
** significant at .1% level
R2
Adj R2
Chi2 Prob
Obs
Iterations

0.191
0.181
<0.001
3306
2000

As Small

Contact
Difference in
Commute Change
(1000 people)
Difference in City
Class
Difference in BA+ (%)
Same ADD

Coeff.
P-value
As Large
City Characteristics (cont)

As Small

0.003

0.212

0.212

0.788

-0.008
0.000

0.134
0.406

0.867
0.594

0.134
0.406

0.207

<0.001**

0

1

6.6 Conclusions
The results of the model are mixed. The low R2 and the shortage of significant
estimates indicates that there is a lot going on which is not explained by this model or lost
in the low response rate. However, there are three general conclusions that can be drawn
from it. First, there is evidence that homophily and social focus increase inter-city
contact. Second, there is something about strategic planning and recession response
which is different from other types of issues. Third, model and theory need to be
revisited, especially if more data can be gathered.
The evidence is ambiguous or disheartening for the interest group theory of interjurisdictional cooperation. Similarity of the interest groups is generally insignificant, and
most policy issues are insignificant, and the significant coefficients are generally small.
There is only a little support for homophily or similarity of goals and situation, and
virtually no evidence of the need for complementary resources. The evidence is not
outright contradictory, but that is because most of the unexpectedly signed variables are
not statistically significant. The evidence seems most consistent with a social focus
story. ADDs and counties provide a place for mayors to communicate and this, in turn,
produces bilateral contact. Perhaps the general finding that cities are autonomous grows
more from the lack of opportunity to talk with other mayors than from the desire to avoid
the meddling of outside forces.
The two issues upon which agreement correlated significantly with higher
probabilities of contact are interesting in their own right. Strategic planning and
recession response both concern keeping the city financially and economically sound into
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the future. They do not directly deal with service provision or the immediate
administrative needs of the city. Both also affect territory beyond the city’s borders.
There a several possible interpretations of this. First, it may mean that inter-city
contact is not for routine city activity. Cities worry about their own public safety, taxes,
and zoning. Unusual events –like a recession –or responses to a changing future are
outside of what cities do every day, and so it is for those issues they seek outside support.
This would suggest outside contact is mostly about information. If an issue is unusual,
then another city might have useful ideas.
Second, it may mean that city to city contact is based on cross-jurisdictional
policy issues. Cities may want to communicate with other planners simply for
coordinative purposes –they do not want to get in each other’s way. Communication is
an easy way to avoid inadvertent conflict later. Recession response falls under the same
structure. One city’s response can affect another by shifting employment, for example.
How one city polices itself is less likely to affect another city. In this case, contact serves
to encourage autonomy by allowing cities to avoid potential conflicts.
Third, this pattern may reflect the benefits from economies of scale. Strategic
planning and recession response are likely to have cross-boundary effects and are also
very expensive. If it is important to the city to develop plans for the future, then it would
be worth cooperating with another city to defray the costs if the alternative is not having
the resources to plan at all. Bolstering this interpretation is the effect of the ADDs, which
exist to support planning and development among cities. Potentially, those for whom
strategic planning is important are more likely to use ADDs, where they meet others who
want to develop plans for their cities, and thus contact is started.
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Fourth, and related to the second and third interpretations, this could be evidence
that city governments look mostly to their geographic peers as assumed in the prior urban
organization literature. This interpretation is hard to prove because few large cities –and
neither of the two largest central cities –responded to the survey.
Unfortunately, none of these theories can be conclusively proven or disproven
from this evidence. Are cities using contact to protect their autonomy, to address
spillover, or to address novel problems? Do cities decide to maintain their own
relationships, or are they limited by the existing social focus? Perhaps they do a little of
all of these things. More data and more analysis are required to narrow these down.
Most problematic for this theory of group/city cooperation is that complementary
resources did not matter. To the extent money, people, and legal power affected contact
between mayors, it was similarity that brought them together. Is this because cities are
inherently powerful groups? Is it that cities do not engage in contact or cooperation that
requires additional resources? Or is it that cities are somehow radically different from
other types of interest groups? One way to narrow this down would be to find data on an
activity where different resources would be expected to matter –such as lobbying (one
provides votes, another money, and another political connections) –and determine
whether different resources matter in that case. Without more data the effect of resources
cannot be distinguished from noise or from benefits derived from economies of scale.
It may also be useful to break up some of the continuous variables to analyze
different behaviors of different sized cites. Perhaps differences in wealth and population
only matter conditional on the cities being total opposites (that is, one city must be large
and poor and the other small and rich). In this model, city pairs where one is rich and
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large and the other is poor and small are treated the same as the opposites case –both of
them have large absolute differences.
Breaking up the continuous variables would also allow for testing the effect of
policy similarity and interest group similarity within certain types of cities. Economies of
scale for addressing public safety, for example, may be more important to small cities
than large cities, but there is no measure for “both cities are small.” Doing any of these
analyses will require more data.
The analysis is also hampered by the limited data on social and personal
characteristics. Survey questions were limited to improve response rate, which was the
reason for supplementing with city-data.com variables. However, the available data was
also limited.
In the final analysis, the full theory is unconfirmed. Mayors have contact when
they have a focus to encourage that contact –county governments and Area Development
Districts. Certain types of homophily encourage contact further. However, there is still a
lot unknown and further exploration to be done. There is no evidence to support cities
having contact when they have different resource levels. Either cities do not make a habit
of buying support from their neighbors or the behavior is more limited than this analysis
can detect. Whatever is happening between cities in this sample, generalizing is probably
not wise because of the low response rate. Further investigation is needed.
However, the effect of homophily and focus on cooperation are interesting alone,
and interact with the findings of the previous chapters. The final chapter summarizes all
the findings and draws conclusions from all the results.
Copyright © Matthew L Howell 2011
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary
Throughout this dissertation, I have explored the implications of treating cities
like interest groups. The historic research into metropolitan consolidation and
fragmentation, the debate over which is the best way to organize the metropolis, and the
growth of the urban landscape into suburbs can all be better understood by recognizing
cities as being more than just places where people live and get services. They are places
where residents identify with their neighbors, and where residents get to choose what
their services are going to be. Like any other interest group organization, this has effects
beyond ideal forms of efficiency.
I have developed a theory of cities as interest groups and explored the
implications on urban organization and city behavior. I have tested these implications
against data from US cities and a survey of Kentucky mayors and have found:
1.)

Urban organization is slightly different in the metropolis compared to the
rest of the United States

2.)

Both in and out of the metropolis, urban fragmentation is dependent only
on the resources and demographics of the geographic area. City formation
is neither addictive nor tiring.

3.)

Across all cities, fragmentation increases with more resources

4.)

Across all cities, fragmentation increases with more population diversity

5.)

In the MSA, fragmentation is due to political preferences and financial
resources (particularly tax base resources)
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6.)

Out of the MSA, fragmentation is due to political preferences, population
diversity, industry diversity, and financial resources (particularly
intergovernmental revenue from states) –but racial diversity leads to more
consolidation.

7.)

The price of government is more important outside the MSA than inside
the MSA.

8.)

While government fragmentation does not prevent population
concentration within few jurisdictions in the MSA, outside the MSA,
government fragmentation leads to populations spread more evenly across
multiple jurisdictions.

9.)

Many Kentucky Mayors do not have contact with anyone else.

10.)

Kentucky Mayors that to have contacts have contact with each other based
on sharing a social focus (Area Development Districts and Counties)

11.)

Kentucky Mayors do not contact each other due to issue, city or personal
similarity in most cases.

12.)

Differences in resource allocation do not lead to more contact.

These twelve findings suggest some interesting ideas. The rest of the chapter
proceeds in four parts. In part 2, I discuss what the differences between MSA and NonMSA fragmentation might mean. In part 3, I discuss what the evidence from the social
network of mayors can say in light of the fragmentation chapters. In part 4, I discuss the
policy implications, and I conclude in part 5.
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7.2 Conclusions on MSA and Non-MSA Fragmentation
The similarity between MSA and non-MSA fragmentation is important. In both
analyses, more resources and more diversity correlated with more governments all else
equal. This is strong evidence that the same things which influence the proliferation of
interest groups also influence the proliferation of cities. These influences do not change
at the edge of the metropolis. Individuals still prefer organizations which provide a better
fitting service and they are willing to pay more for it. The American people do not have
a preference for fragmentation, they have diverse preferences and this manifests as the
proliferation of different cities. Each city provides the best fit of services and residents it
can. Where resources are scarce, cities have to make do with cheaper, but less well
fitting, services. This does not change at the border of the metropolis. The environment
does, though.
As suggested in Chapter 3, the effect of agglomeration and amenity within the
metropolitan area makes smaller cities easier to produce. The amenity can attract
residents to the metropolitan area and the city only has to provide a few better services to
attract residents to a specific jurisdiction. Residents get the rest of their services and
benefits from the neighboring jurisdictions. This does not work away from the
metropolis. The commute to another amenity is too long.
Outside the metropolis, government is more expensive because it has to provide
more. Governments cannot rely on their neighbors to provide benefits. The more
expensive governments rely more on economies of scale, so they have to be larger. As
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the analysis showed, cost of government was a factor outside the MSA. But why do
social, racial, and economic characteristics matter more for these more expensive nonMSA cities? One possibility is that, inside the MSA where governments are small and
limited, it is possible to support numerous jurisdictions that still share some
characteristics. Where government is cheap, African-Americans can subdivide by
economic class or preference for gardens or something else –similarly to the way
individuals do in social situations (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 1998). Whites can do the
same thing. Increasing the diversity of the population would create some additional
fragmentation, but that effect is swamped by the fragmentation coming from plentiful
resources and cheap government. Outside the MSA, where governments have to be full
service, subdivision is not possible. A more diverse population still needs large
jurisdictions to take advantage of economies of scale. If the population is constant, but
becomes more diverse and there are enough minority residents, they can create a
minority-jurisdiction. However, this takes residents away from the other jurisdictions
which are now too expensive to operate –leading to consolidation. The more diverse the
population becomes, the larger the minority jurisdiction becomes and the more the other
jurisdictions have to consolidate to maintain their economies of scale.
This also explains why additional wealth spreads the population across multiple
jurisdictions outside the MSA. In the MSA, additional wealth makes new small cities
possible around the central city. Outside the MSA, it allows for the creation of fewer
larger full-service jurisdictions. Inside the MSA, the proliferation of small cities does not
shift the balance of the population –most still live in the central city. Outside the MSA,
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the new jurisdiction is closer in size to its neighbors, and so the population balance is
shifted towards more fragmentation.
Another possibility offered by the literature –particularly Teaford’s history of
suburbanization –is that the different behaviors within MSAs and outside MSAs and
between governments and populations is caused by the presence of unincorporated land
outside the MSA. Outside the MSA, living in a rural area under county government is
possible. As such, part of what determines the non-MSA county’s population
fragmentation is how much those residents want cities in the first place. That portion of
the population which wants to move into cities will cause fragmentation simply by not
living in the unincorporated land. In an MSA, they would carve out a new city or take
over an existing one among the many already established. Outside the MSA, the first
people who want to live in a city double the number of jurisdictions.
This would also explain the differences in the annexation laws. Among those
who live in cities, the power to annex nearby territory would be very useful. They could
bring in new land and new residents. This makes forming a new city attractive, and so it
appears in the analysis of general governments. However, for those who want to live
outside of cities, it is horrible. Their non-incorporated homes will be eaten up by the
surrounding cities until it is –hypothetically –gone. Without a way to fend off
annexation, unincorporated residents either lose their jurisdiction, and thus reduce the
population fragmentation, or they pro-actively incorporate. The newly incorporated cities
drive up the number of governments –but it is being driven by large cities annexing new
residents. It also explains why, in those states where unincorporated residents can fight
off annexation either through referenda or lobbying county government, the opposite is
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found. There are fewer general governments because no new cities spring up to fend off
annexation. The population spread across the unincorporated county then increased the
fragmentation of the population. Greater wealth would fit into the explanation because it
allows residents to live further away from the cities even if it is expensive. 59 Wealthy
residents in the MSA can buy a city they share with others. Wealthy residents outside the
MSA can buy a ranch they share with no one. These two possibilities are not mutually
exclusive. It is possible that greater wealth could result both in more people choosing to
live without city services and more urban fragmentation –but fragmentation made of
bigger cities when it happens.
Testing these explanations would require establishing whether there was more
fragmentation in the periphery of an MSA (that is, the cities not including the central
core) or in non-MSAs. It would also require showing that cities within MSAs (again,
excepting the core city) are more specialized and cheaper than cities outside the MSA.
The question of whether rural living is cheaper than urban living would also be an
important component. Since the premise that MSA cities can be more specialized is
based on the ease of commuting, some measure of distance between jurisdictions is
needed to show that non-MSA cities are actually further apart than their MSA
counterparts –either in distance or in time. If MSA cities are more specialized and
smaller due to the value of the central city, than the larger and more valuable the central
city is, then the more fragmented will be the periphery.
Finally, there is something unusual about metropolises relative to other urban
areas. My suggestion is that it is the amenities of the metropolis which can be gained
59

Though whether rural living is actually more expensive than city living is a question not addressed in this
analysis.
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through commuting. This indicates that the governance of a metropolitan area is more
complicated than mere fragmentation alone suggests. Cities in the metropolis can be
small because they rely on their neighbors to specialize. This also means that it is
possible to free-ride. Residents can live in a jurisdiction which provides nothing except a
haven from other jurisdictions, and then get all their services from other cities.

7.3 Conclusions on Fragmentation and Social Focus
Fragmentation stems from the desire of interest groups to maintain autonomy
which is close to their preferences. This also leads to groups avoiding contact with other
groups. Cooperation costs autonomy and competition costs resources. Urban areas are
known to be fragmented, and Kentucky mayors are known to avoid numerous contacts.
Where contact does happen is where it is easy and cheap –at a social focus. When
cooperation is cheap, city leaders are more willing to communicate even when they lack
common goals or resources.
However, similarity among cities or mayors did not generally lead to contact.
Differences lead populations to fragment into multiple jurisdictions, but the remaining
similarities are not adequate to promote communication across cities. This suggests that
cities really do value their autonomy.
Cities value their autonomy enough to be organized around legal authority and
financial resources. When resources are different between cities, they are less likely to
communicate. Either the wealthy do not want to influence their neighbors or the poor do
not want to be beholden to the wealthy. Both indicate that cities prefer to mind their own
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business where possible. It would be interesting to see if this holds across metropolitan
and non-metropolitan areas. Would metropolitan jurisdictions be more willing to interact
with each other? Perhaps the existence of a central city would provide more of a social
focus than the decentralized non-metro areas.

7.4 Policy Conclusions
The evidence presented in this dissertation is broadly supportive of the theory that
cities are like interest groups. They seek niches and autonomy, they may avoid
cooperation and competition when possible, they strive to control resources, and they
must balance the benefits that come from economies of scale against the risk of being
undercut by cheaper or better fitting services provided by another entrepreneur.
States have a good deal of control over how fragmented their local governments
become. Fragmentation depends in part on the availability of resources –including
money and legal authority. Therefore, if a state wishes to consolidate its local
governments it should stop transferring money to them, revoke some of their legal
authority, and generally make local government more expensive. Likewise, if they wish
to support fragmentation, then transfer additional money, provide greater authority, and
subsidize local government.
The power of these state interventions is limited, however, by the population the
state wants to affect. Diverse populations with diverse preferences can only consolidate
to a point before the ill-fitting services outweigh the economies of scale. A more
strategic state might consider looking for relatively homogeneous areas which would

200

make good candidates for consolidation rather than trying to force consolidation
statewide. It might also look at particularly diverse jurisdictions as places to allow more
fragmentation or flexibility.
Affecting urban organization is also limited by the power of amenities. If it is
true that valuable amenities in central cities allow smaller suburbs, and that
agglomeration is a valuable amenity, then trying to consolidate metropolitan areas is
ultimately self-defeating. The more agglomerated the central city, the more fragmented
the periphery. Attempts to consolidate the center of a metropolitan area will only push
the fragmentation further away from the core. This effect would be complicated by the
county boundaries, annexation rules, and residents fleeing into unincorporated land.
Consolidation is possible, but it is very difficult.
The governance of the metropolitan area is also more complicated than it first
appears. There are many groups which must be attended to. They all have diverse
preferences, but they also share the desire to maintain the amenity which anchors the
metropolis. Maintaining the metropolis requires effort and resources, and gives the
constituent jurisdictions reasons to prevent free-riding. Finding ways to ensure that every
jurisdiction in a metropolis contributes something to the maintenance of the area would
be an alternative to consolidation which allows autonomy. Research into this field would
be particularly useful to metropolises.
Finally, if it is not possible to force full consolidation, and metropolises need to be
governed cooperatively, then communication has to be encouraged across metropolises.
The same is true of non-metropolitan urban areas. However, cities cannot be forced to
communicate and they still value autonomy. The best policy solution is not to hope city
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officials call one another, or just throw them all in a room. They need a focus.
Communication could be improved far more with a monthly breakfast to discuss
infrastructure projects (Thurmaier and Wood, 2010) than with a list of cities concerned
with the same issues.

7.5 Conclusion
For decades, scholars have argued about the best ways to organize urban areas,
but the source of urban organization has largely been ignored. In this dissertation, I have
described a theory which can explain the pattern of urban organization in metropolitan
and non-metropolitan areas. Cities are a form of interest group, concerned with
maintaining a niche of homogeneous preferences and controlling the resources necessary
to maintain the city. I have tested that theory against data from American counties and
Metropolitan Statistical Areas and the theory is supported by the evidence. There is still
much more to learn, and further implications of this theory to explore.

© Matthew L Howell 2011
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Appendix 1: Crosswalk for Converting 2-digit NAICS Code to SIC Divisions
SIC Division

NAICS Category

SIC Range

A Agriculture
B Mining
C Construction
D Manufacturing

11 Agriculture
21 Mining
23 Construction
31-34 Manufacturing
511 Information:
Publishing
48-49 Transportation
and Warehousing
513 Information:
Broadcasting
562 Administrative
and Support: Waste
42 Wholesale Trade

01-09
10-14
15-17
20-23

Anomalies Within
Category
Landscaping and Veterinary
services
Geophysical Mapping
Remediation Services
None noted

27

Prepackaged Software

40-45

Tourism, Shipbuilding, FAA

48

52-59

58

Transportation

60-67

None noted

60-67

General Warehousing

67

None noted

78-89

Recordings and Sheet Music

73-89

None noted

73-79
73-89

Boat and Railroad rental
Titling, Surveying,
Landscaping, and Veterinary

73-89

Travel Agents and Sanitation

72-87
80-83

None noted
Ambulances, Airlifts

79-84

Dinner Theaters, Stadiums,
Marinas

I Services

44-45 Retail Trade
722 Accommodations
and Food Service:
Food
52 Finance and
Insurance
531/3 Real Estate
and Rental
55 Managerial
Services
512 Information:
Motion Picture and
Sound
514 Information: Data
Processing
532 Real Estate and
Rental: Rental
54 Professional
Services
561 Administrative
and Support: Office
61 Education
Services
62 Health Services
71 Arts,
Entertainment,
Recreation
721 Accommodations
and Food Service:
Hotels

None noted
Repair Services and
Contractors
Some service industry
Repair Services, some
wholesalers

I Services
J Public Services

81 Other Services
92 Public Services

75-89
90+

D Manufacturing
E Transportation, Utilities,
and Communication
E Transportation, Utilities,
and Communication
E Transportation, Utilities,
and Communication
F Wholesale Trade
G Retail Trade

G Retail Trade
H Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate
H Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate
H Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate

I Services
I Services
I Services
I Services
I Services
I Services
I Services

I Services
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42-49
50-51

70

None noted
Education, Religion,
Cemeteries, and Real Estate
Indian Affairs

Appendix 2: Contact Letter and Survey Instrument for Survey of Kentucky Mayors

1 September 2011

Dear Mayor (mayor’s name);

My name is Matthew Howell, and I am writing my dissertation on local government organization
in the Martin School of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Kentucky. Many
local governments serve their residents by building relationships with other local governments.
Some cities coordinate their city functions like urban planning or public safety services, while
other cities maintain social, business, and community ties. For residents and officials, local
government is a network of governments.
However, this facet of local government is still poorly understood. In conjunction with the
Kentucky League of Cities, we would like your help in better understanding how these
government networks form by answering a short survey about yourself, your city, and the other
mayors you interact with. This data will help improve our understanding of local government,
but it will also help the Kentucky League of Cities (KLC) serve you better by showing the network
of local governments –which can be used to plan trainings, events, seminars, and other services
and support.
If you are willing to help build our knowledge of Kentucky local government, please answer the
questions by October 7th at:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/KYmayors
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If you cannot fill out the survey online, I can mail you a hard copy, or you will be able to add
your experience to the database at the KLC Conference and Expo in Lexington on October 4-7. A
hyperlink will also be in the KLC Direct Line e-newsletter.
Your information cannot be made anonymous or confidential. The data will be made available
on the web through KLC, allowing you to see the whole network and your place in it. The final
report will also be available through KLC, or via my contact information below. If you have any
questions, do not hesitate to call or e-mail me.
Thank you for helping us improve our knowledge of local government and improve the Kentucky
League of Cities’ service to you.
Sincerely,

Matthew L Howell
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
University of Kentucky
mlhowe2@g.uky.edu
(859)-327-1221
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Consent to Participate in
A
Survey of the Social Network of Kentucky Mayors
And
Select Antecedent Relationships that Support the Network
Principal Investigator: Matthew Howell
Martin School of Public Policy
University of Kentucky

Thank you for helping us learn more about the social network of Kentucky Mayors. This
survey will ask you about your city’s policy issues, which other mayors you interact with, and
some questions about you. I hope to learn from your answers how Kentucky Mayors are
connected to each other, and what leads to these relationships.
The principal investigator for this study is Matthew Howell, a PhD candidate in the
Martin School at the University of Kentucky. Assisting in this is Edward Jennings, PhD, a faculty
member and the dissertation advisor for this project. You may contact Matthew at any time
with questions about the study, or you may contact the UK Office of Research Integrity with
questions about how we treat your data.
Matthew L Howell, Martin School

Helene Lake-Bullock, ORI

mlhwe2@g.uky.edu

helene.lake-bullock@uky.edu

(859) 327-1221

(859) 257-5943

Before beginning, you should know that network surveys cannot be confidential, and
the data from this survey will be available on the web. This will allow you and other to see your
position in the network of mayors. Even removing your name from the data, your city and
location could still be determined. If you do not wish to participate in this survey, do not
continue. Participation in this survey is up to you and no one will be mad if you choose not to
participate or later decide to opt out. You can quit the survey at any time.
Continuing to the survey means that you have read this page or had it read to you and
you want to be in the study. You agree that you have been told about this study and why it is
being done and what to do. It should take 15-30 minutes at the longest, depending on how
many contacts you have.
Thank you again for your help.
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Consent to Participate in
A
Survey of the Social Network of Kentucky Mayors
And
Select Antecedent Relationships that Support the Network
Principal Investigator: Matthew Howell
Martin School of Public Policy
University of Kentucky
Thank you for helping us learn more about the social network of Kentucky Mayors. This
survey will ask you about your city’s policy issues, which other mayors you interact with, and
some questions about you. I hope to learn from your answers how Kentucky Mayors are
connected to each other, and what leads to these relationships.
The principal investigator for this study is Matthew Howell, a PhD candidate in the
Martin School at the University of Kentucky. Assisting in this is Edward Jennings, PhD, a faculty
member and the dissertation advisor for this project. You may contact Matthew at any time
with questions about the study, or you may contact the UK Office of Research Integrity with
questions about how we treat your data.
Matthew L Howell, Martin School

Helene Lake-Bullock, ORI

mlhwe2@g.uky.edu

helene.lake-bullock@uky.edu

(859) 327-1221

(859) 257-5943

Before beginning, you should know that network surveys cannot be confidential, and
the data from this survey will be available on the web. This will allow you and other to see your
position in the network of mayors. Even removing your name from the data, your city and
location could still be determined. If you do not wish to participate in this survey, do not
continue. Participation in this survey is up to you and no one will be mad if you choose not to
participate or later decide to opt out. You can quit the survey at any time, and skip any
questions you choose.
If you wish to take this survey, please sign and print your name on the lines below and
return it with your survey. This signifies that you have been told about this study, why it is being
done, and what to do. It should take 15-30 minutes at the longest to complete, depending on
how many contacts you have.
Thank you again for your help.

_____________________________

______

Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

_____________________________________

date

_________________________________

Signature of authorized person obtaining informed consent & date
part in this study
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Printed name of person agreeing to take

Survey of the Social Network of Kentucky Mayors

Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. Your cooperation will help
expand the knowledge of how local governments can better serve their residents, and improve
the ability of organizations such as the Kentucky League of Cities to support local governments.
Thank you again for your help.

Before beginning select your name and city from the list.

1. What are three major issues that you consider most prominent in your city?
1) Purchasing and Inventory
2) Balanced Budget
3) Taxes
4) Recession Response
5) Public Safety
6) Economic Development
7) Collective Bargaining
8) Street Construction and Civic Engineering
9) Sewage and Solid Waste Disposal
10) Civic Event Management
11) State or Federal Grant Applications
12) Zoning and Land Development
13) Developing relationships with other governments
14) Strategic Planning
15) Other
2. Which three of these groups or people are most prominent in your city?
1) Local Development Corporations
2) County Government
3) Chamber of Commerce
4) Local Utilities
5) Neighborhood Associations
6) Special Districts
7) Private Industry Council
8) Individual Businessmen
9) Church Committees or Leaders
10) Racial, Cultural, or Ethnic civic leaders
11) Civic Organizations (Rotary, Lions, et cetera)
12) Other
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3. What Kentucky mayors and their cities do you personally interact with as mayor for
official reason?
4. What non-Kentucky cities do you personally interact with as mayor for official reasons?
Please answer some questions about yourself:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Age
What was your profession before you got into politics?
What office, if any, did you hold before running for mayor?
How long have you been mayor?
Sex/Gender
Race/Ethnicity
Where did you receive your last degree? In what year?
What opportunities do you take to network?

This information is very useful to understanding how mayors choose to interact with each other.
Equally helpful, though, are the details of your work, which can provide special information not
picked up in surveys, such as what type of relationships you have and how important you
consider them. Would you be willing to talk about your city and your relationship with other
mayors in a follow-up interview?
No
Yes

Would you like to receive a copy of this report at its conclusion?
No
Yes
What is your contact information?

Finally, what are some opportunities that you would like to see the Kentucky League of Cities
offer to better help you communicate with your fellow mayors and cities? Particularly, are there
internet devices like mailing lists, social networking software, or apps that you would like to
see?
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